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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BRUNO DfASTON, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
DOROTHY D'ASTON, et al., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No, 
APPELLEES PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court of Appeals1 decision conflict with prior 
Utah cases in holding that a postnuptial property agreement binds 
a divorce court absent unique and compelling circumstances? 
2. Did the Court of Appeals disregard its own opinion by 
granting appellant relief while she was still in contempt of the 
trial court and had not complied with the trial court's orders? 
3. Did the Court of Appeals unfairly limit the discretion 
of the trial court on remand by ruling on factual issues which were 
disputed and not decided by the trial court? 
OPINIONS OF COURT OF APPEALS 
Two opinions were issued by the Court of Appeals. The most 
recent, and the one challenged by the instant petition is D'Aston 
v. D'Aston, 794 P.2d 500, 136 Utah Adv. Rep. 47 (Ct. App. 1990). 
A copy of that opinion ("D'Aston II11) appears in Appendix "B". 
An earlier opinion of the Court of Appeals addressed whether 
the court should consider the appeal while the defendant was in 
contempt. DfAston v. DfAston, 790 P.2d 590, 132 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 
(Ct. App. 1990) ("D'Aston I", copy in Appendix "A"). 
JURISDICTION 
The opinion to be reviewed (D'Aston II) was entered June 14, 
1990. Upon motion of Bruno D'Aston ("Husband"), the Court of 
Appeals extended the time for filing a petition for rehearing 
through July 12, 1990, and Husband filed a petition on that date.1 
The Petition for Rehearing was denied by Order entered August 29, 
1990, and an Amended Order Denying Petition for Rehearing filed 
August 30, 1990. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1990) and § 78-2a-4 (1987). 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
Bruno D'Aston is not aware of any controlling constitutional 
provisions, statutes, ordinances, or regulations. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is an action for divorce. The 
complaint also named the parties1 two adult children as defendants 
and sought an order compelling the defendant wife and the children 
to return to the plaintiff husband certain personal property 
alleged to have been stolen from the husband. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. Plaintiff 
("Husband") filed his complaint for divorce against defendant 
xThe order of the Court of Appeals denying the Petition for 
Rehearing states that the Petition was filed July 16, 1990. A copy 
of the Petition was lodged with the Court of Appeals on July 12, 
but it did not comply with the applicable rules for format. The 
Court of Appeals granted a five-day extension to correct the 
defect. A corrected Petition was filed July 16, 1990. 
("Wife") on May 2, 1986. The complaint also named the two adult 
children of the parties as defendants and sought an order compel-
ling Wife and the children to return certain personal property 
alleged to have been stolen from Husband. (R. 1-5.) Wife answered 
and filed a counterclaim for divorce and also sought an award of 
alimony. (R. 29-33.) At Husband's request, the trial court 
ordered Wife to pay Husband the sum of $2,500.00 per month as 
support during the pendency of the action. (R. 244-45.) 
The case came on for trial on April 18-21, 1988. (R. 307-32.) 
The trial court filed a Memorandum Decision on November 17, 1988 
(R. 440-53), and filed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 
454-66) and a Decree of Divorce (R. 467-538) on December 15, 1988. 
Wife served a Motion to Amend Judgment or Grant a New Trial 
on December 22, 1988. (R. 541-42.) The court denied the motion 
by ruling entered on January 10, 1989. (R. 556.) A formal Order 
Denying Defendant Dorothy D'Aston's Rule 59 Motion was entered on 
January 12, 1989. (R. 562-63.) Wife filed her Notice of Appeal 
on January 23, 1989. (R. 579-80.) 
Subsequent to the filing of the Notice of Appeal, Husband 
proceeded on his claim against defendant Eric Aston. An Order and 
Decree substantially in favor of Husband was entered on March 9, 
1990. Eric Aston subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal (Case No. 
900223-CA), and Husband filed a Notice of Cross Appeal (Case No. 
900281-CA). The appeal and crops appeal were consolidated under 
Case No. 900223-CA by Order entered June 1, 1990. 
During the pendency of the instant appeal, the trial court 
found Wife in contempt of court by reason of her failure to comply 
with certain provisions of the Decree of Divorce. Husband moved 
to dismiss Wife's appeal because of Wife's contempt of court and 
avoidance of process. The Court of Appeals preliminarily denied 
the motion and indicated that it would be heard in conjunction with 
arguments on the merits. 
Following oral arguments and on April 9, 1990, the Court of 
Appeals held that the appeal would be dismissed unless Wife 
submitted herself to the process of the trial court and offered 
security to protect the judgment pending appeal. D1Aston v. 
D'Aston, 790 P.2d 590 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("D'Aston I"). 
On May 4, 1990, Wife filed a Notice of Appearance with the 
Court of Appeals. (A copy appears in Appendix "F.") The Court of 
Appeals thereafter entered a second opinion addressing the merits 
of the appeal and reversing the trial court. D'Aston v. D'Aston, 
794 P.2d 500 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("D'Aston II"). 
The Notice of Appearance filed by Wife noted that she remained 
in contempt of the trial court. On May 22, 1990, the trial court 
entered an Order (copy attached as Appendix "G"), giving Wife until 
June 22, 1990, to purge herself of the contempt by depositing with 
the court the money which she had previously and incorrectly 
represented to the trial court was in a safety deposit box. Wife 
remained in contempt of court at the time the opinion of the Court 
of Appeals was issued on June 14, 1990, and continues to remain in 
contempt of the trial court. 
C. Statement of Facts. Bruno D'Aston ("Husband") and 
Dorothy D'Aston ("Wife") were married on September 22, 1953, and 
remained married until the time of this divorce action. Husband 
owned separate property prior to the marriage, consisting generally 
of a coin and stamp collection valued by Husband at $567,700.00, 
and other valuable items. (R. 686-87; Ex. 8, copy attached to 
Decree in Appendix "C") Wife disputed the testimony and asserted 
that the assets owned by Husband at the time of their marriage 
consisted of $5,000.00 in cash and a 1952 Oldsmobile. (R. 1402.) 
During the course of the marriage the parties acquired 
substantial property. The property in general consisted of a 
business real property in City of Industry, California, a residence 
(Skyline Drive property) in Hacienda Heights, California, and 
personal property including cash and bank accounts. (R. 687-91.) 
In March, 1983, Husband and Wife executed a document entitled 
"Agreement." (Ex. 21.) Husband testified the document was 
suggested by his attorney who was also vice president of Husband's 
corporation. Husband testified they were threatened with two 
lawsuits and the attorney suggested that they (Husband and Wife) 
put the factory building and the Skyline property (the valuable 
home) in Wife's name so the creditors would have a difficult time 
to attach it if the lawsuits came to fruition. (R. 754.) Husband 
testified that in a discussion with Wife he told her that they put 
the property in her name in case something happened with the 
lawsuit that was threatened, and that Wife agreed to it. (R. 755, 
835.) Wife testified that Husband did not tell her anything about 
pending lawsuits or threats of lawsuits. (R. 1413.) 
Husband testified that after the signing of the document there 
was no change in the handling of their financial affairs. He 
testified that Wife handled the money and wrote the checks as she 
had always done before the 1973 agreement, and continued the same 
way from the early 1960's until April 30, 1986. (R. 1586-87.) 
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The property given to Wife under the agreement was predomi-
nantly the business property, the residence, and cash and bank 
accounts. The business property was subsequently liquidated for 
approximately $1,000,000.00. (R. 756, 852.) In March, 1982, the 
residence property was sold for $1,250,000.00. The proceeds from 
the sale included a promissory note secured by a trust deed on the 
property in the sum of $687,788.42. (R. 713-14; Ex. 133.) 
In the latter part of April, 1986, Husband returned home from 
a coin show in Bellevue, Washington. At this time, the parties' 
property consisted predominately of valuable coins owned by 
Husband, and cash and real property in Wife's name. (R. 719-20; Ex. 
20.) Husband had with him certain coins he had on consignment, as 
well as coins of his own. These coins he kept in three cases in 
his vehicle. All three cases were chained and locked. (R. 723-24.) 
Husband testified that on April 30, 1986, after he had 
returned from the coin show, Wife invited him to share coffee with 
her. While Wife was thus occupying Husband, their son, Eric Aston, 
broke into Husband's vehicle and removed hundreds of thousands of 
dollars worth of coins and other valuable assets. Eric then 
returned and stated to his father, in the presence of his mother, 
that he, Eric, had removed the coins because "we" could no longer 
trust Bruno D'Aston. (R. 725.) The items stolen included nearly 
all of the assets conveyed to Husband under the 1973 agreement. 
Both Eric Aston and Wife defied they took the coins or that they 
had possession of them at the time of trial. (R. 1001-06.) 
At the hearing on Husband's request for a temporary alimony 
allowance, Husband testified that Wife was receiving $6,300.00 per 
month interest payment on the note from the sale of the California 
house. (R. 609.) Wife testified and said nothing concerning the 
payments being received from the note. The trial court ordered 
Wife to pay Husband $2,500.00 per month out of the $6,304.73 that 
she received each month. (R. 658.) In fact, prior to January, 
1988, Wife had discounted the note and received cash in the sum of 
$633,000.00. (R. 1500, Ex. 144.) She was at all times under an 
order not to dispose of any property. (R. 54-56.) 
At the trial, Husband testified that his income was only 
$438.00 per month from Social Security, and that Wife had posses-
sion of all the parties1 assets except the motor home Husband lived 
in and the Volkswagen he drove. (R. 758-60.) Wife testified that 
she had on hand, remaining from the $633,000.00, $300,000.00 cash 
in a safety deposit box in Far West Bank, $34,000.00 in savings in 
Far West Bank, $26,000.00 in checking at Far West Bank, and 
$75,000.00 cash in a safe at home. (R. 1501-03.) She testified she 
had purchased $86,700.00 in diamonds and $7,600.00 in silver 
bullion, and that she had spent over $100,000.00 for living 
expenses from September, 1987, through April, 1988. (R. 1503-04.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
DfAston I required Wife to submit to the jurisdiction of the 
trial court and provide security for payment of the judgment 
against her, or her appeal would be dismissed. Wife failed to 
fully comply with that directive. DfAston II was issued while Wife 
remained in contempt of the trial court. The Court of Appeals 
failed to enforce its own order. Wife failed to satisfy the 
requirements of D'Aston I, and her appeal should be dismissed. 
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In addressing the merits of the appeal in D1 Aston II, the 
court held the postnuptial property agreement of the parties to be 
binding on the trial court absent "unique and compelling cir-
cumstances.11 This test is not supported by Utah authority. It 
conflicts with prior decisions of this Court which hold that 
"compelling circumstances" are required to modify a property 
settlement agreement which has been incorporated in a decree of 
divorce, but that a predivorce property settlement agreement may 
be modified by a trial court to achieve fairness and equity. 
Review by writ of certiorari is necessary to correct this decision. 
Finally, the opinion in D1 Aston II extends too far. The 
evidence would support a finding of "unique and compelling cir-
cumstances." The trial court made no finding on the evidence 
because the trial court's ruling on the property agreement made 
such findings unnecessary. D1Aston II can be read as precluding 
the trial court from now making findings on those issues and 
fashioning an equitable decree accordingly. D'Aston II should be 
limited to only holding that the 1973 property agreement was 
binding between the parties. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO REQUIRE 
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS OWN ORDER. 
In DfAston v. D'Aston, 790 P.2d 590, 594 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
("D'Aston I'M , the court required Wife to "submit herself to the 
jurisdiction of the trial court and satisfy that court's concerns 
before she may exercise that right [to appeal]." 790 P.2d at 594. 
Q 
Wife failed to comply with that requirement. The Court of Appeals 
nonetheless granted her the relief she requested on appeal. 
Husband called Wife's non-compliance to the attention of the Court 
of Appeals by filing a petition for rehearing. The Court of 
Appeals denied the petition without opinion. 
Wife asserted in her Response to Petition for Rehearing that 
her mere appearance before the trial court constituted full 
compliance with the Court of Appeals' order. The order was not so 
limited. Wife was required to submit herself to the trial court's 
jurisdiction and "satisfy that court's concerns" before receiving 
the benefits of her right to appeal. She had "the obligation to 
come forward and offer a reasonable alternative to the trial court 
to safeguard her assets from dissipation pending her appeal." Id. 
D'Aston I clearly requires Wife to do more than merely appear 
in court. The censured conduct was not merely her avoidance of 
process, but included her demonstration that she was "unwilling to 
respond to a court order with which [s]he disagrees," but which she 
sought to challenge on appeal. 790 P.2d at 595 (quoting Tobin v. 
Casaus, 128 Cal. App. 2d 588, 275 P.2d 792, 795 (1954)). The Court 
of Appeals accordingly required that she "submit" to, i.e., comply 
with, the jurisdiction of the trial court and its orders: 
We therefore hold that appellant has 30 days 
from the date of the issuance of this opinion 
to bring herself within the process of the 
trial court. If appellant submits herself to 
the tria1 court, she should be allowed an 
opportunity to offer alternatives to the trial 
court to protect the judgment. Appellant may 
persuade the court it should hold the disputed 
judgment amount in trust until a resolution of 
this appeal on the merits. However, if appel-
lant persists in secreting herself in violation 
of the trial court's orders, her appeal will 
Q 
be dismissed at the expiration of the 30-day 
period. 
590 P.2d at 595 (emphasis added). 
The transcript of the hearing before the trial court (copy 
attached as Appendix "E") clearly show that Wife did not satisfy 
the trial court's concerns nor fully "submit" to its orders and 
process. She not only failed to pay the money into court or a 
trust account, but she either spent the money or gave it away. 
(See Transcript of hearing May 4, 1990, at pages 4, 11-14.) The 
trial court viewed her trial testimony concerning the money to be 
"a flat out lie to this court." (Id. at page 19.) The trial court 
granted her yet additional time to pay the money into court, but 
expressly stated that she was still in contempt and "in deep 
trouble" as far as the trial court was concerned. (Id. at page 5.) 
Although she did appear at a hearing, she remained in contempt 
of the trial court. Wife may and should be punished for her 
contempt even if the disobeyed order may be incorrect. See In re 
Contempt of Reeves, 112 Idaho 574, 733 P.2d 795 (Ct. App. 1987). 
Wife failed to "satisfy" the trial court's concerns within the 
time frame previously set by this Court. The Court of Appeals 
failed to follow its own order. D'Aston II should be vacated and 
the appeal dismissed as required by D1Aston I. 
POINT II 
THE "UNIQUE AND COMPELLING CIRCUMSTANCES" T^ST 
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY AND CONFLICTS WITH 
PRIOR DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AND 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT. 
D'Aston II held the 1973 property agreement binding on the 
parties, and rejected Husband's argument that the trial court 
i n 
should be afforded discretion to divide the parties1 property as 
equity required notwithstanding the terms of the agreement. The 
court held that "unique and compelling circumstances" must exist 
to justify varying from a postnuptial agreement, and held that the 
record did not disclose such compelling circumstances. D'Aston II, 
794 P.2d at 504 n. 6. The argument below demonstrates that the 
"unique and compelling circumstances" test is not supported by and 
conflicts with prior decisions of this Court and the Court of 
Appeals. Point III of this Petition establishes that "unique and 
compelling circumstances" do exist in this case. 
Footnote 6 of the opinion in DfAston II states, in part: 
Husband argues on appeal that even if we 
find the trial court erred when it found the 
1973 agreement was not intended to apply in the 
event of a divorce, the error was harmless 
because of the broad equitable powers trial 
courts possess in domestic matters. See Colman 
v. Colman, 743 P. 2d 782, 789 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) . However, even if a trial court has the 
equitable power to disregard an otherwise 
enforceable postnuptial property settlement 
agreement and to distribute the separate 
property of the spouses, the circumstances must 
be unique and compelling to justify the ap-
plication of such an exception. The trial 
court made no findings to delineate what it 
found as compelling circumstances to justify 
such an action and we find none. 
DfAston II. 794 P.2d at 504 n. 6. 
The court gives no supporting authority for this "unique and 
compelling circumstances" test. Prior decisions of this Court and 
the Court of Appeals have applied a "compelling circumstances" test 
only to modification of the property division in a final divorce 
decree. Much less stringent tests apply to prenuptial agreements, 
or postnuptial agreements made in contemplation of divorce. 
DfAston II conflict with these decisions. 
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A "compelling circumstances" test has been adopted by this 
Court as applicable to modifications of a property settlement 
agreement which has been sanctioned by a court and incorporated in 
a divorce decree. Foulger v. Foulger, 62 6 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 
1981), Despain v. Despain, 610 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Utah 1980); Land 
v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248, 1251 (Utah 1980). 
A completely different test applies to modification of a 
property settlement agreement not yet sanctioned by the court. In 
Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), the court 
considered the effect to be given a property settlement agreement 
executed in contemplation of a divorce. The court held as follows: 
[I]t is well recognized that a parties1 stipu-
lation as to property rights in a divorce 
action, although advisory and usually followed 
unless the court finds it to be unfair or 
unreasonable, is not necessarily binding on the 
trial court. It is only a recommendation to 
be adhered to if the court believes it to be 
fair and reasonable. 
743 P.2d at 789 (citing Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080, 1082 
(Utah 1987); Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah 1975)). 
The opinion in Colman does not state whether the property 
settlement agreement was executed prior to the commencement of the 
divorce action or during the pendency of the divorce proceedings. 
The distinction does not appear critical to that decision. 
In the instant action, in contrast, the Court of Appeals held 
that if a property settlement agreement is executed at some un-
specified earlier time, at a time when the parties are not im-
mediately contemplating divorce but at a time when divorce is 
certainly foreseeable, the agreement becomes not merely advisory 
if "fair and reasonable," but conclusively binding unless "unique 
i o 
and compelling" circumstances exist. The Court of Appeals does not 
cite to any prior case law establishing such a distinction, and 
Husband is not aware of any. 
Husband respectfully submits that no logical basis exists for 
giving greater effect to a postnuptial agreement (whether executed 
one year or twenty years before the divorce) than to a predivorce 
property settlement agreement. Logic dictates that the predivorce 
(postnuptial) agreement be given less weight, not greater. A 
predivorce agreement is enforced within a short period of time 
after execution. There is little likelihood that the parties1 
circumstances will change prior to the time the agreement is 
enforced. The postnuptial agreement in this case, in contrast, was 
executed nearly fifteen years before enforcement was sought. There 
had been a vast and material change in circumstances subsequent to 
the execution of the agreement. Husband respectfully submits that 
there is no legal or logical reason for giving greater effect to 
a contract which was executed with less knowledge.2 
Alternatively, this Court should adopt the standards for 
enforcement of a prenuptial (or postnuptial) agreement as set forth 
in Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044 (Alaska 1987). The court held 
that the following three criteria are generally considered in 
determining whether to enforce such an agreement: 
1. Was the agreement obtained through fraud, 
duress or mistake, or misrepresentation or nondisclosure 
of material fact? 
2. Was the agreement unconscionable when executed? 
3. Have the facts and circumstances changed since 
the agreement was executed, so as to make its enforcement 
unfair and unreasonable? 
Brooks, 733 P.2d at 1049 (citing Scherer v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 635, 
292 S.E.2d 662, 666 (1982)). The "unfair and unreasonable" test 
in the third factor is identical to that applied to property 
settlement agreements by Utah courts. Colman, 743 P.2d at 789. 
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It is important to emphasize that Husband does not dispute, 
for purposes of this Point, that the 1973 agreement mandates that 
the trial court treat the designated properties as separate 
property. Once the property is properly labeled as either separate 
or marital, however, the trial court in dividing the property 
should be granted a latitude of discretion equal or greater to that 
applicable when dealing with a property settlement agreement. 
Once it is determined that the property is separate, the trial 
court must consider several factors in determining whether it 
should be divided. Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987). 
The trial court did not have any reason to make findings on those 
factors in this case, because it had already determined that the 
1973 agreement was not enforceable and that all the property was 
marital property. The trial court should be permitted on remand 
to exercise its discretion, in accordance with the principles set 
forth above, to divide the separate property if equity so requires. 
POINT III 
EVIDENCE OF UNIQUE AND COMPELLING CIRCUMSTANCES 
EXISTS WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY THE TRIAL COURT 
IN DIVIDING THE SEPARATE PROPERTY. 
Husband testified that on April 30, 1986, after he had 
returned from a coin show in the State of Washington, Wife invited 
him to share coffee with her. While Wife thus occupied him, their 
son, Eric Aston, broke into Husband's vehicle and removed hundreds 
of thousands of dollars worth of coins and other valuable assets. 
Eric then returned and stated to Husband, in Wife's presence, that 
he, Eric, had removed the coins because "we" could no longer trust 
1 A 
Husband. (R. 725.) The items stolen included nearly all of the 
assets conveyed to Husband under the 1973 agreement. 
Wife and Eric disputed Husband's testimony. The trial court 
determined that it was not necessary to resolve the dispute because 
the trial court held that the 1973 agreement was not enforceable 
in any event. The Court of Appeals disagreed and held the 1973 
agreement to be enforceable. The Court of Appeals held that 
postnuptial agreements are enforceable unless "unique and compel-
ling circumstances" exist to justify varying from the agreement. 
The court did not define what would constitute "unique and compel-
ling circumstances," but stated in footnote that "[t]he trial court 
made no findings to delineate what it found as compelling cir-
cumstances to justify such an action and we find none." 794 P.2d 
at 504 n. 6. 
Point II above shows that the "unique and compelling cir-
cumstances" test is not proper. Even if that test applies, 
however, unique and compelling circumstances exist in this case. 
In Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988), for example, the 
Court held that the trial court properly awarded a portion of the 
husband's separate property to the wife where the wife had no 
income or assets and where her present financial needs were the 
result of the husband's tortious conduct. The Court of Appeals 
asserts that Noble is distinguishable because it did not involve 
a prenuptial or postnuptial agreement. The critical issue, 
however, is that the standard applied in Noble is the same as the 
Court of Appeals has previously held applies where a property 
settlement agreement has been made. The Court in Noble held: 
[T]here is no per se ban on awarding one spouse 
a portion of the premarital assets of another. 
15 
In fact, our cases have consistently held that 
under appropriate circumstances, achieving a 
fair, just, and equitable result may require 
that the trial court exercise its discretion 
to award one spouse the premarital property of 
the other. 
761 P.2d at 1373 (citations omitted). 
This language is remarkably similar to that in Colman v. 
Colman, 743 P.2d 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), a case which did involve 
a postnuptial agreement (although executed in contemplation of 
divorce): 
[I]t is well recognized that a parties' stipu-
lation as to property rights in a divorce 
action, although advisory and usually followed 
unless the court finds it to be unfair or 
unreasonable, is not necessarily binding on the 
trial court. It is only a recommendation to 
be adhered to if the court believes it to be 
fair and reasonable. 
743 P.2d at 789 (citations omitted). 
Theft must certainly be considered to be a compelling circum-
stance. Evidence exists which would support a finding that Wife 
stole the coins from Husband. Although the location of the coins 
was not known at the time this case was tried,3 some of the coins 
have subsequently been discovered in Eric Aston's possession. (See 
Appendix "I".) This corroborates Husband's testimony that Eric and 
Dorothy D1Aston conspired to steal the coins from Husband. 
The Court of Appeals' holding leaves Husband without an 
effective remedy. Wife assisted in the theft of all of the assets 
conveyed to Husband under the 1973 agreeront, but the Court of 
3The trial court held that if the coins were later found in 
the possession of either party, that party would be considered in 
contempt of court and punished. (R. 471.) 
Appeals nonetheless prohibits the trial court from allowing Husband 
a share in the assets Wife received under the 1973 agreement. 
The trial court should be granted discretion to make whatever 
orders are necessary and just in this case. The Court of Appeals 
having held that the trial court was in error in its interpretation 
of the 1973 agreement, this Court should now remand the case to the 
trial court to make whatever decree is just and appropriate under 
the circumstances of the case, yet in harmony with the Court of 
Appeals' interpretation of the agreement. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING 
THAT THE 1973 AGREEMENT OPERATED 
TO BIND THE DIVORCE COURT. 
Husband does not, for the purposes of this Petition for 
Certiorari, contest the holding in DfAston II that the parties 
intended the 1973 agreement to be binding, and that the agreement 
was unambiguous. Husband respectfully submits, however, that the 
Court of Appeals has misinterpreted the agreement. The critical 
portion of the agreement (copy in Appendix "H") states as follows: 
3. Hereafter, and until this agreement 
is modified in writing attached hereto, all 
property, real, personal and mixed, acquired 
by either party in his or her sole name, from 
whatever source derived and wherever situated, 
shall be the sole and separate property of such 
person, notwithstanding any law, statute, or 
court decision giving presumptive effect to the 
status of marriage; and such property shall be 
free of all claims, demand [sic] or liens of 
the other, direct or indirect, and however 
derived. 
Defendant's Exhibit 37 (emphasis added). 
DfAston II held that the emphasized portion clearly indicated 
an intent that the agreement be binding and conclusive on any 
i n 
divorce court. 794 P.2d at 504. The agreement does not, however, 
state that it is binding on all court decisions. It is only 
intended to prevent a court decisions "giving presumptive effect 
to the status of marriage." In other words, the agreement prohib-
its the court from presuming, solely by reason of the marriage, 
that the property was community or marital property. The agreement 
only determines the status of the property as separate. 
This argument is supported by Parkhurst v. Gibson, 573 A.2d 
454 (N.H. 1990). The prenuptial agreement at issue in that case 
stated, among other things, that "[i]t is mutually declared that 
it is the intention of the parties to this agreement that by virtue 
of their prospective marriage neither one shall have nor acquire 
any right, title or claim in and to the real or personal estate of 
the other party . . . ." 573 A.2d at 456. The agreement did not 
however, specifically use the words "divorce," "alimony," or 
"property settlement," but appeared to be directed at determining 
the status of the parties1 property for inheritance purposes. The 
subject agreement in this case similarly does not specifically 
refer to divorce or to a property settlement in divorce, and should 
be read as only determining the status of the property as separate. 
Husband does not contest, for the purposes of this Petition 
for Rehearing, that the 1973 agreement conclusively establishes the 
status of the property as separate. In Utah, the general rule is 
that "in appropriate circumstances, equity will require that each 
party retain the separate property brought to the marriage." Burke 
v. Burke. 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987). By designating the 
property as separate, therefore, the 1973 agreement created a 
presumption that the property would remain the property of Wife. 
The trial court must treat the property as separate property. As 
with any separate property, however, the court can order one party 
to convey portions of his or her separate property to the other in 
order to achieve equity under the circumstances of the case. Id. 
Although the agreement mandates that the property be dealt with by 
a divorce court as separate property, nothing in the agreement can 
be read as prohibiting the divorce court from otherwise treating 
the property the same as any other separate property. 
CONCLUSION 
D1Aston II should be vacated and the appeal dismissed as 
required by D'Aston I and for the reason that Wife has been and 
remains in contempt of the orders of the trial court. A person who 
is openly contemptuous of the trial court should not be entitled 
to relief in the appellate courts of this state. 
DfAston II should also be vacated as erroneous on the merits. 
The opinion contradicts prior opinions of this Court and of the 
Court of Appeals. Prior cases hold that the "unique and compel-
ling" circumstances test applies only where a property settlement 
agreement has been approved by a court and incorporated in a 
divorce decree. The trial court has discretion to vary from a 
property agreement to achieve a result that is fair and reasonable. 
The record evidence, and that which has been discovered 
subsequent to the initial decree, would justify the trial court in 
dividing the parties1 separate property. The trial court made no 
finding concerning that evidence, because it was not necessary. 
1Q 
DfAston II should be vacated and the case remanded to the 
trial court with full discretion to divide the separate property 
if necessary to fashion an equitable decree. 
DATED this \ d daY o f September, 1990. 
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[5] Further, in viewing all the facts m 
the light most favorable to Brmkerhoff, we 
can find no prejudice. Harris v. Utah 
Transit Auth., 671 P 2d 217, 222-23 (Utah 
1983); Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hard-
ware Co., 631 P 2d 865, 868 (Utah 1981). 
Bnnkerhoff neither below nor on appeal 
articulates how he was prejudiced by DLS's 
failure to notify him in the notice of hear-
ing that the hearing was going to be infor-
mal. It seems clear that no prejudice 
would ordinarily occur when an informal 
hearing is held under the UAPA because 
the litigant has an absolute right to a trial 
de novo before the district court. In this 
trial de novo, Bnnkerhoff was able to 
present his entire case before a new tribu-
nal for an independent decision. Based 
upon the foregoing, we find the trial court 
erred in revoking the order of suspension 
on the basis that the notice of hearing sent 
by DLS did not state whether the adminis-
trative hearing was to be formal or infor-
mal as required by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-3(2)(a)(v) (1989). 
REASONS FOR THE DECISION 
UNDER SECTION 63-46b-5 
Bnnkerhoff also alleges that DLS violat-
ed Utah Code Ann § 63-46b-5(l)0) (1989) 
by failing to set forth specific reasons for 
its suspension of his driving privileges. 
This statute states, m pertinent part, that 
"[w]ithm a reasonable time after the close 
of an informal adjudicative proceeding, the 
presiding officer shall issue a signed order 
m wntmg that states the following- (li) 
the reasons for the decision." 
[6] We dispose of this issue on similar 
grounds. First, Bnnkerhoff failed to raise 
an objection so as to allow DLS to cure any 
defect, and second, Bnnkerhoff does not 
claim, let alone demonstrate, that he was 
prejudiced by any alleged error 
The record below shows that Bnnkerhoff 
made no request of DLS to provide him 
with more specific reasons for the suspen-
sion of his license As stated above, a 
failure to object to an error and allow a 
tribunal to correct its error precludes an 
appellant from asserting the issue on ap-
peal. Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P 2d 
778, 781 (Utah 1986); Condas v. Condas, 
618 P.2d 491, 495 n. 8 (Utah 1980). 
Finally, Bnnkerhoff does not allege, and 
cannot show, prejudice because, under the 
statutory scheme, he was allowed a trial de 
novo after which the trial court has the 
responsibility to enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law justifying its decision. 
In summary, the tnal de novo cured any 
technical procedural errors occurring at the 
informal DLS heanng. The purpose of al-
lowing an agency to choose an informal 
hearing procedure would be defeated if 
technical, non-prejudicial, procedural errors 
were sufficient to overturn the agency ac-
tion. The statutory trial de novo is the 
proper remedy to cure these non-prejudicial 
errors. 
We find that Bnnkerhoff failed to object 
and preserve his alleged errors. Further-
more, we hold that the trial de novo m the 
district court provided by the UAPA elimi-
nated any prejudice to defendant. We 
therefore reverse and remand for entry of 
an order to reinstate DLS's suspension of 
Bnnkerhoff s dnvmg privileges. 
DAVIDSON and BENCH, J J , concur. 
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Bruno D'ASTON, Plaintiff 
and Appellee, 
v. 
Dorothy D'ASTON, et al., Defendants 
and Appellants. 
No. 890050-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 9, 1990. 
Divorce action was brought. The 
Fourth District Court, Utah County, Boyd 
an opportunity to order a continuance to reme dv anv problem with notice 
D'ASTON v. 
Cite as 790 P.2d 590 
L. Park, J., entered judgment, and wife 
appealed. The Court oi Appeals, Billings, 
J., held that: (1) service on wife's attorney 
of order to show cause why wife should not 
be held in contempt was sufficient where 
wife secreted herself to prevent service of 
order, and (2) wife would be given 30 days 
to bring herself within process of trial 
court, and if she failed to do so, her appeal 
would be dismissed. 
Ordered accordingly. 
1. Divorce <®=>269(8) 
Service on wife's attorney of order to 
show cause why wife should not be held in 
contempt in divorce proceedings was suffi-
cient where wife initially had been served 
with process in case and appeared by coun-
sel in matter but subsequently secreted 
herself to prevent service of order to show 
cause. 
2. Divorce <s»278 
Wife, who had secreted herself and 
refused to submit to process of district 
court in divorce action, would have 30 days 
to bring herself within process of trial 
court if she wished to appeal divorce judg-
ment: however, if wife persisted in secret-
ing herself in violation of trial court orders, 
her appeal would be subject to dismissal. 
Brian C. Harrison (argued), Provo, for 
defendants-appellants. 
S. Rex Lewis (argued), Leslie W. Slaugh, 
Howard, Lewis & Peterson, Provo, for 
plaintiff-appellee. 
Before BILLINGS, GARFF and 
ORME, JJ. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Appellant, Dorothy D'Aston, filed an ap-
peal from a divorce decree entered by the 
trial court on December 15, 1988. Appel-
lee, Bruno D'Aston ("Mr. D'Aston"), filed a 
Motion to Dismiss appellant's appeal on the 
grounds that she was currently in con-
tempt of the trial court's order and had 
secreted herself, refusing to submit to the 
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process of the district court. He thus ar-
gues that appellant should not be allowed 
to seek a review of the divorce decree on 
the merits. We agree with Mr. D'Aston 
and therefore stay this appeal and allow 
appellant 30 days from the date of the 
issuance of this opinion to submit to the 
process of the trial court and to give this 
court notice of her actions. If appellant 
complies with this court's order and gives 
this court written verification of her com-
pliance within the 30-day period, then we 
will consider her appeal on the merits. 
However, if appellant fails to submit to the 
process of the trial court within the 30-day 
period, the motion to dismiss her appeal 
will be granted. 
FACTS 
We only discuss the facts relevant to this 
order, not the underlying dispute. 
At the time of trial, appellant testified 
that she had $300,000 in cash in a safe 
deposit box in Far West Bank and 375,000 
in cash in a safe at home. In the divorce 
decree, the trial court ordered appellant to 
pay Mr. D'Aston $236,800 "from the $300,-
000.00 in the safe deposit box.'' To date, 
appellant has failed to comply with that 
order. 
The trial court issued a writ of execution 
directing the constable to execute on the 
safe deposit box at Far West Bank. The 
constable discovered that no such safe de-
posit box under appellant's name existed, 
nor did she have any substantial assets at 
Far West Bank. 
Mr. D'Aston, on January 11, 1989, filed a 
Motion to Compel Compliance with Decree 
of the Court. On January 23, 1989, appel-
lant filed a Motion for Stay and Approval 
of Supersedeas Bond. The trial court or-
dered a stay and set the amount of the 
supersedeas bond, which was to be posted 
within 30 days. Appellant failed to post a 
supersedeas bond. 
Mr. D'Aston, on March 17, 1989, obtained 
an Order to Show Cause directing appellant 
to appear and show cause why she should 
not be held in contempt for her failure to 
pay Mr. D'Aston the $236,800 ordered in 
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the decree or to post a supersedeas bond. 
The process server could not find appellant 
in order to serve the Order to Show Cause. 
However, her counsel was served with a 
copy of the Order to Show Cause. 
On March 22, 1989, the trial court held a 
hearing on Mr. D'Aston's Motion to Compel 
Compliance. Appellant's counsel was in 
court that day and the judge requested his 
appearance at the hearing. Appellant's 
counsel stated he was making a special 
appearance as he had not been given prop-
er notice of the hearing. 
On April 7, 1989, the court held an order 
to show cause hearing. Neither appellant 
nor her counsel was present. In a minute 
entry, the court noted that the March 22, 
1989, hearing had been continued to April 
7, 1989, and that appellant's counsel had 
been informed of this fact at the March 22, 
1989, hearing. In addition, the record re-
flects that appellant's counsel was served 
with the Order to Show Cause which listed 
the April 7, 1989, hearing date. 
On April 13, 1989, the court entered find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law holding 
appellant in contempt of court because she 
was "purposefully hiding herself from the 
jurisdiction of the Court and from service," 
and issued an order of commitment and 
bench warrant. The court amended its or-
der of commitment on May 26, 1989. Ap-
pellant again evaded service. Appellant's 
counsel, however, was served with the find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law and the 
order of commitment. 
Thereafter, appellant's counsel made a 
Motion to Strike Findings of Fact, Order of 
Commitment and Bench Warrant. He as-
serts that he does not know where appel-
lant is and that his current representation 
is now limited to this appeal. That motion 
was denied. 
NOTICE 
In response to Mr. D'Aston's motion to 
dismiss her appeal, appellant argues that 
since she has not been served with the 
Order to Show Cause, the trial court was 
1. Some jurisdictions have gone so far as to hold 
that no formal adjudication of contempt is nec-
essary in order to dismiss the appeal for failure 
without authority to hold her in contempt. 
Appellant thus contends this court may not 
dismiss her appeal for failure to comply 
with the trial court's orders. 
[1] Utah courts have acknowledged the 
importance of actual notice in contempt 
proceedings. Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 
118, 378 P.2d 519, 520 (1963); see generally 
Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1171-
72 (Utah 1988). However, whether a court 
can issue a civil order of contempt without 
personal service where a party purposeful-
ly hides to prevent service of the order has 
not been addressed to date in Utah. None-
theless, we are in accord with other juris-
dictions which have held that where a party 
initially has been served with process in a 
case, and has appeared by counsel in the 
matter, service of an order to show cause 
why the party should not be held in con-
tempt on the party's attorney is sufficient. 
See Kottemann v. Kottemann, 150 Cal. 
App.2d 483, 310 P.2d 49, 52 (1957); Brewer 
v. Brewer, 206 Ga. 93, 55 S.E.2d 593, 594 
(1949); State ex rei Brubaker v. Pritch-
ard, 236 Ind. 222. 138 N.E.2d 233, 236 
(1956); Caplow v. Eighth Judicial Dist 
Court 72 New 265. 302 P.2d 755, 756 
(1956); Macdermid v. Macdermid. 116 Vt. 
237, 73 A.2d 315, 318 (1950); see generally 
Annotation, Sufficiency of notice to, or 
service upon, contemnor's attorney in 
civil contempt proceedings, 60 A.L.R.2d 
1244 (1958). 
In Kottemann, which is factually similar 
to this case, the plaintiff had left his resi-
dence and thus could not be served with a 
motion for contempt. 310 P.2d at 50. The 
plaintiffs attorneys were served with the 
motion. Id. at 50-51. The attorneys then 
asserted they did not know the where-
abouts of their client and only had authori-
ty to represent him in the appeal. Id. at 
51. The court rejected the attorneys' at-
tempts to limit their authority and conclud-
ed that the service of the order to show 
cause upon the attorneys was proper. Id. 
at 52.1 
to comply with a trial court's order. See Tobin 
v. Casaus, 128 Cal.App.2d 588, 275 P.2d 792, 795 
(1954) (party could not be found for service of 
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The trial court found that appellant was 
secreting herself to avoid service of pro-
cess in this matter. Appellant's counsel 
was served with notice of the Motion to 
Compel Compliance, the Order to Show 
Cause regarding contempt, and the court's 
findings of contempt. Appellant's counsel 
appeared at the March 22, 1989, hearing on 
the Motion to Compel Compliance and was 
given notice of the Order to Show Cause 
hearing. Because appellant has purpose-
fully hidden to avoid service of process and 
notice of the contempt proceedings and the 
court's order was given to appellant's at-
torney, we find the trial court's order of 
contempt was properly entered. 
CONTEMPT 
[2] Likewise, Utah's appellate courts 
have not considered whether they may dis-
miss a civil appeal when the appellant is in 
contempt of a trial court order in the same 
action. However, in the area of criminal 
appeals, the Utah Supreme Court has dis-
missed the appeal of a prisoner after he 
escaped custody. State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 
703, 704 (Utah 1985); see also Hardy v. 
Morris, 636 P.2d 473, 474 (Utah 1981) 
(court dismissed an escapee's appeal from a 
dismissal of a writ of habeas corpus). In 
Tuttle, the Utah Supreme Court refined its 
position in Hardy. The court held that an 
appellant prisoner's escape is not an aban-
donment of his right to appeal and that the 
dismissal of his appeal is not an appropri-
ate punishment for his escape. Tuttle, 713 
P.2d at 704-05. The court stressed the 
fundamental right to appellate review of a 
criminal conviction when reinstating the ap-
peal after the prisoner was returned to 
custody. Id. at 705. 
Appellate courts from other jurisdictions 
have dismissed the civil appeals of contu-
macious parties without allowing the par-
ties an opportunity to bring themselves 
into compliance with the trial court's order. 
Rude v. Rude, 153 Cal.App.2d 243, 314 
P.2d 226, 230 (1957) (failure to pay support 
and attorney fees); Kottemann v. Kottem-
ann, 150 Cal.App.2d 483, 310 P.2d 49, 53 
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(1957) (failure to pay alimony and attorney 
fees); Michael v. Michael, 253 N.E.2d 261, 
263 (Ind.1969) (appellant took child in viola-
tion of custody order and fled jurisdiction); 
In re Morrell, 174 Ohio St. 427, 189 N.E.2d 
873, 874 (Ohio 1963) (appellant took child in 
violation of custody order and could not be 
found); Huskey ?;. Huskey, 284 S.C. 504, 
327 S.E.2d 359, 360 (Ct.App.1985) (party 
left jurisdiction to avoid arrest). Other 
courts have allowed the party time to com-
ply with the trial court's order before dis-
missing the appeal. Stewart v. Stewart, 
91 Ariz. 356, 372 P.2d 697, 700 (1962) (30 
days to comply); Tobin v. Casaus, 128 
Cal.App.2d 588,*275 P.2d 792, 795 (1954) (30 
days to comply); Greenwood v. Green-
wood, 191 Conn. 309, 464 A.2d 771, 774 
(1983) (30 days to comply); Pasin v. Pasin., 
517 So.2d 742, 742 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987) 
(15 days to comply); In re Marriage of 
Marks, 96 IU.App.3d 360, 51 Ill.Dec. 626, 
629, 420 N.E.2d 1184. 1187 (1981) (30 days 
to comply); Henderson v. Henderson, 329 
Mass. 257, 107 N.E.2d 773, 774 (1952) (30 
days to comply); Prevenas v. Prevenas, 
193 Neb. 399, 227 N.W.2d 29, 30 (1975) (20 
days to comply); Hemenway v. Hemen-
way, 114 R.I. 718, 339 A.2d 247, 250 (1975) 
(30 days to comply); Strange v. Strange, 
464 S.W.2d 216, 219 (Tex.Civ.App.1970) (per 
curiam) (10 days to comply); Pike v. Pike, 
24 Wash.2d 735, 167 P.2d 401, 404 (1946) 
(10 days to comply). These courts justify 
the dismissal of the appeals on the ground 
that it violates the principles of justice to 
allow a party who flaunts the orders of the 
courts to seek judicial assistance. See, e.g., 
Stewart, 372 P.2d at 700; Rude, 314 P.2d 
at 230; Greenwood. 464 A.2d at 773; 
Strange, 464 S.W.2d at 219. 
Still another approach is to stay the ap-
peal until the appellant has submitted to 
the process of the trial court. This ap-
proach gives the trial court the flexibility 
to fashion the terms under which the non-
complying party may purge its contempt 
rather than necessarily ordering the en-
forcement of the judgment. In Closset v. 
Closset, 71 Nev. 80? 280 P.2d 290, 291 
process); Pike v. Pike, 24 Wash.2d 735, 167 P.2d children to avoid custody order and service of 
401, 404 (1946) (party secreted herself and her process). 
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(1955), the appellant had failed to comply 
with a trial court order in a divorce pro-
ceeding and had been found in contempt. 
The Nevada Supreme Court did not dismiss 
his appeal for failure to comply with the 
judgment below, but held that the appeal 
would be dismissed unless the appellant 
within 30 days submitted himself to the 
process of the trial court or posted a super-
sedeas bond. Id. 280 P.2d at 291. The 
court stated: 
[AJppellant husband is now a fugitive 
from process of the trial court. We shall 
not permit him to avail himself of judicial 
review while at the same time he places 
himself beyond reach of the process of 
the trial court in defiance of its attempts 
to enforce its judgment 
We do but insist that one seeking the 
aid of the courts of this state should 
remain throughout the course of such 
proceeding, amenable to all judicial pro-
cess of the state which may issue in 
connection with such proceeding. 
Id. at 291 (emphasis added). 
The United States Supreme Court con-
sidered an appellate court's dismissal of a 
civil appeal on the basis that the appellant 
was in contempt of the trial court's order in 
National Union of Marine Cooks & Stew-
ards v. Arnold. 348 U.S. 37, 75 S.Ct. 92, 99 
L.Ed. 46 (1954). The Court was asked to 
decide whether the Washington Supreme 
Court violated either the equal protection 
clause or the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment when it dismissed 
an appeal from a money judgment as a 
reasonable measure for safeguarding the 
collectibility of that judgment. The appel-
lant had filed a notice of appeal, but had 
offered no supersedeas bond and had ob-
tained no stay of the proceedings. Id. at 
39, 75 S.Ct. at 93-94. The trial court or-
dered the appellant to deliver certain bonds 
in its possession to the court's receiver for 
safekeeping pending disposition of the ap-
peal. Id. The appellant refused and was 
held in contempt. Id. As a result, the 
Washington Supreme Court struck the ap-
2. Utah Const, art VIII, § 5 provides, in pertinent 
part: "Except for matters filed originally with 
the supreme court, there shall be in all cases an 
peal on the merits, giving the appellant 15 
days to purge its contempt by delivering 
the bonds. Id. at 40, 75 S.Ct. at 94. The 
United States Supreme Court found no con-
stitutional violation, stating that "[wjhile a 
statutory review is important and must be 
exercised without discrimination, such a re-
view is not a requirement of due process." 
Id. at 43, 75 S.Ct. at 95. The Court 
stressed that "[petitioner's appeal was not 
dismissed because of petitioner's failure to 
satisfy a judgment pending an appeal from 
it. It was dismissed because of petitioner's 
failure to comply with the court's order to 
safeguard petitioner's assets from dissipa-
tion pending such appeal." Id. at 44, 75 
S.Ct. at 96. 
We are persuaded that the Closset ap-
proach is most consistent with the Utah 
Supreme Court's Tuttle decision and the 
United States Supreme Court's Arnold de-
cision. By adopting this approach, we do 
not deny appellant her right to an appeal 
under Utah Const, art. VIII, § 5,2 but rath-
er insist she must submit herself to the 
jurisdiction of the trial court and satisfy 
that court's concerns before she may exer-
cise that right. She merely has the obli-
gation to come forward and offer a reason-
able alternative to the trial court to safe-
guard her assets from dissipation pending 
her appeal. 
Appellant was given the opportunity to 
post a supersedeas bond, but has refused. 
She has ignored the orders of the trial 
court and, apart from obtaining a tempo-
rary stay which she allowed to lapse for 
want of a bond, she has provided no rea-
sonable alternative to allow the court to 
insure that her assets are available to satis-
fy the judgment pending appeal. By her 
actions, appellant is frustrating the admin-
istration of justice. 
Appellant has not claimed that she did 
not have the ability to comply with the trial 
court's order. See Stewart v. Stewart, 91 
Ariz. 356, 372 P.2d 697, 700 (1962). This 
situation is similar to one faced by a Cali-
appeal of right from the court of original juris-
diction to a court with appellate jurisdiction 
over the cause." 
DUNCAN v. UNION 
Cite as 790 P.2d 595 
fomia court, where it found it was "dealing 
with a litigant who not only has previously 
failed to appear as ordered, but who up to 
this very time remains a fugitive from jus-
tice. Apparently, he is unwilling to re-
spond to a court order with which he dis-
agrees, but seeks to obtain on appeal" a 
more favorable result. Tobin v. Casaus, 
128 Cal.App.2d 588, 275 P.2d 792, 795 
(1954). 
We therefore hold that appellant has 30 
days from the date of the issuance of this 
opinion to bring herself within the process 
of the trial court. If appellant submits 
herself to the trial court, she should be 
allowed an opportunity to offer alternatives 
to the trial court to protect the judgment. 
Appellant may persuade the court it should 
hold the disputed judgment amount in trust 
until a resolution of this appeal on the 
merits. However, if appellant persists in 
secreting herself in violation of the trial 
court's orders, her appeal will be dismissed 
at the expiration of the 30-day period. 
GARFF and ORME, JJ., concur. 
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Shelly Bowers; Sherry Bowers; Monica 
Henwood, individually and as personal 
representative of the Estate of Ramon 
Henwood, deceased; Phyllis Kenwood; 
and Owen Henwood, Plaintiffs and Ap-
pellants, 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPA-
NY, a corporation; The State of Utah; 
Paul Kleinman; and Does 1 through 
100, inclusive. Defendants and Respon-
dents. 
No. 890291-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 12, 1990. 
Heirs of victims of train-automobile ac-
cident brought action against railroad, De-
partment of Transportation and railroad 
engineer. The Third District Court, Tooele 
County, Timothy R. Hanson, J., entered 
summary judgment dismissing wrongful 
death action. Heirs appealed. The Court 
of Appeals, J. Robert Bullock, Senior Dis-
trict Judge, held that: (1) heirs failed to 
establish that either engineer or railroad 
were negligent, and (2) Department, having 
given at least some warning or control at 
railroad crossing, was gover^.mentally im-
mune in deciding whether to improve 
means of warning or control at crossing 
because of fiscal effects of decision. 
Affirmed. 
Jackson, J., filed a concurring opinion. 
Lewis DUNCAN, individually and as per-
sonal representative of the Estate of 
Patrick Duncan, deceased; Jason E. 
Duncan, a minor by and through his 
Guardian ad Litem; Alice Duncan; No-
reen Duncan; Michael Duncan; Tim 
Duncan; Kevin Duncan; Brian Dun-
can; Michelle Bowers, individually and 
as personal representative of the Estate 
of Jefrey and Nicole Bowers, deceased; 
Judson Bowers; Florence Hanson; 
1. Railroads <3=>348<1) 
Evidence failed to support claim of 
heirs of accident victims that there was 
negligence in operation of train or entrust-
ing its operation to engineer who was in 
charge at time of automobile-train collision. 
2. Railroads <3=>348<2) 
Evidence did not support claim of heirs 
of accident victims that railroad negligently 
maintained railroad right-of-way at cross 
ing with street where train-automobile colli 
sion occurred; there was nothing to indi 
cate what could have made railroad's right 
APPENDIX "B" 
D1Aston v. D1Aston, 
794 P.2d 500 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
(D'Aston II) 
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judgment or order of the circuit court. 
They, therefore, reason that this is an ex-
ception to the general delegation of appel-
late jurisdiction over circuit court orders to 
the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Again, we do not disagree with the de-
fendants' argument in the abstract, but 
cannot decipher how the argument helps 
them. Defendants still point to no statute 
giving the district court jurisdiction over 
appeals from the decisions of a magistrate 
under Rule 7. In fact, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1989) vests "interlocutory 
appeals from any court of record in crimi-
nal cases, except those involving a first 
degree or capital felony" in the Utah Court 
of Appeals. Certainly the magistrate was 
acting as a court of record in a criminal 
case when it held the preliminary hearing. 
Finally, both defendants make a number 
of policy arguments in favor of giving the 
district courts jurisdiction over objections 
to bindover orders alleging insufficiency of 
the evidence. Although some of their con-
tentions have merit,8 such arguments must 
be made to the legislature. It is the legis-
lature which is charged with the task of 
statutorily delegating appellate jurisdiction 
and we cannot modify its decisions because 
we believe policy considerations so dictate. 
In conclusion, we affirm the orders of 
the district courts refusing to exercise jur-
isdiction. 
GARFF and GREENWOOD, JJ., 
concur. 
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been committed or that the defendant com-
mitted it, the magistrate shall dismiss the in-
formation and discharge the defendant. The 
magistrate may enter findings of fact, conclu-
sions of law, and an order of dismissal. The 
dismissal and discharge do not preclude the 
state from instituting a subsequent prosecu-
tion for the same offense. 
Bruno D'ASTON, Plaintiff 
and Appellee, 
Dorothy D'ASTON, et al., Defendants 
and Appellants. 
No. 890050-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 14, 1990. 
Action was brought for divorce. The 
Fourth District Court, Utah County, Boyd 
L. Park, J., entered decree of divorce, and 
wife appealed, challenging property distri-
bution. The Court of Appeals, 790 P.2d 
590, ordered wife to submit herself to pro-
cess of lower court within 30 days or her 
appeal would be dismissed. After wife 
gave notice of compliance with order, mer-
its of appeal were addressed. The Court of 
Appeals, Billings, J., held that: (1) post-
nuptial agreement not made in contempla-
tion of divorce was enforceable, absent 
fraud, coercion, or material nondisclosure, 
and (2) postnuptial agreement unambig-
uously provided that it would apply to dis-
position of spouses' property in event of 
divorce. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Husband and Wife ®=>30 
Prenuptial agreements are enforceable 
as long as there is no fraud, coercion, or 
material nondisclosure. 
2. Husband and Wife <s=>30 
Postnuptial agreement not in contem-
plation of divorce is enforceable absent 
fraud, coercion, or material nondisclosure. 
3. Husband and Wife <s=>31(2) 
Normal rules of contract construction 
would be applied in resolving disagreement 
8. Defendants correctly claim that because the 
decision to allow an interlocutory appeal is dis-
cretionary, defendants might be forced to go 
through an unnecessary trial if the right to file 
an interlocutory appeal of the bindover order is 
denied. 
D'ASTON v. 
Cite as 794 PJd 500 
between husband and wife regarding scope 
and meaning of postnuptial agreement. 
4. Husband and Wife <s=>31(2) 
Core principle in construing post-
nuptial agreement was to look to four cor-
ners of agreement to determine parties' 
intentions. 
5. Appeal and Error <®=»842(8) 
Threshold determination of whether 
writing is ambiguous, such that court may 
resort to extrinsic evidence of parties' in-
tent, is question of law, and thus trial 
court's determination is reviewed under 
correction-of-error standard, according no 
particular deference to trial court 
6. Evidence <s=>450(5) 
Postnuptial agreement between hus-
band and wife unambiguously provided 
that it would apply to disposition of parties' 
property in event of divorce and, therefore, 
extrinsic evidence regarding spouses' in-
tent in event of divorce should not have 
been considered, where postnuptial agree-
ment, entered into in community property 
state, provided that spouses' property 
would be divided and division would control 
for all purposes, and unambiguously and 
specifically referred to rebutting presump-
tion that all property acquired during mar-
riage was community property. 
7. Divorce <3=>249.2 
Any equitable power of trial court to 
disregard otherwise enforceable post-
nuptial property settlement agreement and 
to distribute separate property of spouses 
at divorce had to be justified by unique and 
compelling circumstances. 
Brian C. Harrison (argued), Harris, Car-
ter & Harrison, Provo, for defendants and 
appellants. 
S. Rex Lewis (argued), Leslie W. Slaugh, 
Howard, Lewis & Peterson, Provo, for 
plaintiff and appellee. 
OPINION 
Before BILLINGS, GARFF and 
ORME, JJ. 
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BILLINGS, Judge: 
Appellant, Dorothy D'Aston ("Wife"), ap-
peals from a divorce decree entered by the 
district court, principally claiming the court 
erred in failing to distribute the parties' 
property pursuant to a postnuptial agree-
ment. 
On appeal, Bruno D'Aston ("Husband") 
responded that since Wife was in contempt 
of the trial court and was avoiding court 
process, this court should not consider her 
appeal on the merits. We agreed with 
Husband and ordered Wife to submit her-
self to the process of the trial court within 
30 days or we would dismiss her appeal. 
See D'Aston v. D'Aston, 790 P.2d 590 (Ct. 
App.1990). Wife gave us notice of her 
compliance with our order on May 4, 1990, 
and therefore we address the merits of her 
appeal in this opinion. 
We agree with Wife's contention that the 
trial court erred in failing to distribute the 
parties' property pursuant to their post-
nuptial agreement and therefore reverse 
and remand. 
Husband and Wife divorced on December 
15, 1988, after a 35-year marriage. In 
1973, Husband asked Wife to enter into a 
written property agreement, which had 
been prepared by his attorney. The agree-
ment was executed by both parties in 1973, 
then notarized and recorded in the State of 
California in 1975. 
Under the 1973 agreement, Wife received 
two parcels of real estate and cash. Hus-
band received all real property outside the 
United States; personal property in his pos-
session, which included $1 million in coins 
and a collection of antique cars; and all 
domestic and foreign patents and patent 
rights. The agreement also provided that 
all property acquired by either party in 
his/her own name would be the separate 
property of that person. Finally, the 
agreement provided that the parties would 
execute documents to implement the agree-
ment, and that each had the advice of coun-
sel, had read the agreement, and had not 
signed the agreement under duress, fraud 
or undue influence. Shortly after the 
agreement was signed, the parties con-
502 Utah 794 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
veyed the property as provided in the 
agreement. 
On May 2, 1986, Husband filed for di-
vorce. Husband claimed that much of the 
tangible personal property given to him 
under the 1973 agreement had been stolen 
on April 30, 1986, the day Wife had asked 
him to leave their home. On July 31, 1986, 
Husband's California attorney, who had 
drafted the 1973 agreement, sent a letter to 
Wife's Utah attorney which stated the 1973 
agreement was in full force and effect 
Both parties at trial acknowledged they 
executed the 1973 agreement voluntarily 
and did not execute it under duress, fraud 
or undue influence. However, at trial, 
Husband claimed the 1973 agreement 
should not control the disposition of the 
parties' property in this divorce action be-
cause the agreement was entered into only 
to protect the couple's assets from possible 
creditors in pending litigation, not to dis-
tribute property in the event of divorce. 
Wife at trial claimed she had no knowledge 
of the alleged pending litigation and as-
sumed the 1973 agreement was to control 
for all purposes, including the possibility of 
divorce. 
1. See Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 
1986) ("it should be noted that in general, pre-
nuptial agreements concerning the disposition 
of property owned by the parties at the time of 
their marriage are valid so long as there is no 
fraud, coercion or material nondisclosure"); 
Berman v. Berman, 749 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah 
Ct.App.1988). 
2. See In re Estate of Harber, 104 Ariz. 79, 449 
P.2d 7, 16 (1969) (en banc) ("[MJarital partners 
may in Arizona validly divide their property 
presently and prospectively by a post-nuptial 
agreement, even without its being incident to a 
contemplated separation or divorce," provided it 
is fair and equitable and is free from fraud, 
coercion or undue influence and that "wife act-
ed with full knowledge of the property involved 
and her rights therein."); In re Estate of Lewin, 
42 Coio.App. 129, 595 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1979) 
("Nuptial agreements, whether executed before 
or after the marriage, are enforceable in Colora-
do [and a] nuptial agreement will be upheld 
unless the person attacking it proves fraud, con-
cealment, or failure to disclose material infor-
mation."). See also In re Estate of Loughmiller, 
229 Kan. 584, 629 P.2d 156, 162 (1981) (post-
nuptial agreements, fairly and understanding^ 
made, are enforceable); In re Estate of Gab, 364 
N.W.2d 924, 925-26 (S.D.I985) (postnuptial 
The trial court held the 1973 agreement 
was not intended to control in the event of 
divorce, and thus, equitably divided all of 
the parties' property and awarded no alimo-
ny to either party. Wife appeals, claiming 
that (1) the trial court erred in dividing the 
parties' separate property in this divorce 
action contrary to the terms of the 1973 
agreement, (2) the trial court erred in deny-
ing Wife alimony, and (3) the conduct of 
the trial judge constituted judicial bias. 
VALIDITY OF POSTNUPTIAL 
AGREEMENTS 
[1,2] In Utah, prenuptial agreements 
are enforceable as long as there is no 
fraud, coercion or material nondisclosure.1 
Utah's courts have not yet considered the 
enforceability of postnuptial agreements 
not in contemplation of divorce. However, 
other jurisdictions review postnuptial prop-
erty agreements under the same standards 
as those applied to prenuptial agreements.2 
We agree with the majority of our neigh-
boring jurisdictions and thus hold that a 
postnuptial agreement is enforceable in 
Utah absent fraud, coercion, or material 
nondisclosure.3 
agreement to protect inheritance rights valid if 
property fairly disclosed and spouse enters into 
freely and for good consideration); Button v. 
Button, 131 Wis.2d 84, 388 N.W.2d 546, 550-51 
(1986) (postnuptial agreement must meet re-
quirements of fair and reasonable disclosure, 
entered into voluntarily and freely, and substan-
tive provisions fair to each spouse). But cf. 
Ching v. Ching. 751 P.2d 93, 97 (Haw.Ct.App. 
1988) (general rule that property agreements 
should be enforced absent fraud or unconscion-
ability applies to prenuptial, but not to post-
nuptial, agreements). 
3. This postnuptial agreement was entered into 
in California. Under California law, married 
couples may contract to change the separate or 
community status of their property. Cal. Civil 
Code § 5103 (1990); In re Marriage of Dawley, 
17 Cal.3d 342, 551 P.2d 323, 328 n. 6, 131 Cal. 
Rptr. 3 (1976). Further, married couples may 
enter into contracts with each other concerning 
their property rights as though unmarried, sub-
ject to rules controlling actions of persons occu-
pying confidential relations with each other. 
Haseltine v. Haseltine, 203 Cal.App.2d 48, 21 
Cal.Rptr. 238, 244 (1962); In re Estate of Marsh, 
151 Cal.App.2d 356, 311 P.2d 596, 599 (1957). 
California law is in harmony with Utah law on 
the issue of the enforceability and interpretation 
D'ASTON v. 
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Neither Husband nor Wife assert that 
the 1973 property agreement was entered 
into as a result of fraud or coercion nor do 
they contend that there was material non-
disclosure of the parties' assets. Thus, this 
postnuptial agreement should be enforced 
pursuant to its terms. 
Our conclusion, however, does not re-
solve this controversy as Husband and 
Wife disagree as to the meaning and scope 
of the 1973 postnuptial property agree-
ment Wife contends the agreement by its 
unambiguous terms applies in the event of 
divorce. Husband argues that it was exe-
cuted merely to protect the parties' proper-
ty from creditors and was not intended to 
control a distribution of the parties' proper-
ty in the event of divorce. Thus, we must 
determine what the parties intended when 
they entered into this 1973 agreement 
Utah courts have applied general con-
tract principles when interpreting prenup-
tial agreements. See Berman v. Berman, 
749 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (A 
prenuptial agreement should be treated 
like any other contract "In interpreting 
contracts, the principal concern is to deter-
mine what the parties intended by what 
they said."). This approach is consistent 
with other jurisdictions' treatment of post-
nuptial agreements.4 
[3,4] Thus, in order to resolve Husband 
and Wife's disagreement as to the scope 
and meaning of this postnuptial agreement, 
we apply normal rules of contract construc-
tion. The core principle is that in constru-
ing this contract, we first look to the four 
corners of the agreement to determine the 
parties' intentions. See Neilson v. Neil-
son, 780 P.2d 1264, 1267 (Utah CtApp. 
of postnuptial agreements and thus we need not 
resolve the issue of which state's law should 
apply. 
4. See Matlock v. Matlock 223 Kan. 679, 576 P.2d 
629, 633 (1978) ("[C]ontracts, made either be-
fore or after marriage, the purpose of which is 
to fix property rights between a husband and 
wife, are to be liberally interpreted to carry out 
the intentions of the makers and to uphold such 
contracts where they are fairly and understand-
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1989); see also Ron Case Roofing & As-
phalt Paving Co. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 
1382,1385 (Utah 1989); LDS Hosp. v. Cap-
itol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 
1988); Buehner Block Co. v. UWCAssocs., 
752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). 
[5-7] The relevant provisions of the 
1973 agreement denoting its scope and ap-
plication state, with our emphasis: 
1. The husband does transfer, bar-
gain, convey and quitclaim to the wife all 
of his right, title and interest, if any 
there be, in and to the following: 
(a) The real property at 14211 Sky-
line Drive, Hacienda Heights, Califor-
nia and in and to all buildings, appurte-
nances and fixtures thereon. 
(b) The real property at 230 South 
Ninth Avenue, City of Industry, Cali-
fornia, including all buildings, appurte-
nances and fixtures thereon, and any 
and all oil and mineral rights thereto. 
(c) Any and all cash in bank ac-
counts located in the State of Califor-
nia. 
2. The wife transfers, bargains, con-
veys and quitclaims to the husband all of 
her right, title and interest in and to real 
property located outside of the United 
States of America, and in and to all per-
sonal property in the possession of the 
husband, or subject to his control in the 
United States, Europe or elsewhere in 
the world, and in and to all patents or 
patent rights under the laws of the Unit-
ed States, United Kingdom or any com-
monwealth thereof, Switzerland, Japan 
or other countries. The provisions of 
this paragraph apply to all property de-
scribed herein, whether presently owned 
ably made, are just and equitable in their provi-
sions, and are not obtained by fraud or over-
reaching."); Roberts v. Roberts, 381 So.2d 1333, 
1335 (Miss. 1980) ("The rules applicable to the 
construction of written contracts in general are 
to be applied in construing a postnuptial agree-
ment."); Bosone v. Bosone, 53 Wash.App. 614, 
768 P.2d 1022, 1024-25 (1989) ("a community 
property agreement is a contract, and effect 
should be given to the clearly expressed intent 
of the parties"). 
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or in existence or to be acquired or cre-
ated in the future. 
3. Hereafter, and until this agree-
ment is modified in writing attached 
hereto, all property, real, personal and 
mixed, acquired by either party in his or 
her sole name, from whatever source de-
rived and wherever situated, shall be the 
sole and separate property of such per-
son, notwithstanding any law, statute 
or court decision giving presumptive 
effect to the status of marriage; and 
such property shall be free of all claims, 
demand or liens of the other, direct or 
indirect, and however derived. 
This postnuptial agreement provides that 
Husband and Wife's property will be divid-
ed and the division will control for all pur-
poses. The agreement was entered into in 
a community property state and the con-
tractual language unambiguously and spe-
cifically refers to rebutting the presump-
tion that all property acquired during the 
marriage is community property. 
The trial court did not expressly conclude 
that the 1973 property agreement was am-
biguous, but nevertheless proceeded to 
take extrinsic evidence5 as to the parties' 
intentions and, based upon this controvert-
ed extrinsic evidence, concluded that the 
5. "Resort to extrinsic evidence of the parties' 
intent is permissible only if the contract doc-
ument appears to express the parties' agreement 
incompletely or if it is ambiguous in expressing 
that agreement." Neilson, 780 P.2d at 1267; see 
also Anderson v. Gardner, 647 P.2d 3, 4 (Utah 
1982) (only when an ambiguity exists which 
cannot be reconciled by an objective and rea-
sonable interpretation of the agreement as a 
whole should the court resort to evidence be-
yond the four corners of the agreement). 
6. Husband argues on appeal that even if we find 
the trial court erred when it found the 1973 
agreement was not intended to apply in the 
event of a divorce, the error was harmless be-
cause of the broad equitable powers trial courts 
possess in domestic matters. See Colman v. 
Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 789 (Utah Ct.App.1987). 
However, even if a trial court has the equitable 
power to disregard an otherwise enforceable 
postnuptial property settlement agreement and 
to distribute the separate property of the spous-
es, the circumstances must be unique and com-
pelling to justify the application of such an 
parties did not intend the 1973 agreement 
to apply in the event of divorce. 
The threshold determination of whether 
a writing is ambiguous is a question of law, 
Buehner Block Co., 752 P.2d at 895; 
Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 
1293 (Utah 1983); Whitehouse v. White-
house, 790 P.2d 57, 60-31 (Ct.App.1990), 
and thus we review a trial court's determi-
nation under a correction-of-error standard, 
according no particular deference to the 
trial court. Id.; see also Seashores Inc. v. 
Hancey, 738 P.2d 645, 647 (Utah CtApp. 
1987). 
We find this postnuptial agreement un-
ambiguously provides that it will apply to a 
disposition of the parties' property in the 
event of divorce.8 Thus, we reverse the 
trial court's contrary ruling which was 
based upon extrinsic evidence as to what 
Husband and Wife intended by their 1973 
agreement 
In summary, we reverse the trial court's 
property distribution and remand for en-
forcement of the 1973 postnuptial property 
agreement and then the division of the 
remaining property, if any, not controlled 
by it. Because we reverse and remand the 
property division, we also reverse and re-
mand on the issue of alimony. We believe 
our decision necessitates the reconsidera-
tion of whether either Husband or Wife 
exception. The trial court made no findings to 
delineate what it found as compelling circum-
stances to justify such an action and we find 
none. 
In support of his argument, Husband claims 
that Utah courts have distributed premarital, 
gift or inheritance property of one spouse to the 
other spouse. See Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 
1373 (Utah 1988); Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 
135 (Utah 1987); Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 
1144, 1147-48 (Utah Ct.App.1988); Peterson v. 
Peterson, 748 P.2d 593, 595-96 (Utah Ct.App. 
1988). We find these cases clearly distinguish-
able as they do not involve an otherwise en-
forceable prenupuai r^ postnuptial agreement. 
Husband also argues that Utah courts may 
refuse to apply property settlement agreements 
in a divorce action. See Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 
472, 476 (Utah 1975); Colman v. Colman, 743 
P.2d 782, 789 (Utah Ct.App.1987). Again, these 
cases do not deal with postnuptial property set-
tlement agreements not in contemplation of di-
vorce and are otherwise factuallv distinguish-
able. 
JACOBSEN CONST, v. 
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should receive alimony.7 
GARFF and ORME, JJ., concur. 
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JACOBSEN, MORRIN & ROBBINS 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
ST. JOSEPH HIGH SCHOOL BOARD 
OF FINANCIAL TRUSTEES, 
Defendant and Appellant 
No. 890468-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 28, 1990. 
General contractor brought suit 
against high school board for balance due 
on a construction contact. The Second Dis-
trict Court, Weber County, John F. Wahl-
quist, J., awarded, inter alia, judgment to 
the contractor and denied the board's coun-
terclaim seeking recovery premised on al-
leged fact that construction "deadlines" 
were not met. Board appealed. The Court 
of Appeals, Bench, J., held that the board's 
appeal was moot due to the board's paying 
of judgment and mailing of satisfaction of 
judgment to contractor, and fact that ap-
peal did not involve claims separate and 
distinct from those involved in satisfaction 
of judgment. 
Appeal dismissed. 
Appeal and Error <$=>781(7) 
School board's appeal of judgment en-
tered in favor of general contractor on a 
construction contract with board was 
"moot" due to board's payment of judg-
7. We need not consider the issue of whether the 
trial court was biased against Wife as we have 
reversed the trial court's property distribution 
on other grounds. 
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ment and mailing satisfaction of judgment 
to contractor for execution which did not 
evidence an intent to appeal, where appeal 
did not involve a claim separate and distinct 
from those involved in satisfaction of judg-
ment, and board's counterclaim seeking re-
covery for alleged breach of contractor's 
duties under contract was not a separate 
and distinct controversy. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
Edward J. McDonough, Salt Lake City, 
for defendant and appellant 
Michael Wilkins and Kendall S. Peterson, 
Tibbals, Howell, Moxley & Wilkins, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee. 
Before BENCH, GARFF, and 
JACKSON, JJ. 
OPINION 
BENCH, Judge: 
Plaintiff general contractor sued defen-
dant high school board for the balance due 
on a construction contract. The district 
court awarded judgment to plaintiff and 
denied defendant's counterclaim. We dis-
miss defendant's appeal as moot. 
In July 1984, defendant St. Joseph High 
School Board of Financial Trustees ("high 
school") executed a written contract with 
plaintiff Jacobsen, Morrin & Robbins Con-
struction Company ("contractor")l for con-
struction work on St. Joseph High School 
in Ogden, Utah. Two separate projects 
were encompassed by the contract—the re-
modeling of a gymnasium and locker 
rooms, and the addition of a classroom and 
library. 
Using a standard form contract publish-
ed by the American Institute of Architects, 
high school agreed to pay contractor the 
total cost of construction plus a five-per-
cent supervision fee. No firm costs were 
established in the contract, although "bud-
1. Now doing business 
Construction Company. 
as Jacobsen-Robbins 
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HOWARD, LEWS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRUNO D'ASTON, : 
Plaintiff, : 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
vs. : 
DOROTHY D'ASTON, : Civil No. CV 86 1124 
Defendant. : 
LISA ASTON and ERIC : Judge Boyd L. Park 
ASTON, 
Co-defendants. 
This matter came on duly and regularly for trial before the above-entitled Court 
sitting without a jury, on April 18, 1988, through April 21, 1988. The plaintiff 
appeared in person and was represented by his counsel, S. Rex Lewis of Howard, Lewis 
& Petersen. The defendant and the co-defendants appeared in person and were 
represented by their counsel, Brian C. Harrison and Don Mullen. The parties were 
sworn and testified, other witnesses for the parties were sworn and testified, and the 
Court received in evidence Exhibit Nos. 1 through 31, 32b-k, 35 to 41, 43 to 45, 47 to 
51, 53, 55 to 83, 85 to 88, 91, 92, 94 to 98, 101 to 108a, 109a, 109b, 110 to 128, 129, 
r-r. 
-ff—#'•"> 
Our File No. 17,603 
129a, 130, 130a, 131 to 146, 147, 147a, 148 to 149a, 150 to 159, 161 to 163, 165 to 177. 
The Court having heard the evidence, examined the exhibits, having subsequently met 
with counsel, and having ruled on subsequent motions and having made its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law herein, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The plaintiff, Bruno D'Aston, is awarded a Decree of Divorce from the 
defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, to become final on the signing and entry of the Decree. 
2. The defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, is awarded a Decree of Divorce from 
the plaintiff, Bruno D'Aston, to become final on the signing and entry of the Decree. 
3. The agreement entered into between Bruno D'Aston and Dorothy D'Aston 
in March of 1973 is null and void and is not a binding agreement for estate distribu-
tion between the parties. 
4. The defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, is awarded as her sole and separate 
property the following: 
a. The residence of the parties situated in Provo, Utah County, 
State of Utah, and described as follows: 
All of Lots 40 and 41, Plat "C Evening Glow Subdivision, 
Provo, Utah County, Utah according to the official plat 
on file in the office of the Recorder, Utah County, Utah. 
Together with the improvements thereon and all built-in appliances. 
b. One-half of the furniture, furnishings, appliances (not built-in) 
and one-half of all art objects, silverware, bedding, etc. to be agreed upon by the 
parties or in the event of no agreement, then two lists will be made of equal value by 
the plaintiff and the defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, will have the right to choose which 
2 
list of property she wants. (A copy of exhibit 11 is attached hereto and make a part 
hereof by reference as though it were fully herein set forth). 
c. Jewelry as listed on exhibit no. 17. 
d. Cash as follows: 
Cash put aside for payment of judgment $ 75,000.00 
Savings account 34,000.00 
Checking account 26,000.00 
Diamonds 86,000.00 
Silver bullion 7,600.00 
Cash from the 5300,000 in savings 
box in the sum of 63.200.00 
Total cash, diamonds and silver 
bullion, excluding 575,000.00 
for payment of judgment 5236,800.00 
e. 1985 Mercury automobile. 
f. One-half of all jewelry, stamps, books, silver and paintings 
(which are not a part of the household art objects described in exhibit no. 14. A copy 
of exhibit 14 is attached hereto and made a part hereof by reference as though it were 
fully herein set forth). 
g. 125 - 520.00 gold St. Gaudens and 562,099.00 of the cash from 
exhibit 17 when this property is located. A copy of exhibit 17 is attached hereto and 
by reference made a part hereof as though it were fully herein set forth. 
h. 30% of value of all coins alleged to have been stolen and listed 
in exhibit nos. 22 and 23. Copies of exhibit nos. 22 and 23 are attached hereto and by 
reference made a part hereof as though they were fully herein set forth. 
3 
5. The plaintiff, Bruno D'Aston, is awarded the following described 
property: 
a. Vacant lot situated in Provo, Utah County, State of Utah, 
described as follows: 
Lot 17, Sec. A, Oak Cliff Planned Dwelling Group 
Subdivision, Provo, Utah County, Utah, according to the 
official plat recorded in the office of the Utah County 
Recorder, Utah County, Utah. 
b. One-half of ail the furniture, furnishings and appliances (not 
built-in) and one-half of all art objects, silverware, utensils, bedding, etc. to be 
divided as provided in the above paragraph 4b. 
c. Cash in the sum of 5236,800.00 from the 5300,000.00 in the safe 
deposit box which the defendant Dorothy D'Aston is ordered to forthwith deliver to 
the Clerk of the Court for delivery to the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney. 
d. Motor home and Volkswagen automobile. 
e. All of the property acquired by the plaintiff prior to the 
marriage as described in exhibit no. 8. A copy of exhibit no. 8 is attached hereto and 
made a part hereof by reference as though it were fully herein set forth. 
f. All optical equipment as described on exhibit nos. 12 and 13. 
Copies of exhibit nos. 12 and 13 are attached hereto and made a part hereof by 
reference as though they were fully herein set forth. 
g. One-half of all jewelry, stamps, books, silver and paintings 
(which are not part of the household art objects), all of which are described in exhibit 
no. 14. 
4 
h. All the consigned coins described in exhibit no. 24. Plaintiff is 
obligated for the debt of the consignment. A copy of exhibit no. 24 is attached hereto 
and made a part hereof by reference as though it were fully herein set forth. 
i. 125 • S20.00 gold St. Gaudens and 562,099.00 of the cash from 
exhibit no. 17, when this property is located. 
j. All patents and patent rights. 
k. 70% of value of all coins alleged to have been stolen as listed in 
exhibit nos. 22 and 23. 
6. In the event the alleged stolen coins (exhibit nos. 22, 23 and 24) are 
found to be in the possession of the defendants, Dorothy D'Aston and/or Eric Aston, it 
should be considered as a contempt of court and punished as such. 
In the event the alleged stolen coins (exhibit nos. 22, 23 and 24) are found to 
be in the possession of the plaintiff, it should be considered as a contempt of court 
and punished as such. 
7. The co-defendant Eric Aston is awarded the gun that is being held by 
Utah County Constable, Anthony R. Fernlund. 
8. The defendant, Dorothy D* Aston, is not awarded any alimony from the 
plaintiff. 
9. The plaintiff, Bruno D'Aston, is not awarded any alimony from the 
defendant, Dorothy D*Aston. 
10. Each party is ordered to pay their own attorney's fees and court costs. 
5 
DATED this X5^dav of }(/%r<tr*&tU 1 988. 
BOYETL PARK "' 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS'TO ?ORMx^ 
*'S. REX LEWIS?ESQ. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
£ 
BRIAN C HARRISON, ESQ. 
Attorney for Defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, 
and Co-defendants, Eric Aston and Lisa Aston 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was hand 
delivered to the following this day of , 1988. 
Brian C. Harrison, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant 
3325 North University Avenue 
Suite 200, Jamestown Square 
Provo, Utah 84604 
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Customer's Order 
O 
I 
0 
T 
O 
Aston Laboratories 
230 So. 9th Ave-
City of Industry, CA* 
Date 5-30-72 
s 
H 
I 
P 
P 
E 
0 
A re SHIPPED 
-n 
SHIPPEO v u TERMS 
Net 30 
F O B . 
T 
0 
SAIESMAN 
Rudv Runqe 
60mn Dlstagon used #2679051 
Ex 130 
Leica M3 used #1155019 
50mm Suralcron #1568527 
Used Camera Case 
Leica M3 Used #807246 
Used meter 
Used case 
5% Tax 
250 00 
1 07 
249 50 
135 50 
20100 
262100 
2k 00 
12100 
47I70 
$1,001 .77 
jrm 
30 
I N V O I C E 
Exhibit 13 - Page 9 of 26 
JMl£2rCA3 CAMERA EICHAHGE 
615 South Spring S t r e e t 
Los Arise Las, CA 90014 
T e l . 627-5678 
•to B 32243 
s 
o 
I 
D 
Customer's Order Oof 5-30-72 
T 
O 
Aston Laboratories 
230 9th Ave. 
Cltyof Industry, CA, 
DATE SHIPPED 
5-30-72 
1 
1 
1 
20 
20 
2 
1 
1 
1 
20 
20 
2 
SHIPPED VIA TERMS 
Net 30 
FOB 
T 
O 
SALESMAN 
Rudy Runqe 
Trfpod 1A100 
1 Ax 119 tfjipod head 
1*4x168 tripod head 
K-N 36 exp. 
EX"T6 exp/ 
39E fii I ters 
2. 
2. 
Tax 
39 
6k 
12l00 
12L20 
211.60 
J» 7L80 
52.80 
19L20 
—rstra 
81.28 5173 .8  
iiform 
> 730 I N V O I C E 
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AaERICAM CAMERA EXCHAHC2 
615 South Sp r ing S t r e e t 
L03 Anga lea , CA 90014 
T « l . 627-5b78 
>ic. B 32702 Customer's Order Date 6-J 6-72 
S 
? •Aston Laboratories Inc. 
o 230 9th Ave. 
T City of Industry, CA# 917W 
s 
H 
I 
P 
? 
E 
0 
T 
O 
DATg SHIPPED SHIPPED VIA TERMS SALESMAN 
6-16-72 Net 30 Rudv Runoe 
Microscope adapter 
250nro f . l Sonnar #589723 
Knob r ing 
FI Itn cutter 
Film screen adapter 
Hasselblad lent film adapter 
Tax 
295, 
3, 
5, 
25, 
23. 
00 
00 
85 
00 
00 
16 
392i0I 
19JS0 
S4 I U 61 
ifprm 
730 
I N V O I C E 
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49 
A2ERICAM CAAERA EXCHAtfGZ 
615 South Spring S t r e e t 
Los Angalaa, CA 90014 
T « l . 627-5678 
>fc. B 3 3 H 6 Customer's Order Dofe 6-28-72 
0 
I 
0 
T 
0 
PATE SHIPPED 
Aston Laboratories Inc* 
230 9 th Ave. 
City of Industry, CA. 917^6 
s 
H 
I 
P 
P 
£ 
0 
T 
0 
SHIPPED v u TERMS SALESMAN 
6-28-72 Net 30 Rudy Run.ge 
telca M5 #1291385 
M5 Case #145*1 
Rol1 studio paper 
Mayflower skope 
Viewer 
Tax 
50H 
27 
10 
92 
60 
60 
00 
00 
160 
"PHTTHO" 
3212k $67? oA 
todifprm 
7S 730 I N V O I C E 
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A3E8ICAM ZMZRA EXCHANGE 
o l5 South Spring S t r e e t 
Los Ange les , CA 900i4 
T « l . .6^7-5678 
B32693 Customer's Order Dote 6-15-72 
L •Aston Laboratories Inc. 
o 230 9th Ave* 
T
 City of Industry, CA. 917^$ 
s 
H 
I 
P 
P 
£ 
0 
T 
O 
DATE SHIPPED SHIPPED V I A TgPMS SALESMAN 
S-TS-72 Ji££. Net ?0 Rudy Runge 
J 1 
3 
2 
2 
! 
Hasselblad 500 EL -M body # 16099 w/70mm 
magazine # 304462 
Magnifier hood 
Sets of film magazines 
Mask for SWC finder 
59021 70mm negative files 
35mm conversion kit for prints projector 
Tax 
UPS 
694 
72 
24 
\k\ 
351 
n/cl 
TOTj 
42 I 
oo 
60 
00 
56 
52 
35" 
03 
THHItTT 
•form 
730 I N V O I C E 
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EHICAN CAUERA EXCHANGE 
bl5 South Spring S t r e e t 
Los hnzzUs, CA 90014 
T « l . b27-5b78 
B 32699 Customer's Order Dote 6-16-72 
s 
0 
I 
0 
T 
O 
-Aston Laboratories inc. 
230 9th Ave. 
City of Industry, CA. 917^6 
ifprm 
730 
TE SHIPPED 
-16-72 
1 
1 
6 
1 
6 
6 
1 
1 
SHIPPED VIA 
UPS 
TERMS 
Wet 30 
F O.8. 
Mlnox tripod 
FI*ah 
Dozenbbubes 
Minon B v e r a used # 651117 
Mlnox color 36 exposures 
TX 135-2.6 exposures 
HasseIbTad lOOf camera # CT22836 mag, #CT31352 80nro Tessar # 1337962 
Ser. 7 f i l t e r 
f 
o 
S*1ES«A*N 
Rudy Runge 
azine 
1 
Tax 
.10 
26. 
18. 
5. 
119. 
\k, 
6. 
280 
5 
T7b 
23 
"$5W 
00 
00 
9^ 
95 
58 
60 
,00 
-££ 37 44 T& 
I N V O I C E 
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AVESICAS cASERA excoAws* 
615 South Zpring S t r e e t 
Los Ao^elea, CA 90014 
T e l . 627-5678 
c«B 32411 
s 
o 
I 
0 
Customer's Ordtr Dote 6-5-72 
T 
o 
Aston Laboratories 
230 Ninth Ave. 
Ci ty of Industry , CA, 
>ATE SHIPPED 
•5-72 
1 
1 
I 
SHIPPED v u 
UPS 
TERMS 
Net 30 
FOB 
I 
0 
SALESMAN 
Rudy Runge 
Professional lens shade 
Exackta case (used) 
Hasselblad SWC complete with view finder 
Camera #9997 
Lens #^9583^5 
magazine #1780A9 
Tax 
Ups 
61 
9 
832 
.20 
.00 
.00 
$ M L 2 0 
A5L11 
1L 50 
$$A8 .81 
arm 
no I N V O I C E 
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AUEItlCAtf CAaERA EXCHANGE 
615 South Sprins S t r e a t 
L03 Ange les , CA 90014 
T a l . 627-5678 
B 33291 
S 
Customer's Order Date 7 -5 -72 
O 
I 
0 
T 
0 
Aston Laboratories lnc< 
230 9th Ave. 
C i t y of Indust ry , CA. 
kit SHIPPED 
-5-72 
1 
SHIPPED V I A 
UPS 
TERMS 
Net 30 
f O.B. 
T 
0 
SALESMAN 
Rudy Runge 
K31B SB Complete o u t f i t w/barn doors 
215 
Tax 
Ups 
,00 172. 
8J 
186« 
1. 
$181 , 
00 
60 
"65 
00 
CT 
difprm 
5 730 I N V O I C E 
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5 
A: .ICAit CAMERA EXCHANGE 
615 South Sp r ing S t r e e t 
U a A n g e l e s , CA 90014 
T e l . 627-5678 
»B kk0k6 Customer's Order Dote 7-2-73 
o 
I 
0 
T 
o 
Aston Laboratories Inc . 
2 3 0 S o , 9 t h Ave. 
Ci ty of industry , CA. 917^6 
s 
H 
I 
P 
P 
E 
0 
T 
O 
VE SHIP»€D 
li23 
1 
! 
1 
1 
1 
5 
5 
1 
1 
SHIPPED v u 
UPS 
TERMS 
Net 30 
f . 0 8 . SALESMAN 
Rudv Runae 
Polaroid SX 70 
SX 70 Case 
Close up attachment 
Acces. shoe 
Tripod mount 
Color fdlm 
Fteh bars 
Lens shade 
Shutter cord 
6. 
2. 
Less 
Tax 
UPS 
90 
77 
180. DO 
13.05 
7.D5 
5.B5 
6.B5 
3^-50 
13.B5 
2.fe5 
5 .g5 
272.PS 
5A.So 
217. 
13. 
2 . 
P^  
06 
50 
$233'.fc 1 
I N V O I C E 
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AaSWCA!! CAJESA EXCHANGE 
615 South Spring S t r e e t 
Los Angelas , CA 90014 
T e l . 627-5673 
voic B 33891 
s 
Customer's Order Date 7-21-72 
O 
I 
0 
T 
O 
Aston Laboratories inc. 
230 9th Ave* 
City of Industry, CA* 
DATE SHIPPED 
7-21 
1 
1 
- 7 5 
1 
1 
SWPPFO V I A 
UPS 
TERMS 
Net- 30 
f.O.S. 
0 
SALESMAN 
RuHv Riinnp 
Letca MA camera # 1267792 
MRA Meter #28135 
Tax 
UPS 
360.00 
ss.bo A 15.120 
20J76 
5^35. 
1 . 
$A37. 
S6 
50 
A5 
Rcdiform 
7S 730 I N V O I C E 
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SO 
AUESXCAH CA2ERA EZCHAHGE 
615 South Spring Strdat 
Los Angelas , CA 90014 
T e l . 627*5678 
13030 Customer's Order 
S 
0 
i 
0 
T 
O 
Dr. Brunna D. Aston 
U211 Skyline Drive 
Hacienda Heights, Calif. 917^5 
Aston Laboratory, Inc. 
Date 
S 
H 
I 
p 
p 
E 
0 
I 
o 
August k, 1975 
>T£ SHIPPED 
1 
1 
1 
SHIPPED VIA TEPMS 
Net.30 
50mm Elmar Lens #905301 F3. 
Lens Cap 
Case 
f O B. SAIESMAN 
Rudy 
5 
6% Sales Tax 
69 
i». 
k\ 
79 
J» 
b3 
95 
.60 
150 
:o'5 
lh 
"79 " 
30 
ak (50 Mts) 7P730 
I N V O I C E 
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AMERICAN CAIIEHA EXCHAHG* 
615 South Sprlag Street 
Los Angeles, CA 90014 
TaL. 627-5678 
»voic.B 35383 Customer's Order Dot.8-11-72 
s 
o 
L 
D 
T 
O 
Aston Laboratories 
230 9 t h Ave. 
City of Industry, CA. 
s 
H 
I 
P 
9 
E 
0 
T 
O 
DATE SHIPPED 
8-11-72 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
SHIPPED VIA /TERMS 
Net 30 
F.O.B. SAIE5MAN 
*udy Runge 
Real cord for 500EL camera 
Haneblad 1000F combination case 
Ne* York BSW p r i n t 
Tax 
W. 
53, 
kl. 
50 
50 
150 
1 ^ 5 0 
7J28 
$152. 75 
Redifprm 
7S 730 I N V O I C E 
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AMERICAN CAMERA EXCHAHCE 
615 Sooth Spring Street 
Los Angeles, CA 90014 
oce B 3464*6 
s 
o 
I 
0 
T 
o 
Customer's Order 
Aston Laboratories tnc. 
230 9th Ave. 
City of Industry> CA. 
Dot. 8-16-72 
DATE SHIPPED 
•16-72 
2 
1 
SHIPPED VIA 
14823 Cases 
AC Adapter 
T 
0 
TERMS 
Net 30 
F.0.8. SALESMAN 
Rudy Runge 
Tax 
86. 
25. 
I N . 
5. 
$116. 
kO 
00 
AO 
57 
97 
dtfprm 
5 730 I N V O I C E 
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50 
ASSSICAN CAMERA EXCHABGS 
615 South Spring S t r a e t 
Los Ange les , CA 90014 
T « l . 627-5678 
Invoice B 34649 Customer's Order Dot. 8-16-72 
S 
o 
L 
D 
T 
O 
Q A T E SHIPPED 
Aston Laboratories inc. 
230 9th Ave. 
City of Industry, CA* 
s 
H 
I 
P 
P 
£ 
0 
T 
O 
SHIPPED VIA 
Pet 
TERMS F 0 .8 . SALESMAN 
B-l$-72 30 Rudy Runge 
T 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
Leica 3G Camera #948254 
Elraar 50nw f 2.8 #1575322 
Case 
Chains 2. 80 
Tax 
26a 
lol 
5 
"T75i 
13i 
12H§ 
.69 
00 
.60 
TSo" 
Rediform 
7S 730 I N V O I C E 
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5 
F I N E P H O T O G B ' 'C E Q U I P M E N T 
« 1 '1 
B 31096 
EXCHMGE 
a^OH^JDU.; 
"LOOK FOR THE BIG "A" ON SPRING STREET" 
615 SOUTH SPRING STREET 
LOS ANGELES. CALIF. 90014 
PHONE 627-5678 I 
N A M E . *=>v s-*C L h r\ 
^ C U S I O M C R f 
•V^)-H; 
P H O N E 
STREET. 
CITY STATE 
HOW SHIPPED 
otrnpT CASH 1 C.0.0 I CHAR<*£ LON ACCT i WILL CALcJMOSE. RETD CUST. OROERf 
Q U A N . D E S C R I P T I O N 
<AC^h V ^ N W J » ^ 1 . Q 
PRICE A M O U N T 
A. 
VfatL 1(^~ 
\ ^ < i h O fr\ i m isnft 
^-n ^ 7 
Title to the above described Equipment shall not pass from Amencon Camera 
Exchange io the Purcnoser and Amtricon Com«ra Eichonge retains a secunty 
interest (herein until the entire indebtedness evidenced by ihtt agreement is 
poid in lull. 
NOTICE See reverse side and accompanying statement lor important intor-
motion. in consideiuhon oi the extension oi credit lor purchases made bv me 
ami in worraniy IIKJI any goods described herein ore to be used primarily 
for persunoi. family ond household purposes unless otherwise specified here, 
I aijree to the terms above and on the reverse hereol. 
C U S I O M E R ' S 
SiGNAlURE 
|kink.(.(ou <Bt 
Exhibit 13 - Page 23 of 26 
51 
AMERICAN CAHERA EXCHA2C*. 
615 South Sp r ing Sfcraat 
Los A a g e l e s , CA 90014 
T « l . 627-5678 
Customer's Order invoice 
B 35797 
s 
f .Aston Laboratories Inc. 
o 230 9th Ave. 
T City of Industry, CA. 917^6 
DtJ„ 9-26-72 
Rediform 
7S 730 
S 
H 
I 
9 
P 
E 
0 
DATE SHIPPED 
9-26-72 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
SHIPPED VIA TERMS 
Net 30 
F O B . 
T 
O 
SALESMAN 
Rudy Runoe 
Studlomatlc 1 Stand #105-133 
Camera Mt. Brkt. #105136 
Med. Ctr*gt . #105-138 
Prec. T l l t top 1! #105357 
Shipping charge 
from Germany 
Tax 
829. 
B7«. 
39. 
$910. 
35 
U7 
32 
27 
39 
I N V O I C E 
Exhibi t 13 - Page 24 of 26 
b l i :>e\lth 5p^-:.:i^ i t i ^ a t 
i,ca A n . j s l a s , CA 90014 
T e l . 627-S67iS 
>i« B A6482 
s 
Customer's Order Dot. 9-7-73 
i * Aston Laboratories inc. 
0
 230 S. flth Ave. 
£ City of Industry, CA. 917^6 
DATS SHIPPED 
S 
H 
I 
P 
P 
E 
D 
T 
O 
SHIPPED V I A F.O.B. SALESMAN 
9-7-7? Net 30 Rudy Runce 
Z 
6 
1 
Z 
6 
Used Rol le i f lex 2.8 camera #1623515 
Camera Case 
CX 120 
Trade-in f i lm 
tax 
323.00 
am 
Sl.9*« 
19. 
T3oT 
9* 
06 
"So" 
Jii 
34 
ifprm 
730 
• l"ok (50 Mtti 7P730 
I N V O I C E 
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ASEBXCA3 CAMERA EXCHANGE; 
615 South Spring S t r e e t 
Lod Ange les , CA 90014 
T e l . 627-5678 
Invoke B 3 5 2 6 0 
S 
Customer's Order Da.. 9-7-72 
I 
0 
T 
O 
Aston Laboratories Inc* 
230 9th Ave. 
City of Indust ry , CA, 
s 
H 
I 
P 
P 
E 
0 
T 
O 
OATE SHIPPED 
9-7-72 
1 
1 
1 
1 
SHIPPED VIA 
UPS 
TERMS 
Net 30 
P.O.B. SALESMAN 
Rudy Runge 
Lelca 59nwn f inder 
Lelca 35nrcn f inder 
Tax 
UPS 
! 
31 . 
*5 . 
7b. 
3. 
• 
$81. 
20 
60 
"83 8k 
60 
24 
R«difprm 
7S 730 
I N V O I C E 
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51 
I, 
OD 
0rt£ 
CMS 
one. 
one 
OstE 
<PK€-
TWO, 
j j . » iz. k 
ft 
IHK __. 
1$K ^-HAiu kMK 
- #!£ 
/+u 
+ * 
— IOO-1>U(-* 
A k M% _- w,U >Zk *... .« 
Two Hi&H4rttf 04u PQIHT-IM6-%— 
IQO&D tf#££S779HfS 
CeuJ&ioft &jV#/Z(/?ftp!>£.C£L4(Jf 
c*LL€cri9*i rtftzoUi<z-'8oGtL*J2iZ ro /fOf 
3.*«* -
l.zso-
7S0-
?**-
2.TOO 
S.°o° 
10.000 
10. oe><3 
\JS00 
O « o e o 
2 ^ . 0 0 0 
SxOOO 
lZ-Soo 
Exhibit 14 
r* Slr,IHWESTEHN GOLD COS ^ / C / 7 
CITY CSNTSE 3UILDINC* A T , / I r*JU-~~ 
6400 UPTOWN BOULEVARD, SUITE 403-S 
AL3UGUERCUE. NEW MEXICO 37110 
£0-
SILL TO: 
TELEPHONES: (505) 331-3535 • 1-aQQ-545-o575 
MAiUNG A QQRESS: P.O. SOX 9083 AJi^^ ALBUQUERQUE SM 37113 
Rare Cain ufe: S/sm . 
Bullion LJ Date 
"7^<D. 72r,s #10 W^ 
Co«om«f N 
Aaar 
C t v 
DaX8 PtitfwrtJ 9/Z5/3Z 
TERMS 
P*on« 
I j PURCHASE 
Show CI Offica 
QUANTTTY 
too ma 
Inventory 
N u m o r DESCRIPTION G 3 A 0 6 
^?fTnl 2571 
h ^ £ SH-r £^rW<=> 
Unit TOTAL 
•AMOUNT 
TZiSfe 
? % 7 ^ 
£?y? CVitt*, T > \ w , i ?/?*& 
tITPi 
ITS, by. QVr7^ a^sF" 
'ff^Qfffaj' 
^ 7 ^ 1 
S P S C ' A L I N S T R U C T I O N S 
TTTLE DCES NOT PASS UNTIL MERCHANDISE IS PAIO FOR IN FU 
Exhibit 17 - PEC- l of 4-
SUB TOTAL 
TAX 
mirtfi * 
51 
2 5 0 -
7 2 9 -
1 3 2 2 5 0 - 0 0 
3 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 + 
6 3 0 4 - 7 3 + 
2 7 5 0 - 0 0 + 
0 0 3 
3 0 9 0 5 4 - 7 3 * 
3 0 9 0 5 4 - 7 3 + 
1 3 2 2 5 0 - 0 0 -
2 6 0 6 - 0 0 -
999 
T 2 4 T 9 8 - 7 3 * 
Exhibit 17 - Page 2 of 4 
51' 
» ' l 
H i ft j 
^lj 
I I 
n»{ 
" l 
H,| 
»\s8 
si 
OAl EWOOD DOWNS 
APARIMEN1S HENSEL INVESTMENT, INC, I I I W POMONA OLVD. - M O t l f E H E Y PARK. CAl IF 01764 - ( 2 1 3 ) 720 2 1 0 0 
.»s time* tn 
i » - A ¥ » H i n o r 
ll-MJi I l - S U O 
• IF. t O W 
f WNOPHNO-' , NAME OF VENnOH-
SIMMONS 
APARTMENTS 
DATE • I CHECKN 
I T)o«-of | l . | Vs) (WtOr^ \m D* L a ^ o cD> VOICfcOAU INVOICE NO I lUMHtF^nENC&ANPM^MPl $ AMOUNT; I M ^ OISCPUN?'- BAMNC& '• ' 
HENSEL INVESTMENT, INC. 
I I I W POMONA 01.VU. - MOIJ IE I IEY PAI1K. CALIF. 01764 
PHONE - |2 I3> 728-2 100 __ 
*•! 
/ DATE 
OALEWOOD DOWNS APARTMENTS 
SIMMONS APARTMENTS 
l/lf^J CHECK fr *-~f 
CALIFORNIA FIRST BANK 
MOMlEBEUOOFf iC fc 
050 l l o d h WIICOM Av«nu«. MonUballo. C»lllo»nU 900*40 1 6 - 4 9 / 1 2 2 ! 
PAY 
EXACTLY T I U A ^ ))u^o/i^o 7 }\L>0«>/)A>P DOLLANS AND :sNia 
1
 PAY 
l O 1Mb* 
ORDER OF 
* ^>Op/?OD.b-,-L 
MGNSEL I N V E S J M E N r . INC IE I ] 
<u TV }Um I 2&JLZ1&*IAJL 
)K.0l)l^l '-) )\^>l D/KJ QEonae ii. H E N S E L • pnesioENF 
jOtf 
. labial II *j ' - ^ _ _ _ 
i l I 
• * 4 | 
I 
3 LISTED 
'LOW • * I T V ' /) 'dzn . / ^ ^ ^ / > Wi* 
tft*Ml«€BB«gfl*T«CWP - •" i jnnr I w c a m c 
> ST/*** •zT0rt/f 
f i t* ^ 
/ , / * -
-?, *s2> CJ. 
(21CJ 72S-d*75 
(7H» + * O l 3 * 0 
>ecx ts 
W6NT 01? 
SUSTSD 
LOW. 
OAIE: I if»«BC£ NO I 
ggeunvg o*«*ci. 
CALIFORNIA SAFETY CENTER, INC. 
111 w. PCJUCNA auva — MONTESST ^AAK. CAUF. 31754 
M.flDflW.r^ rVJtfFQFUEllCnJfc 
,DcJiroi^nu I) £< for, #7= 
(8121 371-757C 
SAM UCRA APART%4g* 
(813 371^3^6 
9/ Vf* 
~ ITEfi»«EFEfiENCHA«IM€aja^ 
nfirj^z'T <3»JY 
SAMGUMT | tnsccunr 
^ ' •
 7 ; 
* / 
/•< * 
£ 3«« 2-
.i»«oonow«3 HENSEL INVESTMENT, INC. 
APARTMENTS ; 
' t-.I« f* j 
111 W. PCMCNA aLYO. - MCNTSHcT ?A*K. CAUF. 91734 - ( T I 3 1 728-2100 
^ - - ^ 
V*a Tl\)*7 Da^c^ 1 SDDfidO^, 
^^r-'bi- ^7 - ?a^e ^ of 4 
HEN S"E1~ f N /ESTVIE NT. 1NC. 
R 1 
or<s 
0 
It 
£ - 4 
k 
k 
W^" 
a 
/?5/ ~<^-/?t; 
/ W ~-P&Q_E 
(/,3 ff £ i peU-ML. &*cp 
(*}u ~D-ns>7o — M5f6£ 
* : 1 ?{H -~&&i " 
diS^. $J°.. Dou-J-Z. b-ot-p 
1132. - 6e.tl-rr 
r
'*r-f'V J**,: ..---fft" 
•z5~o -
25*0— 
J o o -
7S£> 
•Zoo — 
7. S9<5-
j.POO 
I'. 00 & 
"> ; ^ r 
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U y.JF ?& .0*tr<-fHC6*rP 
o l( 
K 
A 
it 
h 
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Michael A. Graham 
P.O. Box 997 
Sisters. OR 97759 
(503) 548-4428 
(503) 923-0244 Private 
COIN NET OR11 
INVOICE 
INVOICE NO. 
ZS"6.T3 
OAT£ 
?-/f-f£ 
T 
QTY. UNIT DESCRIPTION UNIT 
PRICE 
AMOUNT 
'/fff/Z- IF - > * y » / ^ i ^ i W j r *J_i 
Jt'/Jn^~~r '/QZ?Z. l ^ f e t ^ 
\*dLC 
fwv+jy 
H37.f^££.£~4\!'/A 
*T PLEASE PAY FROM THIS INVOICE TOTAL 
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Micftaei A. Graham 
P.O. Box 997 
Sisters, OR 97759 
(503) 548-4428 
(503) 923-0244 Private 
COIN NET OR11 
INVOICE 
n NVOIC2 NO. 
OA7£ 
TEAMS 
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Michael A. Graham 
P.O. Sox 997 
Sisters. OR 97759 
(503) 548-4428 
(503) 923-0244 Private 
COIN NET OR11 
INVOICE 
f INVOICE NO. 
OATE 
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V 
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i
-\z° 
\ 
Ms?'-4/W-& 
!
 ' / 
QTY. UNIT 0ESCHIPT1ON M UNIT PRICE AMOUNT 
Z0 (157- BO Ho i°ibS ViU-W 
120 1158-Jd HO mz-Ms-w 
izo WSI-00 I Hltrp&P 3Bfy$-W 
IZO i%o~3o \tzo mb\i\g.&y 
izo nbi-du I w4a Y IS1 Bd 
120 IUZ-B0 120 \ti7V.$o 
I2o 
& 
W3-B0 
\W- BO 
TO ZH l}o ttt£-r?~(-fU ^ 
ito ltt5-Tf-Z-8 0 MVv 
* 0 /«S-ry-3-^o v\\ 
^ ^ d -PLSASS PAY FHOM THIS INVC1CS OTAL 
Exhibit 24 - Page 5 of 10 
THE OREGON MINT 
POST OFFICE BOX 89 
UMPQUA, OREGON 97436 
(503)672-0157 
CONSIGNMENT FORM 
The Oregon Mint hereby auchoriz 
to s e l l the following merchandise: ' 
ITEM QESOUPT10N PRICE DESIRED 
"7 / . 
^ / / / 0CS/SG.&? o r \ 
S u w / 1 
GQfi £fi~S/Z*T F?A/€* 
1 / / / 
-/^<P ^ si O X & 
/ 7 
/ CLS^/?&*-r- yJ^/fA^^S'/^ > * 
/ / ^ £ O- / /* «<** >-* . s~* . .-« / I ^ ! 
J > / ~/^r 
Y 
Iff J J 
xry 
Z_L 
The Oregon Mint hereby indemnifies \and holds harmless 
the above named for any merchandise*, le*st due Co fire, 
theft, Act of God, or any causes beyond their control. 
Date 7-/z-r5" Signature, 
OTYOUI , PHONE NO, , in?•!*€??-— &v 
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THE OREGON MINT 
POST OFFICE BOX 89 
UMPQUA, OREGON 97436 
(503) 672^157 
CONSIGNMENT FORM 
rhe Oregon Mint hereby authorises 
to s e l l the^!ullwJiA£ 
<rnJ 
ITEM I 
Z^c? I 
Z&O 
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1 / - — 7 ^ 
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% 
***** mm 
• ^ V 
) j 
| 
Oate 
The Oregon Mint hereby indemnifies and holds harmless 
the above named for any merchandise los t due to f i r e , 
thef t , Act of God, or any causes be^md their control* 
Signature. 
•-_*. isn 
> m 
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Michael A. Graham 
P.O. Box 997 
Sisters. OR 97759 
(502) 548-4423 
(503) 923-0244 Private 
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May 7, 1985 
Bruno Aston 
P.O. Box 1543 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Dear Bruno: 
With the Long Beach Show coming up, I would like the return of some of my dollars 
you have on consignment - namely: 
1876 
1873 
1878 
1878-^ 
1879 
1880 
1881 
1882 
1883 
1883 
1892 
1893 
1896 
1903 
Trade ! Proif 
7 T-Fsather Proof 
8 T-Feather 
Metric 
Trade 
Pattern Proof 
Proof 
Gem Proof 
Proof 
Proof 
Proof 
Proof 
Proof 
Proof 
Proof 
S-<MS£ i 
$ 7,500.00 
7j500.00 
4,200.00 
12,500.00 
5,500.00 
12,000.00 
5,100.00 
5,600.00 
3,250.00 
4,500.00 
20,000.00 
20,000.00 
12,000.00 
25,000.00 
Have several people interested, 
at other shows. 
What doesn't move, I will give back to you to show 
Thanks for the ones you moved for me in the past. 
Sincerely, 
Al Schafer 
11043 Candor St. 
Cerrltos, Cal. 90701 
APPENDIX "D" 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
OS DEC 15 H V-25 
S. REX LEWIS (1953), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRUNO D'ASTON, : 
Plaintiff, : 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
vs. : AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
DOROTHY D'ASTON, : Civil No. CV 86 1124 
Defendant. : 
LISA ASTON and ERIC : Judge Boyd L. Park 
ASTON, 
Co-defendants. 
This matter came on duly and regularly for trial before the above-entitled Court 
sitting without a jury, on April 18, 1988, through April 21, 1988. The plaintiff 
appeared in person and was represented by his counsel, S. Rex Lewis of Howard, Lewis 
& Petersen. The defendant and the co-defendants appeared in person and were 
represented by their counsel, Brian C. Harrison and Don Mullen. The parties were 
sworn and testified, other witnesses for the parties were sworn and testified, and the 
Court received in evidence Exhibit Nos. 1 through 31, 32b-k, 35 to 41, 43 to 45, 47 to 
51, 53, 55 to 83, 85 to 88, 91, 92, 94 to 98, 101 to 108a, 109a, 109b, 110 to 128, 129, 
"JK. • 
U 
Our File No. 17,603 
129a, 130, 130a, 131 to 146, 147, 147a, 148 to 149a, 150 to 159, 161 to 163, 165 to 177. 
The Court having heard the evidence, examined the exhibits, having subsequently met 
with counsel, and having ruled on subsequent motions and being fully advised in the 
premises, now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The plaintiff and defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, were both residents of 
Utah County, State of Utah, for more than three months prior to the filing of the 
action for divorce herein. 
2. The plaintiff and defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, were married September 
22, 1953 in New York City, New York, and have since that time been husband and 
wife. There have been two children born as issue of that marriage, to-wit: Lisa 
Aston and Eric Aston, both of whom are adults. 
3. On April 30, 1986, the defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, directed the plaintiff 
to leave the home of the parties from which home the plaintiff has been excluded 
since that date, all of which treatment was cruel to the plaintiff causing himi great 
mental distress. The plaintiff is entitled to a decree of divorce from defendant, 
Dorothy D'Aston, on the grounds of mental cruelty, the divorce to become final on the 
signing and entry of the decree. 
4. The plaintiff has treated the defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, cruelly during 
the course of the marriage by continued physical and mental abuse, all of which caused 
said defendant great mental distress. The defendant is entitled to a decree of divorce 
from the plaintiff on the grounds of mental cruelty, the divorce to become final on the 
signing and entry of the decree. 
2 
5. The plaintiff and defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, have acquired substantial 
property during the course of their marriage from the efforts of both parties. The 
plaintiff having worked for others and also established his own businesses, and the 
defendant working in the businesses of the plaintiff's from time to time. The plaintiff 
brought into the marriage coin and stamp collections and other miscellaneous items 
which he has listed in Exhibit No. 8 as having a current fair market value of 
5567,700.00. The defendant contends the plaintiff brought into the marriage .items 
having an approximate value of 55,000.00. Because this is a thirty-five year marriage, 
and because there is substantial conflicting testimony as to the whereabouts, value and 
current existence of this property, the Court will not consider this property separate 
and apart from the marital assets. 
6 . / In March of 1973, the plaintiff and defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, entered 
into a Property Settlement Agreement in the State of California. There is substantial 
conflicting testimony and evidence regarding the purpose of said agreement. Subse-
quent to the date of the agreement, the parties continued their married lives together, 
and bought and sold property as though the agreement did not really exist, except that 
certain real properties were changed to the name of defendant, Dorothy D'Aston. The 
Court finds the said agreement was entered into for the purpose of avoiding possible 
creditors claims due to threatened litigation, and was not intended to be a binding 
agreement for estate distribution between the married parties. 
7. The defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, transferred title to the residence and 
one adjoining lot of the parties to defendant Lisa Aston (daughter of the married 
parties) (exhibit no. 148). The plaintiff had not concurred in the gift of said premises 
3 
to Lisa Aston, and Lisa Aston should be ordered to transfer the property back to 
Dorothy D'Aston to be dealt with by the Court as marital property. 
8. The plaintiff alleges that he owned a collection of coins, silver and gold 
bullion and other valuable items located in his brief cases in his automobile, which 
were secured to the automobile by chains and locks, on the morning of April 30, 1986 
(exhibit no. 22). The plaintiff also alleges he owned and stored in his motor home 
parked at the residence of the married parties in Provo, Utah an inventory of coins, 
stamps, gold and silver bullion, and other valuable items (exhibit no. 23). Plaintiff 
alleges that he further had a consignment from other coin dealers certain coin 
collections and gold and silver bullion valued at 5324,238.00 (Exhibit no. 24), which was 
located in his motor home and in his automobile. 
Plaintiff alleges that defendants, Dorothy D'Aston and his son Eric Aston, 
acting concertedly, broke into the motor home on or before April 30, 1986 and took 
possession of all the coins, stamps, gold and silver bullion, and other valuable items 
(exhibit nos. 23, 24). Plaintiff alleges that Eric Aston, acting in concert with Dorothy 
D'Aston, cut the chains and locks on the brief cases in his automobile on April 30, 
1986 and took the coin collection and other valuable items from the brief cases 
(exhibit nos. 22, 24). Plaintiff further alleges that Dorothy D'Aston and Eric Aston 
still have in their possession the contents allegedly taken from the motor home break-
in and the contents from the automobile and brief case break-in. Plaintiff reported 
the alleged theft to the Provo City Police but refused to follow through with the 
complaint testifying he could not do this because it was his family. 
4 
9. Defendants, Dorothy D'Aston and Eric Aston, admit that plaintiff had a 
collection of coins, stamps, silver and gold bullion, and other valuable items, the total 
value of which they do not know. Defendants, Dorothy D*Aston and Eric Aston, deny 
any knowledge of any consigned merchandise to the plaintiff. Defendants, Dorothy 
D* Aston and Eric Aston, deny they broke into the motor home or the automobile at 
any time, and deny they are in possession of the coins, stamps, silver and gold bullion 
and other valuable items that plaintiff alleges were stolen. Said defendants further 
allege that the plaintiff is still in possession of these items. 
10- Witnesses for the plaintiff testify that they have seen some of the coins 
alleged to have been stolen on or about April 30, 1986 in possession of defendants, 
Dorothy D'Aston and Eric Aston, and offered for sale, by them at coin shows subse-
quent to April 30, 1986. 
11. Witnesses for defendants testify they have seen some of the coins 
alleged to have been stolen on or about April 30, 1986 in possession of the plaintiff 
and offered by him for sale at coin shows subsequent to April 30, 1986. 
12. The plaintiff and defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, allege they have acquired 
during the course of their marriage the following assets, to-wit: (Dollar amounts 
rounded off) 
Pltf's Defs* 
Ex. ** Property Value Value Possession 
.22 (1) Coins stolen 
from auto 4/30/86 Don't Unknown to 
(alleged by pltf) 51,009,978 know the Court 
23 (2) Coins stolen 
from motor home on 
5 
or before 4/30/86 
(alleged by pltf) $448,398 
Don't 
know 
Unknown to 
the Court 
(3) Coin consign-
ment stolen from 
auto and motor home 
on or about 4/30/86 
(alleged by pltf) $324,238 
(4) List of property 
prior to marriage 
owned by pltf $565,700 
Don't 
know 
$5,000 
at time 
of marriage 
Unknown to 
the Court 
Pltf contends 
this property 
was left in the 
home occupied by D. 
D'Aston. D. D'Aston 
contends the property 
is not in the home 
and does not know 
where the property is. 
(5) Optical 
equipment 
(6) Household 
furnishings, 
furniture and 
appliances 
(7) Property 
purchased from 
payment of $300,000 
on sale of Calif. 
$27,918.87 
$165,060 
home (payment of 3rd 
trust deed note) and 
interest checks of 
$2,750 and $6,304 
to-wit: 
250 - $20.00 gold 
St. Gaudens @ $729 
each 
Jewelry 
Cash 
Total 
(8) Jewelry, 
stamps, books 
$182,250 
2,606 
124.198 
$309,054 
$214,200 
Don't 
know 
$5,000 
$182,250 
2,606 
124.198 
$309,054 
Does not 
know 
Same as above 
Dorothy D'Aston 
Pltf contends def D. 
D'Aston has this 
property - Def D. 
D'Aston contends pltf 
has this property, 
except for jewelry 
given to her. The 
Court does not know 
where this property 
is located. 
Pltf contends 
this property is 
6 
silver, paintings, 
(510,000 of 
paintings 
included in 
exhibit 11) 
Does not 
believe 
they exist 
except for 
some paint-
ings. 
in the home occupied 
by def. Def contends 
not in home except 
for some paintings. 
(9) 2nd trust deed 
from sale of Calif 
home in the amount 
of $687,788.42 was 
discounted by def and 
she received $633,000; 
from that amount she 
has the following 
property: 
Cash - safe deposit 
box 
Cash - put aside for 
judgment taken against 
defendant 
Savings account 
Checking account 
Diamonds 
Silver Bullion 
(10) Vehicles 
Motor home 
VW GTI 
1985 Mercury 
(11) Patents 
(12) Provo home 
1171 N. Oakmont 
lots 40 & 41 -
Plat HCn Evening 
Glow Subdivision -
Purchased 3/80 -
Cost 
Remodeling (1980 
cost) 
Remodeling (i982 
cost) 
$20,000 
6,000 
No value 
$184,722 
37,596 
40.284 
$262,602 
$300,000 
75,000 
34,000 
26,000 
86,000 
7,600 
$ 8,500 
No value 
D. D'Aston 
D. D'Aston 
D. D'Aston 
D. D'Aston 
D. D'Aston 
D. D'Aston 
Plaintiff 
Plaintiff 
D. D'Aston 
Plaintiff 
D. D'Aston 
D. D'Aston 
D. D'Aston 
7 
98 Did not 
value 
10 (13) Vacant lot 
#17 - Sec A. Oak 
Cliff Planned 
Dwelling Group -
Cost S 18,000 D. D'Aston 
13. The plaintiff alleges that there were certain automobiles at the residence 
of the parties when he left the residence on or about April 30, 1986 (see exhibit no. 
19). Defendants contend the only automobile at the residence of the parties consisted 
of the motor home, Volkswagen and Mercury. That the Cadillac belonged to defendant 
Eric Aston. Plaintiff further contends that the vehicles as listed in defendants' Exhibit 
No. 31 and Defendants' Exhibit No. 32(a-k) were sold and the money spent prior to the 
divorce action. The Court finds the only vehicles which it can order distributed are 
the motor home, Volkswagen and Mercury. 
14. Plaintiff and defendant, Eric Aston, testified regarding a purported gun 
collection and the sale of guns. The Court finds there was no gun collection of any 
significance at the time of the divorce proceedings and the only gun that the Court 
knows the whereabouts of is the gun held by the Provo Police Department, which 
belongs to defendant Eric Aston. The Court makes no award between the married 
parties or to the purported gun collection. 
15. The parties had no outstanding debts as of the time of the filing of the 
complaint herein, except the alleged obligation of the plaintiff as to consigned mer-
chandise as hereinabove mentioned. 
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(l6v The plaintiff's income at the present time is social security in the sum 
of $438.00 per month. The defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, has no monthly earned or 
retirement income. 
17. The property of the parties should be awarded as follows: 
a. To the defendant, Dorothy D'Aston: 
(1) Residence of the parties: Lots 40 and 41, Evening Glow 
Subdivision, together with the improvements thereon and all built-in appliances. 
(2) One-half of the furniture, furnishings, appliances (not 
built-in) and one-half of all art objects, silverware, bedding, etc., to be agreed upon by 
the parties or in the event of no agreement, then two lists be made of equal value by 
the plaintiff and the defendant, Dorothy D*Aston, having the right to chose which list 
of property she wants. 
(3) Jewelry listed in paragraph no. 12, item 7. 
(4) Cash as follows: 
Cash put aside for payment of judgment $ 75,000.00 
Savings account 34,000.00 
Checking account 26,000.00 
Diamonds 86,000.00 
Silver bullion 7,600.00 
Cash from the $300,000 in savings 
box in the sum of 63.200.00 
Total cash, diamonds and silver 
bullion, excluding $75,000.00 
for payment of judgment $236,800.00 
(5) 1985 Mercury automobile. 
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(6) One-half of all jewelry, stamps, books, silver and paint-
ings (which are not a part of the household art objects) described in exhibit no. 14. 
(7) 125 - S20.00 gold St. Gaudens and $62,099.00 of the cash 
from exhibit no. 17, when this property is located. 
(8) 30% of value of all coins alleged to have been stolen as 
listed in ex. nos. 22 and 23. 
b. To the plaintiff, Bruno D'Aston: 
(1) Vacant lot - 17, Sec. A, Oak Cliff Planned Dwelling 
Group. 
(2) One-half of all furniture, furnishings and appliances (not 
built-in) and one-half of all art objects, silverware, utensils, bedding, etc. to be 
divided as provided in paragraph 17a(2). 
(3) Cash in the sum of $236,800.00 from the $300,000.00 in 
the safe deposit box. 
(4) Motor home and Volkswagen automobile. 
(5) Property acquired by the plaintiff prior to the marriage 
(exhibit no. 8). 
(6) Optical equipment (exhibit nos. 12 and 13). 
(7) One-half of all jewelry, stamps and books, silver and 
paintings (which are not part of the household art objects) (described in exhibit no. 
14). 
(8) All of the consigned coins described in exhibit no. 24. 
Plaintiff should be obligated for the debt of the consignment. 
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(9) 125 - S20.00 gold St. Gaudens and 562,099.00 of the cash 
from exhibit no. 17, when this property is located. 
(10) All patents and patent rights. 
(11) 70% of value of all coins alleged to have been stolen as 
listed in ex. nos. 22 and 23. 
18. The Court is not convinced that the value attributable to the alleged 
stolen coins by the plaintiff is a realistic value, and that the value is excessive; that 
other values assigned by the plaintiff to other property were cost values or replace-
ment values and not current fair market values. Therefore, the Court has not at-
tempted to make the division of the marital property an absolute division of one-half 
each based on values assigned by the plaintiff. 
19. The Court believes that the above distribution of property is fair and 
equitable under the totality of the existing circumstances and testimony. 
20. In the event the alleged stolen coins (exhibit nos. 22, 23 and 24) are 
found to be in the possession of the defendants, Dorothy D'Aston or Eric Aston, it 
should be considered as contempt of court and punished as such. 
In the event the alleged stolen coins (exhibit nos. 22, 23 and 24) are found to 
be in the possession of the plaintiff, it should be considered as contempt of court and 
punished as such. 
(ly The Court makes no award of alimony for either party as there should 
-be sufficient assets on which to live. The defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, should be able 
to draw social security at age 62. 
22. Each party should pay their own attorney fees. 
il 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from the defendant, 
which Decree should become final upon the signing and entry of the Decree. 
2. The defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from 
the plaintiff, which Decree should become final upon the signing and entry of the 
Decree. 
(3y The agreement entered into between the plaintiff, Bruno D'Aston, and 
the defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, in March of 1973, should not be a binding agreement 
for estate distribution between the parties. 
4. The plaintiff, Bruno D'Aston, and the defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, should 
each be awarded the property together with other conditions concerning the property 
as more particularly set forth in the Findings of Fact. 
The defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, should be entitled to no sum of money 
as alimony. 
6. The plaintiff, Bruno D'Aston, should be entitled to no sum of money as 
alimony. 
7. Each party should pay their own attorney's fees incurred herein and 
each should pay their own costs. 
Let a Decree be entered accordingly. 
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DATED this i  /£_<day of ll6t&™&<^\ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
^ S L R E X LEWIST ESQ. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
• T / 7 
s • r 
)YD £ PARK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
BRIAN C HARRISON, ESQ. 
Attorney for Defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, 
and Co-defendants, Eric Aston and Lisa Aston 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was hand 
delivered to the following this day of . 1988. 
Brian C. Harrison, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant 
3325 North University Avenue 
Suite 200, Jamestown Square 
Provo, Utah 84604 
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APPENDIX "E" 
Transcript of Hearing, May 4, 1990 
1 I IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
2 STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
3 
4 
5 
* I BRUNO D'ASTON 
7 
Plaintiff, 
g | Civil No. CV-86-1124 
9 | HEARING TRANSCRIPT 
V; 
10 I ) 
11 I DOROTHY D ' ASTON 
I Defendant. 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on Friday, the 4th day of 
May, 1990, the HEARING in the above-entitled matter was 
taken by Richard C. Tatton, a Certified Shorthand 
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah 
before the Honorable Boyd L. Park, at the Utah County 
Courthouse, Provo, Utah 84601 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Defendant: Mr. Brian Harrison 
Attorney at Law 
Provo, Utah 
Mr. Don Mullin 
Attorney at Law 
Provo, Utah 
For the Plaintiff: Mr. Rex Lewis 
Attorney at Law 
Provo, Utah 84601 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: This is the case of Bruno D'Aston 
Plaintiff, vs.Dorothy D'Aston et.al. This matter is before 
the court concerning the Court's Findings and Conclusions 
of Law dated the 13th day of April, 1989 and order of 
commitment regarding Dorothy D'Aston and also I suspect 
seeking to come into compliance with the holding of the 
Appellate Court regarding the appeal in this matter. Am I 
correct Mr. Harrison? 
2 
1 MR. HARRISON: Yes that is correct. 
2 THE COURT: All right, this court has heretofore 
3 signed an order of commitment ordering that Dorothy D'Aston 
4 be held in custody until such time as she complies with the 
5 order of this court of December 15, 1988. Do you want 
6 to speak to that Mr. Harrison? 
7 MR. HARRISON: I would like to make a brief 
8 statement. I think Mr. Lewis may want to ask some questions 
9 or make a statement. 
10 I would note that Mrs. D'Aston is in court today. Did the| 
11 court note that on the record she is here? 
12 THE COURT: I did not but I will note that she is 
13 here. 
14 MR. HARRISON: I have tried to look carefully at th£ 
15 Court of Appeal's opinion as well as other documents in 
16 this case and I have the following comments that I think may 
17 be pertinent to the court. 
18 One of the concerns, I believe is the existence of a 
19 safety deposit box which was set forth on Mrs. D'Aston's 
20 financial declaration during about January of 1988. It 
21 was subsequently testified to during the trial in April of 
22 1988. 
23 I I would indicate to the court that Mrs. D'Aston will testify 
24 |if she is asked that the safety deposit box was box number 
25 | 866 and that it was located at First Security Bank in Orem 
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not at Farwest Bank, she made a mistake. That bank is at 
1175 South State in Orem. 
She will produce a letter for the court today from First 
Security Bank that shows that box was opened in September of 
1987 and continued to be opened until sometime in September. 
of 1989 about a year and a half after the trial in this 
case. 
She would further testify that she of the money that 
she had in there she withdrew that at a certain point. That 
she used about $160,000.00 on living expenses. She had 
no other income source whatsoever. She used that for 
herself going back and forth to her parent's home in Californ 
for witness fees and other costs. 
She gave the sum of $127,000.00 to Lisa, her daughter. 
She did that in October of 1983. She also had $75,000.00 
which was at her home in cash plus some diamonds and Silver. 
She gave $75,000.00 plus diamonds and Silver to Lisa in 
October of 1988. 
She has n-ot seen Lisa or talked with Lisa since that 
time. The court set, pursuant to our motion to set a 
Supersedeas Bond and set the bond amount at $312,000.00. Thai 
was done in January of 1989. 
Once that bond was set, as ,ou can note from what I have 
indicated, she had already used some of the money for 
expenses and she gave a substantial sum almost $280,000.00 in 
4 
Lisa in October of 1S88. She was not able to come up with 
that bond amount. 
So shortly thereafter as the court will recall the court 
awarded the house, the home of the parties, to her. She 
received a offer to sell the home for approximately 
$210,000.00. I then prepared a stipulation and submitted 
to Mr. Lewis, Mr. D'Aston's attorney, suggesting that the 
proceeds from the sale of the home be held as part of the 
security in this case if they would release the lis pendens 
which they had filed against the property in which was 
preventing the sale. 
Mr. Lewis talked with me and told me that his client 
had rejected that proposal. And the consequence of that 
rejection was that this sale failed. 
Sometime later in March of 1989, Dorothy D' Aston in 
approximately March 15, quit claimed any interest that she 
may of had to Eric although she never did show up as a 
record title owner on that property. 
THE COURT: She initially showed up as a record 
title owner. 
MR. HARRISON: I think it was in Lisa's name. 
THE COURT: Purchased in Lisa's name. 
MR. DOROTHY Dl ASTON: t was given to Lisa. 
THE COURT: You gave it to her. 
MR. HARRISON: You are right. I think originally 
5 
1 it was in her name then it got conveyed to the daughter 
2 Lisa some two or three years I think before our court 
3 appearance. 
4 THE COURT: I don't know if it was that soon or 
5 not. At least that is what happened. 
6 MR. HARRISON: Apparently from looking at the 
7 settlement statements of the title company it appears 
8 that when Lisa executed a quit claim deed to Eric, Eric 
9 then executed documents of sale to Mr. and Mrs. Engle. That 
10 sale instead of being $210,000.00 was for $125,000.00. 
11 So the settlement statements shows that home was sold 
12 for $125,000.00. Of that amount $116,000.00 was the net 
13 proceeds that went to the seller in this case Eric. 
14 Mrs. D'Aston would further testify that Eric 
15 then told her that he gave $116,000.00 to Lisa. That Lisa 
16 received those funds. At that point, after March of 1939, 
17 Mrs. D1 Aston went to California. She went there to care 
18 for her mother and father. Her mother at the time was 77 
19 years of age, and her father was 82. Her mother 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
died in Novmeber of 1989. She has cared for her father 
continuously since she went down there. 
Her present address in California is 1322 South Delmar 
in San Gabriel, California, that is the home of her parents. 
She would further state that her reasons for leaving 
this jurisdiction were because of death threats made to 
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1 her by Bruno. She doesn't say this byway of excusing 
2 rcot complying with the court's orders but she would say 
3 that she was fearful because he had threatened to kill her. 
4 He had also threatened Lisa.And he in fact in another case 
5 that this court may or may not have knowledge of, he 
6 pulled a gun and threatened Eric in the case that was heard 
7 by Judge Harding. 
g THE COURT: Well is that a matter of findings on 
9 the part of Judge Harding or is that a disputed statement? 
IQ MR. HARRISON: I don't think that is a disputed 
11 statement. 
12 MR. LEWIS: It is completely disputed. 
13 MR. HARRISON: My information on that is that it 
14 is contained in the police incident report and beyond that 
15 I was not involved in the trial so I couldn't 
|g address that issue. 
17 
18 
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20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
That had to do with a coin operation that Eric tried 
to establish in Salt Lake and that is all I can say about 
that because I am not involved in that. 
With respect to Lisa's status the last contact that Mrs. 
DfAston had with Lisa was in April of 1989. She has not 
tal-ked with her since that time. She has not met with her 
since that time. She has no idea of where she works or 
where she lives. I would indicate to the court that I 
asked Mrs. D1Aston to give me a little bit of background 
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on that. She tells me that following the divorce her 
relationship with Lisa became strained. She was upset 
bec-ause of the loss of the Provo House which had been promise 
to her by her father and mother. 
Dorothy indicated that she believed that was a correct 
representation and promised her that she would still try 
and keep the promise if she could. 
Dorothy tells me that Lisa is bright and well educated 
and that Dorothy had no hesitation entrusting the proceeds 
of the house and these other funds to her. 
Dorothy would further indicate to the court that she 
has no income now whatsoever. Nor has she ever had any incom 
except for the assets that were acquired during the marriage, 
She has been unable to support herself. She presently 
has no assets except for those for the small assistance 
of her father. He allows her to live at his home and from 
his Social Security income buys the food or lets her buy 
the food and pays for the living expenses in that home. 
He has a Social Security income and a small pension and 
that is his only source of income. 
I would indicate further to the court that Dorothy's 
father is here today. He came with her. He suffers from 
Cancer of the bone. She dresses him, bathes him, feeds him, 
and is with him 24 hours a day. 
I would further indicate to the court that she would 
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1 state that going back and forth to California became a very 
2 difficult task for her. She asked for her son's assistance 
3 with regard to the real estate which she believed the court 
4 had awarded to her. She thought that she could intrust 
5 the funds to Lisa because she received a threat from Bruno 
6 that he could get into any safety deposit box in the country 
7 regardless of whose name it was in. 
$ Again I am not suggesting that by way of justification 
9 merely to let you know what her state of mind was at the 
\Q time these events occurred. 
H Shortly after that apparently Mr. D'Aston called and 
12 wanted some of the personal property that the court had 
13 awarded. Mrs. D'Aston would testify that she agreed 
14 that they came to the housie and took possession of sofas, 
15 dressers, pictures and lamps. She did not inventory that 
15 material and just assumed that he was taking the things he wa 
17 entitled to. 
18 She believes that Mr. D'Aston knows where Lisa is but 
19 she has no factual basis for that. She has continued to 
20 receive threats from him at Post Office Boxes and through 
21 other means has had some of the witnesses in this case. 
22 She does not know where Lisa is. She would say that 
23 her attempts to locate Lisa has been in vain. She loves 
24 her very much and she hopes that some day Lisa will realize 
25 that and try and regain contact. 
1 That would basically be her factual statement. I would 
.2 like to ask if the court would indulge me I would like to ask 
3 Dorothy's father just to make a one or two sentence 
4 statement by his need for Dorothy in caring for him if the 
5 court would allow that? 
6 THE COURT: Well I don't know if that is material 
7 thing. 
8 MR. HARRISON: I am not sure it would be material 
9 but I think it is background that is important. 
10 THE COURT: I don't see that it is material with 
11 my order and I don't see it is material with the holding of 
12 the Appellate Court. 
13 MR. HARRISON: I don't think it is material, Your 
14 Honor, but I think it is important background. Dorothy's 
15 father would want to let the court know that in fact what I 
16 have told you is correct that he has no one to care for 
17 him except her. 
18 THE COURT: Well I would suspect that is true 
19 and I don't have, that may or may not be true, I don't 
20 know. 
21 MR. HARRISON: I would merely say that is what he 
22 would say. 
23 THE COURT. Well I don't hold that as any kind of 
24 justification for what is happening? 
25 MR. HARRISON: I don't either. I just wanted the 
1C 
1 court to know that. If the court would like her to take the 
2 witness stand? 
3 THE COURT: I would leave that up to Mr. Lewis. 
4 MR. LEWIS: Well I think the orders speaks for 
5 itself, Your Honor, order her committed until she pays the 
6 money. She had the money. She was ordered not to 
7 dispose of it and ordered to pay it over. The court 
8 has made findings. She had the ability. The law is clear 
9 that someone that has the ability and then voluntarily gets 
10 rid of that ability why that is no excuse. The case 
H exactly contradicts substantially all of the alleged statemen 
12 of fact that were made we just contradict them all including 
13 any threats or anything that they said. The gun thing, Eric 
14 pulled a gun on Bruno. It is not significant here but 
15 that happened. He hasn't threatened her. He has 
16 never been to the house and never got any assets from the 
17 house. He just hasn't had anything. He hasn't had any 
18 contact with her actually since the trial. 
19 We are asking the court to just enforce the court's order 
20 and have her pay the money which she proffered she could do. 
21 MR. HARRISON: The procedural posture as I 
22 see it I think the most recent order of the court is that 
23 as the court will recall that Dorothy was not served with the 
24 order to show cause but I was in court that day and eventuallf 
25 the court told me about what it was considering doing based 
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upon no appearance or testimony by any party counsel for 
Mr. D'Aston prepared the findings relative to the ability 
of compliance and so forth and so on. 
The point is that based upon that, the court issued 
an order of commitment and then modified it to say that 
she was ordered committed and set a bail amount in the sum 
of $10,000.00. I think that is the most recent document 
that now is before the court. It is not as Mr. Lewis 
characterized that she is required to pay. 
THE COURT: The $10,000.00 is simply to keep her 
out of jail until the court makes a determination as to what 
to do. 
The Appellate Court has simply indicated that the trial 
court may want to have some flexibility to fashion some terms 
under which the non-complying party may purge herself of a 
contempt. You tell me how she is going to do that? How 
do you spend a $160,000.00 for support in less than a 
year. To me this is absolutely ludicrous absolutely. All 
four of the parties were here'in court. All four of the 
parties knew what the court's orders were. There was ample 
money to sustain everybody in this action. The appeal 
could have gone on if she just simply had put the money 
there. I find no reason whatsoever to believe that she 
was confused as to where the bank box was. That is 
absolutely ludicrous. $300,000.00 and she stands up here and 
12 
testifies, Lisa stands up here and testifies. Eric 
stands up here and testifies and when that is going on she 
has already given all of this money away and not one word to 
the court about where it has gone. 
MR. HARRISON: I think the court misunderstands 
that. This is the letter from First Security Bank I think. 
THE COURT: Well you have already told me and 
if I misunderstood you that she gave $127,000.00 to Lisa. 
She gave $75,000.00 to Lisa and this was in September and 
October of 1988. The court's ruling was in December. 
MR. HARRISON: Right the trial was in April. 
THE COURT: Well then she gave it away after. 
MR. HARRISON: Before the court's ruling before 
the court's decision but after the trial had been 
completed, I think that is correct. 
THE COURT: All right that may be so. But 
nevertheless she knew that was funds out there that belonged 
to her estate and to Mr. D'Aston's estate and what gave her 
the idea she had total liberty with these things to give 
them away? 
MR. HARRISON: I think if you would ask her that 
question and she has told me what her answer to that that 
she understood that she continued to use that money for . 
her living expenses as she had done before . That is what 
she did. 
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I think the court will recall that the - -
THE COURT: I said that she could live on but 
who is anticipating $160,000.00 and who is anticipating 
making gifts of excess of $200,000.00. I don't buy that 
at all. 
MR. HARRISON: I don't, Your Honor, believe her 
intent was to make a gift. I think her intent was to merely 
entrust this money to Lisa until it was decided and 
after the court reached its decision in December , she was 
never able again to talk with Lisa and has not been able 
to. 
THE COURT: I don't buy that story. I just can't 
believe that story. 
MR. HARRISON: Perhaps the court would want her 
put under oath and have Mr. Lewis or the court ask her 
questions. I have represented to the court the best of 
my ability what I think she would say. I think that is 
an important inquiry. 
THE COURT: Well I find it very difficult to believe 
I just can't buy that kind of a story. In effect if I let 
her get away with this I am going to let her get away 
22 kith an absolute disregard for justice in this matter , the 
23 
24 
25 
order of the court or the power of the court. She can get 
put the back door by coming and making a lot of excuses now 
fchat wouldn't let her get out the front door on initially. 
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MR. HARRSION: Your Honor, I think as I looked at 
the some of the cases cited by the Court of Appeals one of 
the distinquishing factors was that the case they particular 
cite on, I think it was the one involving the transfer of 
bonds. In that case the party that was required to do 
something never stated that he just didn-'t have those things. 
He said that he had them and always had them and had them 
all the way up through the contempt proceedings but just 
didn't want to give them to the other party. 
I think you have got a little bit different situation 
here and that is that before the court made its decision 
on the case which was in December of 1988, but after the triaJ 
which was held in April of 1988, she transferred this 
property,the cash, to Lisa. The only thing that she hadn't 
done was to sell the house. The hous»e was then sold in March 
of 1989 and those funds again given to Lisa. 
She would indicate to the court that she will answer 
any questions relative to bank accounts historically 
produce bank statements, keep the court advised. 
THE COURT: What good is that going to do? 
MR. HARRISON: The point is to both parties it is 
important it seems to me to be able to locate Lisa to both 
parties. There may be something in those documents that 
may be helpful to either party. 
THE COURT: It may be important to them but why does 
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this burden fall upon Mr. D'Aston when your client is the 
one, your clients, all three of them, are the one that put 
this thing in this kind of a posture. 
MR. HARRISON: Well - -
THE COURT: Why should she come in here now and say 
that it is all Mr. D'Aston's fault? 
MR. HARRISON: I didn't say that. 
THE COURT: Basically you are saying that because 
of some alleged threats, some alleged problems. 
MR. HARRISON: No, I am only telling you that 
to let you know her state of mind. I am not excusing 
her behavior because of that. I just give you that by 
way of state of mind. I think that what we have is , we 
have a civil case where the court has rendered a judgment. 
I think in a certain point Mrs. D'Aston had to say , okay 
am I going to stay there and force the.proceedings by 
posting a bond or are they entitled to go ahead and try and 
execute and do anything else they want. She made a good 
faith effort to comply with part of the bond requirement 
which was rejected by Mr. D'Aston. After that happened 
she wasn't able to produce the bond so what that did was to 
leave her open for any kind of enforcement action that they 
wanted to *ake and she still open and she has nothing she 
can do about that. I think if the court moves the other 
direction then what the court is saying is that well you know 
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we have a judgment and that has not been paid and so we are 
going to create a debtor's prison situation. If the court 
says that okay I think she ought to go to jail , she will 
never come out of there. The only way she could possible com£ 
out of there if all of a sudden Lisa would come forward and 
say that yes here is this money and I will go ahead and 
deposit it with the court. She had no control over Lisa 
at all. 
THE COURT: Well she was awarded the house. She 
sold the house after, sold it at a fire sale, disappeared 
and took all the money and let Eric give it to Lisa. 
MR. HARRISON: That is correct. 
THE COURT: I have a hard time making that wash. 
Mr. HARRISON: Your Honor, the only two people that 
she had, well four people left in her life were the two 
children and her parents. She went back and forth to try and 
take care of her parents. She thought she could trust 
Lisa to hold this stuff. She was afraid about what he might 
do. 
THE COURT: Why don't we have this during this wholje 
period of time? . She never told you that at least if she did 
she never represented it to the court. Your only representation 
to this court is I don't know how to get a hold of her. I 
don't know where she is. I don't know what she is doing. 
She can call me . 
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MR. HARRISON: That is correct. 
THE COURT: But I never got any explanation of 
any kind. Now that things get down to push and shove whether 
she gets to go forward with her appeal or not, we all of a 
sudden have an appearance and the appearance says that 
I don',t have any money I am stone broke, what am I going to 
do about it? What am I going to do about it to uphold the 
integrity of this court's order? 
MR. HARRISON: Well, Your Honor, you know I have 
thought aobut that because it is a difficult problem because 
I think that she, I mean it is not exactly like a Motion 
for Supplemental Proceedings where you just are trying 
to identify and execute on it. The assets have previously 
been identified and listed. 
THE COURT: Not only identified and listed but lied 
to as to where they were so there was no opportunity and 
Mr. Lewis immediately went out to get those funds. We couldn 
locate them. You knew within a short period of time that 
he couldn't locate them but there was never any effort 
to come forward at that time and say that golly gee whiz 
they are over in First Security Bank. 
MR. HARRISON: I didn't know. 
THE COURT: I know you didn't know and I am not 
blaming you but I am saying that your client had that 
opportunity and didn't. Surely you were telling her that 
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those funds had been awarded. She had a copy of this court's 
order. Now all of a sudden she has got this miraculous 
memory of where the thing was. I have real problems. I 
think it is a flat out lie to this court. 
MR. HARRISON: Well I asked her to talk with both 
banks that she had an account in Farwest and First Security 
and get any records they had of any accounts or safety 
deposit boxes and that is how I discovered . I was 
out at First Security Bank getting that letter, (indicating) 
THE COURT: All I can say is if your client 
legitimately doesn't know where $300,000.00 is then you 
ought to have her tested for competency and let's get her 
to the State Hospital where she belongs. I don't know of 
any other human being that I have ever been associated with 
that doesn't know where $300,000.00 is of their assets. 
To sit through a five day trial and not ever have that 
disturbed her memory is beyond me. 
MR. HARRISON: I understand that. 
THE COURT: Now to have two children here who 
also, I am sorry Mr. Harrison it just appears to me this is a 
conspiracy on the part of her and the two kids. That is what 
it smacks to me as. It has already smacked to me earlier 
with regard to Eric and that is the reason I am not hearing 
his case. He thinks I am prejudice and I guess you get that 
way after hearing people lie for five days. 
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MR. HARRISON: Well, Your Honor, does the court 
believe that at the time of trial that Lisa was not honest 
with the court and Eric was not honest with the court? 
THE COURT: I absolutely do. 
MR. HARRISON: Does the court believe that both 
parties were not honest or just Mrs. D'Aston? 
THE COURT: I find like Judge Harding there was an 
awful lot of lies in this trial. 
MR. HARRISON: On both sides of the case? 
THE COURT: I don't know who was lying. I think 
my findings of fact will indicate that, that I didn't 
know who was lying but somebody obviously had to be lying 
and now from every step forward from this point forward, 
it appears, or from the point forward the trial that it appears 
that it is Mrs. D'Aston and the two children because of 
everything that has gone on. 
Now you tell me from an objective standpoint why I 
shouldn't feel that way? 
MR. HARRISON: Well,if I knew of some way to I thinl 
Lisa is the key to this thing. If I knew of some way to loca 
here either through employment or residence or boyfriends 
or anything. 
THE COURT: You know uhe thing that disturbs me 
when we find her I would almost beat a steak dinner and she i 
going to come up and say that I didn't get any of this money, 
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Eric got it or Mrs. D'Aston had got it or Bruno took 
it from me. I bet she doesn't have it. The testimony 
will be that she doesn't have it. That is what I would think 
because that is the way this ball has revolved every since 
the date of the trial. Whoever happens to be in front of 
the court they don't have it somebody else has it. The 
dilemma is what to do? There is obviously no way she can 
purge herself from the contempt. 
MR. HARRISON: I agree. 
THE COURT: Do you want to see her sit in jail 
for about six months Mr. D'Aston is that what you want? 
MR. 3RUNO D'ASTON: Your Honor, it is up to the 
court, I am beyond reason to say anything. 
THE COURT: Well it is a real aggravation to the 
court. 
MR. LEWIS: What to do, and obviously the question 
is they haven't paid the money to the court. We believe 
strongly that she has the ability to pay and she has the 
money and you are going to say that she is going to sit 
in jail for six months I suspect that maybe if she were there 
the money might appear is my feeling. Also I think that such 
a short time that someone has got to report back to the 
Appellate Court by March 9th and I assume that it excuse me 
May 9th. If she is still in contempt of court then simply 
the appeal would be dismissed and that is the way I read the 
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court's decision. 
MR. HARRISON: I disagree with Mr. Lewis' 
interpretation. I think that her responsibility 
under the Court of Appeals is to appear for further 
proceedings as this court may determine appropriate. This 
is not a case where - -
THE COURT: Well - -
MR.HARRISON: That the court is saying you must pay 
a judgment as a condition of the appeal. 
THE COURT: Let me read what they say and 
then you can argue this with them but this is what they say. 
Still another approach is to stay the appeal until the 
appellate has submitted herself to the process of the trial 
court. This approach gives the trial court the flexibility 
to fashion the terms under- which the non-complying party may 
purge the contempt rather than necessarily ordering the 
enforcement of the judgment. They go on over here and say 
that - -
MR. HARRISON: At the bottom of Page 6 there is 
important language, the petitioner's appeal is not 
dismissed because of the failure to satisfy a judgment but it 
was dismissed because of the failure to comply with the courl 
order to safeguard so forth and so on. 
THE COURT: On top of Page 7? 
MR. HARRISON: Top of Page 7. 
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MR. HARRISON: It seems to me, Your Honor, 
that when you look at this case on the two extremes as far 
as fashioning something, you have either got a case where 
she could say that well you pay $236,000.00 into court and if 
you don't do that you don't satisfy me with respect to 
anything. 
THE COURT: Well ,the thing of it is she is in contempt, 
MR. HARRISON: There is no question about that. 
THE COURT: I have already held that she is in 
contempt. Now the question is am I going to allow her to 
purge herself on what conditions? 
MR. HARRISON: I think at that point you get into 
this issue of does she have the ability to purge herself 
or not. 
THE COURT': Mr. Lewis believes it is and maybe 
I am misquoting you but it is all a pack of lies and she has 
got the money. If she would be put in jail the money would 
come forward. 
MR. HARRISON: Your Honor, if he is wrong then 
she stays there for what 30 days, 60 days, 90 days, a year, 
five years? 
THE COURT: Well,.what if he is not wrong' 
MR. HARRISON: Well, if he is not wrong then that 
would be a great relief to me and the court and to counsel. 
I happen to believe that she has told me about having no 
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1 assets. I have talked with her father. He would tell 
2 the court the same thing that he has provided everything 
3 for her since she has came down to take care of him because 
4 she had nothing. 
5 THE COURT.- Where did $160,000.00 go in living 
6 expenses? 
7 MR. HARRISON: I think she early on I could just 
8 tell you generally that she had medical expenses, she had 
9 living expenses, she had travel she had witness' expenses 
10 and she had to pay for all of these people to fly from 
11 wherever they were. One guy came from Oregon and another 
12 came, two people came from California for the original 
13 trial that we had in this case. She had trial related 
14 expenses of about $40,000.00 to $50,000.00. Most of that 
15 a large part of that had to do with witnesses and paying 
16 their lost earnings from their jobs because they were away 
17 and so on and so forth. Then she had this period of time 
18 where before that she was living on $6,000.00 or $7,000.00 
19 a month as the court will recall. That was the interest 
20 that was accruing on a note. So she was spending 
21 at the level of $6,000.00 or $7,000.00 before we even came 
22 to trial. Then after trial - -
23 THE COURT: Why sell the house at a fire s~le 
24 for a $100,000.00 less than its value? Why do that? 
25 MR. HARRISON: What I know about that is that the 
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house had been listed for sale even before the trial and 
they had no offers on it and all of a sudden - -
THE COURT: One offer out there. 
MR. HARRISON: All of a sudden we got the one offer 
of $210,000.00 about in January of 1989 and that is why 
I was personally convinced that this is great because we 
don't have the ability to pay this $300,000.00 but we could 
pledge the $210,000.00 because it was a mortgage free 
house. We could pledge that and Bruno informed his lawyer 
that he rejected that. At that point that sale failed 
because they filed a lis pendens. 
THE COURT: Well it didn't stop the sale a lis 
pendens is still there. 
MR. HARRISON: Apparently what happened is about 
a year later or several months later they found they had 
another offer. Those people were willing to buy it subject 
to I guess, whatever the lis pendens was and I think they 
are involved in a lawsuit right now. I think Mr. D1Aston 
has sued them. 
THE COURT; I suspect anyone that bought it with a 
lis pendens on it whether they paid $220,000.00 or $120,000.00) 
MR. HARRISON: I think they are involved in a 
jlawsuit right now on that. 
You know her ability to lease, and at one time the court 
Isaid that well if she didn't have the ability to post the 
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$312,000.00 and if you had come back in and told me 
about that maybe we would ha\ze modified that order to some 
extent. The court made that comment at the time we came in 
and complained a little bit about the fact that we 
couldn't stay the action anymore because we couldn't post 
that bond and the thing we tried to do is offer the proceeds 
of the sale and that had been rejected . I prepared the 
documents and sent them to Mr. Lewis. Then he called me and 
said that his client wouldn't accept it. They knew that 
they could interrupt that sale and did interrupt that sale. 
So then the thing sort of got given to Eric and the court 
knows the history of that. 
THE COURT: As I recall during the time of the trial 
the allegations were that she was receiving this interest 
every month and it wasn't until the last day of the trial 
we found out that she had already discounted the note and had 
the money. 
MR. HARRISON: Your Honor, Mr. Lewis' representation 
on that were wrong. I think the court's impression is wrong. 
What happened was at the time that she had given a financial 
declaraction, she indicated on there what her assets were 
at that time. The record will reflect and they have been 
transcribed - -
THE COURT: There wasn't any indication of anbody 
to correct this impression then because that certainly was th< 
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idea that I had from the very beginning and that never even 
surfaced until the last day of trial. 
M.R HARRISON: Your Honor, I expected Mr. Lewis 
to cross examine relative to that financial declaration. 
You remember that was submitted when they came in and asked 
for alimony . The court awarded Mr. D'Aston alimony 
of $2500.00 a month. It was based upon - -
THE COURT: It wasn't alimony, it was just the 
division of some of the assets. 
MR. HARRISON: It was temporary support from whatever 
source that was. It was phrased that way . It was phrased 
as alimony . But the court awarded that $2500.00 to him on 
the basis' of her financial declaration submitted in about 
January of that year. 
Now nobody asked any further questions about it. I 
made no statements to the court about it. What happened 
was Mr. Lewis comes in to trial and all of a sudden he is 
questioning her and she says that she has discounted the note 
and so forth. We were complaining because he had transferred 
all of his assets to this California attorney Mr. 
Sidney Troxell and then had filed a lawsuit against her in 
California in violation of a previous court order. So the 
court said that well, you transferred your assets and Mrs. 
D'Aston discou nted it I am going to hold those things as equal 
and not worry about either one . But Mr. Lewis made some big 
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argument about the fact that somehow he was deceived. He 
was not deceived. He never asked any questions about it until 
the trial. At the trial it came out that had been discounted 
that is all. Now if the court had this impression that someho\ 
it was not the case. It had nothing to do with the evidence 
presented or arguments of counsel had to do. 
THE COURT: I would expect that somebody 
would enlighten the court as to what the true facts 
where somewhere along the case instend of go on the assumption 
which you knew that the assumption that the court had. 
Somebody has that obligation. 
MR. HARRISON: I think at the time of trial that we 
brought forward a financial declaration that had been used 
before. She testified at trial about what the 
differences were between that time and trial. You know one 
of the frustrations that she had Judge, was that Mr. D*Aston 
never did do a financial declaration. You don't have in your 
record right now the fact that he owns an RV and he has all 
this stuff that is attached to it. 
THE COURT: Well I did too, I knew that all the way 
through. 
MR. HARRISON: on a financial declaration . I 
asked him questions at various times in trial but there 
has never been a financial declaration given by him. That 
is not to say - -
2 
1 THE COURT: It doesn't matter about the financial 
2 declaration. The concern is that I wasn't fully apprised 
3 as to what the situation was and the status was. 
4 MR. HARRISON: I understand. 
5 THE COURT: Now your client's position is 
6 that Lisa has all of a sudden disappeared and nobody 
7 knows where she is at and she has got all the money? 
8 MR.HARRISON: Not all of a sudden. She hasn't 
9 seen her since October of 1988 which was about two months 
10 before the court made its decision in this case. 
11 THE COURT: Well somebody has seen her if they 
12 transferred the whole ball of wax from the sale of the 
13 house to her? 
14 MR. HARRISON: The only person that has seen her 
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is Eric. Eric saw her in March of 1989. Eric was subpoenaed 
and he is outside. I don't know if the court wants to ask 
him anything about it? 
THE COURT: It is not my lawsuit. 
MR. HARRISON: I agree but my information is through 
my client that Eric saw her and gave her the $116,000.00 
in March of 1989. 
THE COURT: Well, Mr. Lewis do you have anything 
further? 
MR. LEWIS: Well, I certainly don't want to retry 
the case. I think the orders of the court, the court has mad4 
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the findings. I don't think we can go back on them. 
MR. HARRISON: Let me just respond to that brieflyi 
It seems to me when the court is talking about a situation 
which is a very serious one that where you have got a default, 
findings of fact and order that it is particularly - -
THE COURT: That has been held and I am not going to 
rehash that. 
MR- HARRISON: I understand that but it is particula 
important to note. 
MRS. D'ASTON: Can I take my father out and lay 
him down ? 
THE COURT: You take him out Mr. Mullin I want 
Ms. D'Aston to stay in here. 
MR. MULLIN: Your Honor,I don't know how to care 
for him . 
THE COURT: The only care right now is to just 
wheel him out in his wheelchair. 
MRS. D'ASTON: I need to lay him down on the bench. 
THE COURT: All right you take him out and lay 
him down and you come back. 
(WHEREUPON, a brief break was taken to take Mrs. D'Aston's 
father out to lay him on the bench) 
THE COURT: Back on the record. If my arithmetic 
is accurate Lisa has $318,000.00? 
MR. HARRISON: Plus - -
30 
1 THE COURT: That doesn't belong to her. 
2 MR. HARRISON: Plus the financial declaration 
3 in January of 1988 showed diamonds and Silver Bullion 
4 worth about my recollection was about $80,000.00. 
5 THE COURT: $75,000.00. If this is accurate you 
6 told me that she gave a $127,000.00 in cash to Lisa, 
7 $75,000.00 which was the value of the diamonds - -
8 1 MR. HARRISON:: $75,000.00 was the cash that she had 
9 in her home. 
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THE COURT: All right, you add those to together 
yo get $202,000.00 . 
MR. HARRISON: Right. 
THE COURT: Then she got a $116,000.00 out of the 
sale of the home. 
MR. HARRISON: Plus the diamonds and Silver Bullioi 
which at that time were valued at approximately I think 
$37,000.00. 
THE COURT: She has those as well? 
MR. HARRISON: Yes those were given to her at the 
THE COURT: That is $405,000.00. 
MR. HARRISON: That is right. 
THE COURT: Well, the only thing I can see is to give| 
Mrs. D'Aston 30 days in which to deposit $236,800.00 with this 
court or in somebody's trust account. That will give her 30 
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30 days to locate Lisa . If that has not happened in 
30 days I am going to sentence her to 60 days in jail then 
we will see where we are at after that. 
MRS. D'ASTON: My father will die without my care. 
He can't even bathe himself. I don't have the money. 
I swear to God I don't. I don't have anything. 
THE COURT: Why did you give it all away? 
MRS. D*ASTON: She was supposed to hold it 
for me. I suspect Bruno got a hold of her and he has got 
the money from her. 
THE COURT: I don't know why you even felt like 
that was necessary? 
MRS. DrASTON: Because I had to run. My mother 
died in November. I have her death certificate. I have 
been with them for over a year taking care of their needs. 
THE COURT: Why didn't you make some appearance 
in this court? 
MRS. D'ASTON: I couldn't leave them. 
THE COURT: You could have told your attorney 
where you were at. You could have explained to this court 
why you were away. This court is not without some sympathy. 
MRS. D'ASTON: Your Honor, I made a bad choice. I 
made a bad decision. I should have dealt with it differentl 
My life has been unbelievable horrible and whether you believ 
me or not this man (indicating) he has been sending death 
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threats to my parents when I was living with them with a 
tape from a newspaper to tell them to drop dead that he would 
get them. My life has been hell for the last few years. 
Now I ai n bankr i ip t I cannot come up with that money, Your 
Honor ;f I den'* take care of my father he will die. He 
will diF -*--; e literally cannot take care of himself. 
. am sure you could see that? He is dying of Bone Cancer. I 
am all he has got left in the world ani vou are letting 
this man destroy our whole family. He had destroyed 
my children. He had destroyed my parents and he has destroye4 
own family. ' ather knows about that. He needs 
a Psychiatrist and he lies and everybody believes him. I 
am sorry , Your -•"••-. 
THE COURT: You could have solved this problem 
very easily by just keeping in contact with your attorney? 
MRS. D*ASTON: You are right, Your Honor, I should 
have done something sooner but when you are caring for your 
to J i v J. n g p a r e n 15 y J u Leally don't think about anything else. 
|I just figured I would just take care of them. I didn't know 
what to do. I made stupid choices. ?. s far as the bank thing, 
21 \L did not lie. I swear to you I didn't lie. 1 just made 
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a mistake. I thought it was in the other bank. I was under 
ja lot of stress . I did not do that deliberately. 
THE COURT: I will be perfectly honest with you 
lit is awfully hard for iie to believe that. 
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MRS. D1 ASTON: I can see that. I did make some 
bad decisions. I am bankrupt. I have no money. I 
am literally living with my father in California. I had to 
bring him here because there is just no one to care for him. 
He was frightened. He said that just put me in the backseat 
of the car and drive me with you. We had to keep stopping 
at motels. This is the dearest sweetest man in the 
world and I won't let him die without me caring for him. I 
won't turn him over to a stranger. How do you live with 
yourself Bruno? Ifyou would let my father testify, he would 
tell you how he used to hit me and abuse me mentally and 
physically . He made my life hell. Now he should go to jail. 
He is a convicted felon. I never even got a traffic ticket. 
I was a good wife and a good mother. I was good to my 
parents and I never hurt anybody my whole life. 
THE COURT: Why do you account for the fact that 
Lisa won't even speak to you? 
MRS. D'ASTON: I don't know. I love her with all 
my heart. I don't know. I don .'t know whether he got to 
her or what happened. Maybe she saw all that money and 
just wanted no part of this whole chaos anymore. I don't 
know. 
THE COURT: Probably not if she has got all the mom 
it certainly puts her in a advantageous position. 
MRS. D1ASTON: She is my child and I still love her 
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If the money means that much to her then let her have it. 
THE COURT: Your share you certainly have a right 
to give away anyway you want to but it is your husband's shar£ 
that is creating the problem. 
MRS. D'ASTON: He has his assets hidden. I know 
that people bought coins from him in the last year. 
He is lying about that too. 
THE COURT: There is a big dispute going on between 
him and Eric in Judge Harding's courtroom over that but I am 
not a party to that right now. 
MRS. D.'ASTON: He is a pathological lier, Your Honour 
He lies about anything and everything. 
THE COURT: Well I am sympathetic with what you are 
saying Mrs. D'Aston but I don't know how to maintain the 
integrity of this court. 
MRS. D'ASTON: I have not lied to you. 
THE COURT: Somebody just flaunted the order of 
this 
MRS. D'ASTON:: I didn't intend to flaunt it. I 
made stupid decisions. 
THE COURT: Didn't your counsel tell you how serious 
this was? 
MRS. D'ASTON;: I only called him up on a few 
occasions. 
THE COURT: Why didn't he tell you, why didn't he 
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tell you how serious this was? 
MRS. D'ASTON: I got so wrapped up in caring 
for my parents that frankly I was so emotional distraught 
this whole last year that is all I could think about. I 
know he has money to take care of himself. He wasn't 
starving. 
THE COURT: I don't think he is starving either. 
That is not the question. The question before the court 
is the contempt of this court. I don't understand why 
you would even have to be in contempt of this court. 
MRS. D'ASTON: I would ask the court to forgive 
me for my stupid actions. I never meant to do anything 
wrong because I have never done anything wrong in my life. 
I have always tried to be nice and fair and honest in 
dealing with people that way. 
THE COURT: That is not the impression, you left 
the court with when you deed the house away, when you deed the 
extra lot away. When Eric comes along and sells the house 
and the lot that I awarded directly to him.After the order 
of the court you give all this money to Lisa and now Lisa 
is not to be found anywhere. 
I jean if you put yourself in my shoes what you are asking 
me to do is put myself in your shoes, you put yourself in the 
court's shoes and say that why do I have one bit of reaso 
for believing you? I understand what you are saying. I don' 
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disbelieve that this is obviously your father and he is 
in bad shape and he needs some help. How old is he? 
MRS. D'ASTON: He is 82. 
THE COURT: Does your client know where Lisa 
is' 
MR. BRUNDO D'ASTON: No. 
THE COURT: Have you had any contact with her at 
all? 
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MR. BRUNO D'ASTON: None whatsoever, I never 
did since she was in court here and then she wasn't speaking 
to me. 
Your Honor, the only party that has all those assets 
is Dorothy. Lisa doesn't have them . She has over a million 
dollars in cash before any sale in California property 
or anything else. She ha s it. 
THE COURT: Lisa just up and moved? 
MR. HARRISON: She was employed and the fellow 
that cam in and testified . You remember that there was a 
young man that came in and testified that he went to a show 
*i "r~ Tu u -ome Go 1 d from Br uno during the time that Bruno 
claimed that he wasn't to be transacting business. That was 
^ •**" • - .terns of evidence. He was her boyfriend. She 
had taken him to this trade show. I think it was in Long 
Beach and made that purchase in the anticipation for the 
court trial. So they were both down in Los Angeles 
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some place. That is the last connection that I found 
with her. 
THE COURT: Does Eric know where she is at? 
MR. HARRISON: He tells me no but I have no 
problem in having him step up here on the witness stand and 
ask that question to him? 
THE COURT: Well it wouldn't be beyond his power 
to tell me no. 
MR. HARRISON: That is right. 
THE COURT: Because of all that he has gone through 
I don't think an oath means .anything to him. 
Well this is a real mess. 
MR. HARISON: Another thing I was going to suggest, 
Your Honor, that one of the things is important that Dorothy 
do obviously would be to be available at any time the 
court wants her here or whenever Mr. Lewis wants to serve 
her with anything else. 
THE COURT: I don't think that is even important and 
if what you represent is true what difference does it make? 
MR. HARRISON: Well I don't know. I think there is a 
chance that Lisa might come forward. I don't know her 
well enough to know if she is sensitive to difficulties 
created in the situation ? I have no idea. 
At the time I spoke with her before trial I was impressed 
to the fact that she seemed intelligent. She is a college 
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1 graduate and she seemed to be responsible in the sense of ". 
2 living her own life and had a job and so forth. That is 
3 all I know about her. 
4 Mrs, D'Aston had indicated where exactly - -
5 THE COURT: How are you going to get in touch 
5 with her? You are saying that there is just a chance she 
7 is going to show . If she has absented herself all this 
g time, I am sure the only time she is going to surface 
9 is when she is going to come back and she is going to 
10 say that she is bankrupt my boyfriend has took it all or 
11 I 1 os 1: :i 1: :i I bi J sines s dealings. T h i s I s going to be as 
12 absent as the million dollars worth of coins is absent. 
U Nobody knows where they went. Everybody acknowledges that 
14 t h e y were there but nobody knows where they went. You have 
15 two sides of that story. 
15 MR. HARRISON: I know the court believes that 
17 Bruno is truthful on key issues and believes that Mrs. 
13 D Aston is not truthful? 
19 THE COURT: That is not necessarily so. In the 
20 beginning I felt like I was getting stories from: b o t h s i d e s „ 
: But all I can say is what I have said before is what has 
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happened since indicates that to this court that Mr. D*Aston 
is probably more truthful than the other three defendants. 
MR. HARRISON: All I can say is I think in general 
tl iat the court has felt that he wa s more truthful than she 
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1 was. And a lot of these orders reflect that. I think if 
2 the court considers that a chance exists that in fact 
3 Mrs. D'Aston has been truthful about these things and 
4 what I have stated to you as to what I proffered as her 
5 testimony today is the truth and you still have his position 
6 saying that is fine let her go to jail. Let her father 
^ have whatever health problems he has. He doesn't care. 
8 THE COURT: Why don't we have Eric take care 
9 of his grand dad? 
10 MR. HARRISON: Well do you want my personal opinion 
11 THE COURT: Why don't we have Eric come in and tell 
12 us and ask him why he don't come in and take care of his 
13 grandfather while his mother goes to jail. Bring him in. 
14 (WHEREUPON, Mr. Eric D'Aston is brought into the courtroom) 
15 MR. HARRISON: As I indicated he is here 
16 pursuant to a subpoena. 
17 THE COURT: This court is about to send your mother 
18 to jail and you go by Aston I guess now? 
19 MR. ERIC ASTON: Yes. 
20 THE COURT: We want to know why you can't take 
21 care of your grandfather while your mother is serving 
22 jail time? 
23 MR. ERIC ASTON: I am running a business. 
24 j THE COURT: Which is more important? 
MR. ERIC ASTON: Feeding myself. Because of this 25 
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wno'- -.ourt thing and my lying father and he knows he is 
lying. hope you enjoy what you are doing? (indicating) 
THE COURT: Never mind making those representations 
just answer the court's question? 
MR. ERIC ASTON: I have my own family now. To 
be quite frankly honest this whole situation has literally 
destroyed my life in the past five years from taking coins 
that I brought in' • . * • •' • bring them in 
to having them taken fron -. being able to run 
a business. 
THE COURT: Well that is not in this court. That 
is up in Judge Harding's court. 
MR. ERIC ASTON: I don't have room. I have a wife 
and a kid and a small condo. 
THE COURT: Do you know where your sister is a~? 
MR. ERIC.ASTONl 'No I don't. I wish I did. 
THE COURT: Do you know why she would want 
aJlegedly she has in her possession some $405,000.00 that 
belongs to your mother and your father? 
MR. ERIC ASTON: Your Honor, in my opinion my 
father has that money right now and he knows it all right. 
You are dealing with a professional lier and someone that is 
very good at what they do. 
THE COURT: Well there is no evidence to that effect 
The only evidence I have is representation from Mr. Harrison 
4 1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
today that Lisa has all that money. 
MR. ERIC ASTON: I can't prove it but I 
know my father and don't sit there and cry because he turns 
his emotions on like that you know. He made us look like 
the bad people. He is running around the country with 
his motorhome. He is going to shows. He is spending a lot 
of money. 
THE COURT: He didn't make you look like the 
bad people because after the decision of this court it 
could have very adequately handled if you hadn't of sold 
the property which you had no business in selling No. 1 
after this court order. 
No. 2 , your mother had the money if she would have 
just simply put it in trust or whatever the money that I 
awarded to your father nome of this would have happened. 
So I don't see where you are getting off your like the Mr. 
Clean in this thing. 
MR. ERIC ASTON: In selling the house I read a pape: 
from you giving the house to my mother. My mother stated 
for me to sell it and give my sister the money so I did that. 
I mean I have started my own business. 
THE COURT: Not only that but you sold the lot that 
I awarded to Mr. D'Aston. 
MR. ERIC ASTON: I just signed the papers that 
they told me to sign. 
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THE COURT: You are a very intelligent man. 
I don't buy that for five seconds that you don't understand 
what is going on. Well okay, do you have any questions 
of Mr. Eric Aston? 
MR. LEWIS: No. 
THE COURT: You may step back out of the courtroom. 
You are not a party to this. 
(WHEREUPON • : - • • -. nail) 
MR. • HARRISON: It is obvious if Eric would 
step forward and say that let me Lar^ e care of my grandfather 
that would be one thing but I think what you have heard 
is exactly what I predicted he would say. He just doesn't 
care about him. 
THE COURT: The only milk of human kindness I 
see in the family is Mr -ston taking care of her father 
and I just hope it is not a - excuse. 
MR. HARRISON: I think that is genuine Judge. 
THE COURT: I feel like there has been so many 
opportunities or at least not opportunities but there has 
been so many occasions where they tried to pull the wool 
over the court's eyes that I don't know what I can trust and 
what I can't trust. 
MR. HARRISON: You have got Eric who doesn't 
care if his grandfather dies. You have got Mr. D'Aston 
iwho doesn't care if she goes to jail for 10 years and the 
4 3 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
father dies. You have got Lisa who doesn't care if she goes 
to jail because she has got the money and couldn't come 
forward with it. I think I agree. 
THE COURT: All in the name of dollars and cents. 
Mrs. D'Aston you are still in contempt of this court bad 
decisions or otherwise. It is no different from the 
criminal who commits a crime and comes in here and says 
that please forgive me I didn't know what I was doing. 
I made a bad choice-and there is always an accountability 
for that. 
I don't know what is the prognosis for your father do 
you know? 
MRS. D'ASTON: No he has Bone Cancer. 
THE COURT: I understand. Has the Doctor 
said anything about his life span? 
MRS. D'ASTON: He hasn't give us any time. 
THE COURT: Heck of a place to be playing that out 
in the courtroom in talking about somebody's life in that 
fashion but. 
MR. HARRISON: When I talked to him briefly 
he tells me that he has Prostate Cancer and Bone Cancer 
and there is no prognosis for recovery and beyond that 
that is all he told me. 
THE COURT: What I am going to do . . . 
(WHEREUPON,the rest of the hearing was previously transcribe: 
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and t h i s concludes the other por t ion of the hearing) 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH 
• ss . 
COUNTY OF WASATCH ) 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the HEAR/ was reported 
by me in Stenotype, and thereafter causey me to be 
transcribed into typewriting by Richard CTatton and that a* 
full, true and correct transcription of id HEARING was so 
taken. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY th'-t I am ft of kin or otherwise 
associated with any of the parties to fail cause of action 
and that I am not interested in the e e^nt -herp_:Ji. 
WITNESS my hand and officii seal at Midwa^ 
Utah, this /f^ day of uuluy, 1990 
RICHARD C. TATTONjCi* 
My commission expires: 
June. 15-., tJSfta-^ -*-??^ :—N-NoBryPoW'ic -
WISH?!'
 : , ^ ^ « J 
APPENDIX "F"' 
Notice of Appearance 
HARRIS, CARTER & HARRISON 
Brian C. Harrison 
Attorney for Defendant 
3325 North University Avenue, #200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: 375-9801 
Utah State Bar #1388 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRUNO D'ASTON, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
-vs- ] 
DOROTHY D'ASTON ] 
Defendant. ] 
> NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
) Civil No. CV-86-1124 
) Judge Boyd L. Park 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS: 
You will hereby take notice that the Defendant, Dorothy 
D'Aston, appeared before me on the 4th day of May, 1990 for further 
Court proceedings as required by your opinion in Case 
Number 890050-CA filed April 9, 1990. 
The Defendant is still in contempt of Court, but has been 
granted 45 days in which to purge her contempt. Additional 
proceedings have been scheduled for June 22, 1990 to review this 
matter. 
DATED this ? day of "^'h;f 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM:. . 
S„ Rex Lewis/ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Notice of Compliance on this 7 day of 
ft"! , 1£89, by first-class, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid to 
the following: t W 
S. Rex Lewis 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
The Utah Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Secretary 
APPENDIX "G" 
Order, May 22, 1990 
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" ^STRICT COURT 
^ i Alt OF LiT^M 
*
T # J9 58 AM '30 
S. REX LEWIS (1953), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street k:aston-or.Io 
P.O. Box 778 Our File No. 17,603 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRUNO D'ASTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOROTHY D'ASTON, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. CV 86 1124 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
The defendant Dorothy D'Aston personally appeared before the Court on the 4th 
day of May, 1990, in person and was represented by her counsel, Brian C. Harrison. 
Plaintiff appeared in person and by his counsel, S. Rex Lewis of Howard, Lewis & Petersen. 
The Court considered its Amended Order of Commitment dated the 26th day of May, 1989, 
together with its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated April 13, 1989, and having 
heard representations made by defendant's counsel, us well as by the defendant, and the 
defendant having previously been found in contempt of an order of this Court, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Defendant may purge herself of the contempt order of this Court by 
depositing with the Court the sum of 5236,800.00. The defendant is given ^6 days from May 
4, 1990 to purge herself of her contempt. 
2. In the event the defendant fails to make the aforesaid deposit, the 
defendant is ordered committed to jail for a period of sixty (60) days. 
3. Unless previously modified by an Order of this Court, the Court will review 
the Commitment Order on June 22, 1990, at the hour of 1:30 p.m. at which time the 
defendant is ordered to appear in person before the Court. The Court will make its review 
on that date prior to committing the defendant to jail. 
4. The Bench Warrant previously entered herein on the 13th day of April, 1989 
is hereby withdrawn. 
DATED this day of iMay, 1990. 
BY THE COURT 
BOYD L. PARK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this day of May, 1990. 
Brian C. Harrison, Esq. 
3325 No. University Avenue 
Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
:RETAR^ SEC TARY 
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APPENDIX "HM 
Agreement 
4U 
A G R E E M E N T 
RECORDED IN OFFICIAL RECORDS 
OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, CA 
MAR 7 1975 AT 8 A.M. 
Recorder's Office 
This agreement is made by and between BRUNO DfASTON, 
husband, and DOROTHY DfASTON, wife, at Hacienda Heights, Cali-
fornia, on the first day of March, 1973, with respect to the 
following facts: 
1. The parties own property which is held in joint 
tenancy, community property or in their separate names; and 
2. They wish to make this agreement to state their 
actual intention with respect to said property and the status 
thereof and with respect to property to be acquired hereafter. 
Now, therefore, in consideration of mutual covenants 
herein it is agreed as follows: 
1. The husband does transfer, bargain, convey and 
quitclaim to the wife all of his right, title and interest, if 
any there be, in and to the following: 
(a) The real property at 14211 Skyline Drive, 
Hacienda Heights, California and in and to all build-
ings, appurtenances and fixtures thereon* 
(b) The real property at 230 South Ninth Avenue, 
City of Industry, California, including all buildings, 
appurtenances and fixtures thereon, and any and all oil 
and mineral rights thereto, 
(c) Any and all cash in bank accounts located in 
the State of California. 
2. The wife transfers, bargains, conveys and quit-
claims to the husband all of her right, title and interest in and 
to real property located outside of the United States of America, 
and in and to all personal property in the possession of the 
husband, or subject to his control in the United States, Europe 
or elsewhere in the world, and in and to all patents or patent 
rights under the laws of the United States, United Kingdom or 
MAIl TAX STATEMENTS TO ' f c ^ ^ ^ f l * , * } "^ ^ 
( | 
ooctiMriTTAfrr T I W W T O T TAX * . . 
cr.ir'irr^ cr* rvti VMUE C pr**—T? coNvnrro, | 
i.? c • r:« -N run VALI- •.. " t'lf". /.rto 
**D6578PC894 
any commonwealth thereof, Switzerland, Japan or other countries. 
The provisions of this paragraph apply to all property described 
herein, whether presently owned or in existence or to be acquired 
or created in the future. 
3. Hereafter, and until this agreement is modified in 
writing attached hereto, all property, real, personal and mixed, 
acquired by either party in his or her sole name, from whatever 
source derived and wherever situated, shall be the sole and sepa-
rate property of such person, notwithstanding any law, statute or 
court decision giving presumptive effect to the status of marriage; 
and such property shall be free of all claims, demand or liens of 
the other, direct or indirect, and however derived. 
4. Ho thing herein applies to the earnings, from what-
ever source derived, of either party, which shall be community 
property under the laws of the State of California. Nor shall 
anything herein be construed to derogate from the rights and 
privileges of either party or both of them, under the tax laws 
of any state or nation of the world. 
5. Each party agrees to execute documents necessary 
to implement this agreement. 
6. This agreement may be, but need not be, recorded 
in any office for recording documents in California or elsewhere. 
7. Both parties have read and understood this agree-
ment, have been advised by counsel, and do state that it has not 
been made under duress, fraud or undue influence. 
Dorotmr D1 Aston 
-2-
M f CA I4.7S) 
dividual) 
LTE OF CALIFORNIA 
mm HF Log Angeles 
TTTUE INSURANCE 
ANDTRUST 
ss. 
February 28. 1975 
BK055T8W895 
before the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said 
*. personally appeared . Bnmo P'A?t;pn and porothy P'As ton 
whose name S a r e e t h e . 
he within in oment and acknowledged that t h e y 
.subscribed 
, known to me 
OFFICIAL S E A L j 
CORINNE H. YOUNG j 
NOTAIIY PUBLIC . CALJFOAHIA J 
PRINCIPAL OFFICE IN I 
LOS Arfrgtr<t COUN7T I 
J ^ ^ \ My Commisaon Expires December 14, 1977 j 
Name (Typed or Printed) 
APPENDIX , fI f l 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
(Eric Aston) 
Fourth Judicial District Court of 
Utah County, SJate of Utah. 
SMITH, Clerk 
Deputy 
S. REX LEWIS (1953) and 
KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD (3872), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
K:Astn-fof.lo 
Our File No. 17,603 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRUNO D'ASTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOROTHY D'ASTON, 
Defendant. 
LISA ASTON and ERIC 
ASTON, 
Co-defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. CV 36 1124 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
Plaintiff's Orders to Show Cause against co-defendant Eric Aston and plaintiff's 
Motion for an Order directing the delivery of certain personal property to plaintiff came on 
regularly for hearing before the Hon. Ray M. Harding of the above-entitled Court on January 
8, 9 and 22, 1990. The plaintiff was present and represented by his counsel, S. Rex Lewis and 
Kevin J. Sutterfield, co-defendant Eric Aston was present and represented by his counsel, 
Keith W. Meade. The Court, having received evidence and heard testimony of the parties and 
other witnesses, considered the memoranda of the parties, heard argument of counsel, having 
issued its Memorandum Decision dated January 31, 1990, being fully advised in the premises, 
and good cause appearing therefor, now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court herein entered a Decree of Divorce on or about December 15, 1988, 
whereby it awarded various personal property to the plaintiff, including various items which 
plaintiff alleges were removed from his car and his motor home on or prior to April 30, 1986. 
2. The divorce decree also awarded to plaintiff a one-half interest in various 
personal property located at the marital home of 1171 No. Oakmont, Provo, Utah ("marital 
home"). 
3. The Decree of Divorce awarded the marital home to defendant Dorothy 
D'Aston. 
4. The Decree of Divorce also awarded to the plaintiff other personal items, 
including cameras, lenses, carrying cases, and other optical equipment. 
5. Prior to the separation of plaintiff and defendant Dorothy D'Aston, plaintiff 
was involved for numerous years in the buying, selling, and collecting of coins, rare coins, and 
other similar items. 
6. On many of plaintiff's rare coins, he stamped the rim above the head with 
the letter "A." 
7. Shortly after the plaintiff's personal property disappeared in Ap 11, 1986, 
plaintiff was able to make a detailed list for the police department from his memory of many 
2 
of the missing items. Some of those items, while not exceptionally rare, would not be expected 
to appear in an average coin shop. 
8. On March 15, 1989, Eric Aston made and executed a Bill of Sale to Lloyd Ross 
Engle and Jan Chapman Engle to various items of personal property located in the marital 
home. Eric Aston assisted in the sale of the real property and accepted a quit claim deed 
from defendant Dorothy D'Aston aka Dorothy Aston on March 14, 1989. On the same date, 
Eric Aston executed a warranty deed to the Engles for the sale of the marital home. At the 
closing of the sale of the property on March 14, 1989, Eric Aston received two trust account 
checks from Provo Land Title Company, one for the sum of 358,144.44, and one for the sum 
of 558,144.48, for a total cash receipt of 5116,288.92. 
9. On April 14, 1989, this Court issued its .Writ of Execution and Assistance. 
Pursuant to that Writ, John Sindt, a constable of Salt Lake County, took various items into his 
possession on April 29, 1989, from co-defendant Eric Aston. 
10. The various property identified as Exhibit 7 at the hearing hereof obtained 
by Constable Sindt, was previously located at co-defendant Eric Aston's business known as The 
Gold Connection at approximately 21st South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
11. Many coins identical to plaintiff's missing coins, even those which were 
unusual, unexplainably appeared in Eric Aston's coin shop. Several of the coins reported 
missing by plaintiff were stamped with an "A." Identical coins bearing an "A" were found 
among the coins in co-defendant Eric Aston's inventory. 
12. Though given an opportunity, co-defendant Eric Aston has not adequately 
explained why he had so many coins identical to plaintiff's missing coins. 
3 
13. Within the past several months, co-defendant Eric Aston has made significant 
purchases, including inventory for his coin shop, several automobiles, and two separate 
condominiums. Co-defendant Eric Aston has not plausibly explained the manner and source 
of the funds sufficient to purchase the inventory for his coin shop, the automobiles, and 
property he has recently acquired. 
14. The Court finds and reasonably infers that much of the capital for co-
defendant Eric Aston's recent purchases came from the sale of plaintiff's coins, many of which 
are still missing. 
15. The Court also finds and reasonably infers that co-defendant Eric Aston had 
several coins in his possession identical to plaintiff's missing coins because those coins were 
actually taken by co-defendant Eric Aston. 
16. The parties have stipulated that co-defendant Eric Aston claims no interest 
in the cameras, lenses, cases, and optical equipment found in co-defendant Eric Aston's store, 
and that the Court can enter an order awarding the same to plaintiff, which items were 
received by plaintiff at the time of the hearing herein. 
17. The parties have also stipulated that plaintiff makes no claim to various 
dimes, pennies, nickels, quarters, one-half dollars, dollars, and panda bullion which can be 
awarded to co-defendant Eric Aston and were received by him at the time of the hearing 
herein. 
18. Plaintiff has met his burden of proving ownership to many of the items 
entered as evidence herein. Pont i f f is the owner of all coins which bear an "A" stamp, 
including all of the coins now held by the Court which bear an "A" stamp. A list of the "A" 
stamped coins held by the Court is as follows: 
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1892 P 
1890 
1879 
1871 S 
1914 S 
1881 0 
1890 CC 
1922 D 
1923 S 
1924 S 
1934 D 
1896 S 
1904 S 
Morgan Silver Dollar 
Carson City Silver Dollar 
Metric Proof U. S. Dollar 
U. S. $20 Gold Coin - Liberty 
U. S. $20 Gold Coin - St. Gaudins 
1 set Diving Goose Canadian Dollar 
Morgan Silver Dollar 
Morgan Silver Dollar 
Peace Dollar 
Peace Dollar 
Peace Dollar 
Peace Dollar 
U. S. $20 Gold Coin - Liberty 
U. S. $20 Gold Coin - Liberty 
19. Plaintiff is also the owner of the items held by the Court which match those 
items listed on plaintiff's first list of stolen property which was given to the police. These 
items on plaintiff's first list of stolen property are as follows: 
Complete set of coins of The Golden West (36 coins in set plus 2 Calif, coins). 
U. S. Gold Dollars 
1 1849 - AU 
2 1853 - AU 
S2 1 11 U. S. Gold 
1905 
1915 • 
1911 • 
- UNC 
• AU 
- D 
S10 U. S. Gold 
1 1910 - D - UNC 
1 1915 - UNC 
S20 U. S. Gold 
1 1871 - AU 
1 1897 - BU 
D 
1 1914 - S - BU 
1 1925 - BU 
1 18.5 gram Alaska gold nugget 
2,013 oz. silver bullion (1-oz. rounds; 5-oz. bars; 10-oz. bars; 100-oz. bars) 
187 Libertads (1982, 1983, 1984, 1985) 
Canada Dollars 
13 1958 - BU 
20 1962 - BU 
45 1963 - BU 
120 1964 - BU 
137 1965 - Type 1, BU, Type 2 BU, Type 3 BU, Type 4 BU and Type 5 BU 
60 1966 - LB - BU 
1 1967 - D.G. 45° - BU 
120 1967 - BU 
6 1967 - Canada proof sets with $20 Gold 
470 1984 - proof dollars and case 
U. S. Proof & Gem Silver Dollars 
1 1879 - Metric proof 
5 coins of 13 coin Gem set MS - 65 - CC - dollars consisting of 1-1879; 1-1882; 1-1883; 
1-1884; and 1-1890. 
84 Common dates BU - dollars 
60 Common dates CIRC - dollars 
Miscellaneous Gold 
6 1-oz. - K - Krugeran. 
1 1-oz. - M - Mapleleaf. 
3 Mex - 2 Peso 
3 Mex - 2 1/2 Peso 
2 Mex - 1947 - 50 Peso - BU 
Stamps - one book. 
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20. Plaintiff's later inventories do not appear to have the same reliability as the 
original list of stolen property. 
21. Plaintiff is the owner and should receive any items held by the Court which 
match the list of consignment items as awarded to plaintiff in the divorce decree, as listed on 
Exhibit 24 thereof and which are a part of Exhibit 7 and also described in Exhibit 57. The 
bullion which was a part of Exhibit 7 is also a part of the bullion described in Exhibit 57 at 
the trial and all of these items are to be returned to plaintiff. 
22. Co-defendant Eric Aston is the owner of the items not included in the above 
listing and any furniture which is now in his possession at his store. 
23. Plaintiff has incurred costs of court and is entitled to be awarded them from 
the co-defendant Eric Aston. 
The Court having made and entered its Findings of Fact, now makes and enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties to and subject matter of this 
action. 
2. The Court should approve the stipulations of the parties made at the hearing 
regarding ownership of cameras, lenses, cases, and optical equipment to plaintiff and various 
coins to the co-defendant Eric Aston. 
3. Plaintiff should be awarded all coins which bear an "A" stamp, including all 
of the coins now htid by the Court which bear an "A" stamp, and all items held by the Court 
which match those items listed on plaintiff's first list of stolen property which was given to 
the police. 
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4. Plaintiff should also receive any items held by the Court which match the list 
of consignment items as awarded to plaintiff in the divorce decree, as listed on Exhibit 24 
thereof and which are a part of Exhibit 7 and also described in Exhibit 57. 
5. Plaintiff should be awarded all of the bullion which was a part of Exhibit 
7 herein, and which was described in Exhibit 57 herein. 
6. Ail of the above-described items should be ordered returned to the plaintiff. 
7. Co-defendant Eric Aston should be awarded any items not included in the 
above listing and any furniture which is now in his possession at the store. 
8. Plaintiff should be awarded costs of court. 
9. Co-defendant Eric Aston should not be held in contempt for his actions in 
assisting in the sale of the marital home and executing the bill of sale on the various personal 
property contained therein. 
DATED this *Z day of gobwiai-as 1990. 
R A T ^ t HARDING 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
KEITH W. MEADE, ESQ. 
Attorney for Co-defendant Eric Aston 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was faxed to the 
following, this 4 day of February, 1990. 
Keith W. Meade, Esq. 
525 East 100 South 
Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
SECRETARY 
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APPENDIX "J" 
Colman v. Colman. 743 P.2d 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
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Phyllis E. COLMAN, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
William J. COLMAN, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 860325-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Oct 2, 1987. 
Husband appealed from order of the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
David B. Dee, J., which divided property in 
connection with divorce. The Court of Ap-
peals, Garff, J., held that: (1) evidence sus-
tained trial court's determination to pierce 
corporate veil of husband's corporations, 
and (2) distribution was proper. 
Affirmed. 
1. Pleading <s=>427 
If theory of recovery is fully tried by 
the parties, court may base its decision on 
that theory and deem the pleadings amend-
ed, even if the theory was not originally 
pleaded or set forth in the pleadings or the 
pretrial order; that the issue has, in fact, 
been tried and that the procedure has been 
authorized by the express or implied con-
sent of the parties must be evident from 
the record. 
2. Divorce «=>203 
Although alter ego issue was not spe-
cifically raised in pleadings, where entire 
trial testimony concerned husband's control 
over assets in question, the issue was tried 
by the consent of the parties and trial court 
properly based its decision on that issue. 
3. Divorce <3»253(2) 
Finding that corporation was hus-
band's alter ego was supported by evidence 
that husband ignored corporate formalities, 
that he referred to the corporation's check-
ing account as his personal account, that he 
dealt with corporate assets without suggest-
ing that he was acting on behalf of anyone 
other than himself, that the officers and 
directors played little or no role in the 
operation of the corporate entity, that cor-
porate records were not kept, and that the 
husband used the corporation and other 
corporate shells as a facade for his person-
al business operations. 
4. Corporations <3=>1.6(10) 
Corporate veil which protects stock-
holders from individual liability will be 
pierced only reluctantly and cautiously. 
5. Corporations «»1.4(4) 
To disregard corporate entity under al-
ter ego doctrine, there must be shown such 
a unity of interest and ownership that the 
separate personalities of the corporation 
and the individual no longer exist, and it 
must be shown that, if the corporate form 
were observed, it would sanction a fraud, 
promote injustice, or result in an inequity; 
it is not necessary that plaintiff prove actu-
al fraud but he must show that a failure to 
pierce the corporation veil would result in 
an injustice. 
6. Corporations <s=»1.4(l) 
Factors which are significant in deter-
mining whether corporate veil should be 
pierced are undercapitalization of a one-
man corporation, failure to observe corpo-
rate formalities, nonpayment of dividends, 
siphoning of corporate funds by dominant 
stockholder, nonfunctioning of other offi-
cers or directors, absence of corporate 
records, use of corporation as a facade or 
operations of the dominant shareholder, 
and use of the corporate entity in promot-
ing injustice or fraud. 
7. Corporations <3»1.4(1) 
Failure to observe corporate formali-
ties, which may justify piercing corporate 
veil, includes such activities as commence-
ment of business without the issuance of 
shares, lack of shareholders at directors 
meetings, lack of signing of consents, and 
making of decisions by shareholders as if 
they were partners. 
8. Corporations <3»1.4(1) 
Rationale used by courts in permitting 
corporate veil to be pierced is that, if princi-
pal shareholder or owner conducts his pri-
vate and corporate business on an inter-
changeable or joint basis as if they were 
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one, he is without standing to complain Frank J. Allen, Salt Lake Cityf for de-
when an injured party does the same. fendant and appellant. 
9. Divorce e»252.3(3) Bryce Roe, Albert Colton, Salt Lake City, 
Former spouses attempting to shield f o r Plaintiff and respondent 
assets from a court-ordered property distri-
bution by using a corporate form are espe- Before BILLINGS, GARFF and 
cially looked upon with judicial disfavor. JACKSON. 
10. Divorce «=>252.2 
Fact that property distribution may 
not have been mathematically equal is not 
sufficient grounds to constitute an abuse 
of discretion, as fair and equitable property 
distribution is not necessarily an equal dis-
tribution. 
11. Divorce <3=>252.3(3) 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in dividing property after piercing corpo-
rate veil on the grounds that the corpora-
tion was the husband's alter ego. 
12. Divorce <3=>252.3(5) 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in requiring husband to pay an amount 
representing a percentage of the price of 
proceeds from sale of ranch where he 
found that husband held an interest in the 
ranch. 
13. Estoppel 3=52(4) 
Estoppel arises when there is a false 
representation or concealment of material 
facts made with knowledge, actual or con-
structive, of the facts to a party who is 
without knowledge or the means of knowl-
edge of the real facts and made with an 
intention that the representation be acted 
upon, and the party to whom the represen-
tation was made relies or acts upon it to his 
prejudice. 
14. Estoppel <3»54 
Estoppel cannot be inferred from facts 
of which party to be estopped had no 
knowledge. 
15. Husband and Wife <3=>279(1) 
Wife was not estopped from denying 
that husband had furnished adequate ac-
counting as required by their divorce 
agreement even though wife's attorney had 
returned certain stock certificates which he 
had turned over to them. 
OPINION 
GARFF, Judge: 
Defendant/appellant William J. Colman 
appeals from a property settlement judg-
ment in favor of plaintiff/respondent Phyl-
lis E. Colman stemming from their 1977 
divorce. He seeks reversal of the judg-
ment 
The parties were divorced after a twenty-
four year childless marriage during which 
they acquired substantial property. On 
August 2, 1977, in anticipation of divorce, 
they executed a written property settle-
ment agreement. Because questions had 
not been resolved as to which assets con-
trolled by defendant were part of the mari-
tal estate, this agreement required him to 
provide plaintiff with a "complete account-
ing of all stocks currently owned by him or 
in which he [had] any interest/' and a 
"complete accounting of all royalty inter-
ests currently owned by him or in which he 
[had] any interest" within one year of the 
agreement Once the extent of defend-
ant's holdings was determined, plaintiff 
was to receive one-half of defendant's in-
terest in any stocks "held in . . . [his] name 
or in which he [had] any interest," and 
one-half of the sales proceeds of the 
Anderson Ranch, jointly owned property 
located in Cache County, Utah. 
Much of the dispute between the parties 
centered around defendant's relationship to 
Owanah Oil Corporation [Owanah], a close-
ly held corporation which defendant and 
Francois de Gunsberg had founded in 1952 
to engage in oil and gas exploration. De-
fendant had served as Owanah's president 
during much of the parties' marriage. In 
1959, Owanah was restructured to gener-
ate outside capital. As a consequence, de-
fendant and plaintiff held approximately 
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twenty percent of Owanah's outstanding 
shares. 
At the time of the divorce, defendant 
also controlled stock, originally issued in 
various names, in other closely held corpo-
rations: Western Oil Shale Corporation, 
Cayman Corporation, and Royalty Invest-
ment Company. Defendant claimed that 
most of this stock belonged to Owanah, 
was not part of the marital estate, and, 
therefore, was not subject to the property 
division agreement 
The Western Oil Shale Company stock 
was issued in 1964 in consideration for 
Owanah's interest in several oil shale leas-
es. Although defendant alleged that none 
of the parties, personal funds were expend-
ed to acquire these leases, he introduced no 
evidence beyond his testimony to that ef-
fect He also explained that the stock was 
issued in names other than Owanah's so 
that Owanah could sell it more easily by 
avoiding normal corporate formalities. At 
the time of trial, he held at least 28,200 
Western Oil Shale shares under his person-
al control, but admitted ownership of only 
2,256 of them. 
Cayman stock had been issued by Cay-
man Corporation as consideration for stock 
in another closely held corporation, Nation-
al 00 Shale Corporation, and for an oil and 
gas lease with a producing oil well. De-
fendant testified that both the National Oil 
Shale and Cayman shares were issued in 
his name for ease in sale and handling, but 
that he held them in trust for third parties. 
However, he introduced no evidence other 
than his testimony that there was an actual 
trust relationship between himself and oth-
ers. Part of the reason for his failure to 
introduce evidence was the lack of Cayman 
and National Oil Shale corporate records. 
At the time of trial, defendant held at least 
48,000 shares of Cayman stock in his name. 
At the time of the property settlement 
agreement, Royalty Investment Company 
owned, as its only major asset, the 
Anderson Ranch. At trial, defendant testi-
fied that Owanah and two other parties had 
made installment payments on the ranch 
and, thus, were entitled to 62%% of Royal-
ty's outstanding stock. However, defend-
ant's earlier deposition contradicted this 
testimony, stating that he and plaintiff 
owned 62V2% of the Royalty stock. De-
fendant ^ his personal financial state-
ments, valued the ranch at between $250,-
000 and $1,000,000. 
In January 1982, Royalty sold the 
Anderson ranch for $250,000 and autho-
rized Owanah to use the proceeds. The 
only consideration which Royalty received 
for the proceeds was its choice between an 
interest-bearing loan and a 4% overriding 
royalty interest in Owanah. 
Defendant also claims that he made an 
oral accounting pursuant to the property 
settlement agreement with the law firm 
Roe and Fowler, and turned over to Roe 
and Fowler all stock certificates in the par-
ties' safe deposit box. Because plaintiff 
was not satisfied that there had been an 
adequate accounting under the terms of 
the property settlement agreement she fi-
nally brought this action on May 29, 1980, 
to compel the accounting and judgment for 
any damages caused by defendant's delay 
in submitting the accounting. The purpose 
of the accounting was to identify the 
amount to which plaintiff was entitled as 
her share of the marital estate. 
The trial court agreed that defendant 
had not made an adequate accounting, find-
ing that Owanah was defendant's alter ego 
even though this issue was not explicitly 
raised in the pleadings. The court also 
found that the assets subject to the ac-
counting were, in fact owned by defend-
ant, and, pursuant to the terms of the 
settlement agreement that plaintiff was 
entitled to one-half of those assets. How-
ever, because most of the assets had been 
sold by defendant the court established a 
monetary value for the liquidated assets 
and included that amount as part of the 
marital estate to be distributed between 
the parties. Although this was an account-
ing action, the court appropriately disposed 
of the assets according to the terms of the 
stipulated property settlement agreement 
without objection by either party. 
Defendant raises the following issues on 
appeal: (1) Was the alter ego issue proper-
ly before the trial court? (2) If the alter 
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ego issue was properly before the court, 
was there sufficient evidence to sustain the 
court's finding that Owanah was defend-
ant's alter ego? (3) Does applying the al-
ter ego doctrine effect a property distribu-
tion contrary to the parties' property distri-
bution agreement? (4) Did the evidence, 
findings, and conclusions support the order 
requiring defendant to pay plaintiff an 
amount representing a percentage of the 
Anderson Ranch sale proceeds? (5) Is 
plaintiff estopped from denying that de-
fendant furnished a satisfactory account-
ing? 
I 
Under Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, issues not raised by the 
pleadings may be tried by the express or 
implied consent of the parties.1 The Utah 
Supreme Court has observed that issues 
tried by express or implied consent shall be 
treated as if raised in the pleadings. 
Therefore, "even failure to amend the 
pleadings does not affect the result of the 
trial of these issues." General Ins. Co. of 
Am. v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 
502, 506 (Utah 1976). 
[1] If a theory of recovery is fully tried 
by the parties, the court may base its deci-
sion on that theory and deem the pleadings 
amended, even if the theory was not origi-
nally pleaded or set forth in the pleadings 
or the pretrial order. MBI Motor Co. v. 
Lotus/East, Inc., 506 F.2d 709, 711 (6th 
Cir.1974). However, that the issue has, in 
fact, been tried, and that this procedure 
has been authorized by express or implied 
consent of the parties must be evident from 
the record. Wirtz v. KM. Sloan, Inc., 285 
F.Supp. 669, 675 (W.D.Pa.1968). "A trial 
court may not base its decision on an issue 
1. Utah R.Civ.P. 15(b) (1977) reads as follows: 
When issues not raised by the pleading are 
tried by express or implied consent of the 
parties, they shall be treated in all respects as 
if they had been raised in the pleadings. 
Such amendment of the pleadings as may be 
necessary to cause them to conform to the 
evidence and to raise these issues may be 
made upon motion of any party at any time, 
even after judgment; but failure so to amend 
does not affect the result of the trial of these 
issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial 
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that was tried inadvertently/' MBI Motor 
Co., 506 P.2d at 711. 
Implied consent to try an issue may be 
found "where one party raises an issue 
material to the other party's case or where 
evidence is introduced without objection," 
General Ins. Co. of Am., 545 P.2d a,t 505-
06, where it "appear[s] that the parties 
understood the evidence [was] to be aimed 
at the unpleaded issue." MBI Motor Co., 
506 F.2d at 711. See First Security Bank 
of Utah v. Colonial Ford, Inc., 597 P.2d 
859, 861 (Utah 1979). 
Thus, the test for determining whether 
pleadings should be deemed amended un-
der Utah R.Civ.P. 15(b) is "whether the 
opposing party had a fair opportunity to 
defend and whether it could offer addition-
al evidence if the case were retried on a 
different theory." R.A. Pohl Const. Co. v. 
Marshall, 640 F.2d 266, 267 (10th Cir.1981). 
See also Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 
205, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963); Buehner Block 
Co. v. Glezos, 6 Utah 2d 226, 310 P.2d 517, 
519-20 (1957). 
[2] In the present case, even though the 
alter ego issue was not specifically raised 
in the pleadings, either initially or by 
amendment, the entire trial testimony con-
cerned defendant's control over the assets 
in question. During trial, evidence con-
cerning every element of the alter ego is-
sue was introduced without objection. Fur-
ther, the basic question raised in an alter 
ego case is whether the principal had per-
sonal control over assets which he claimed 
to belong to the corporation. Since this 
question is the essential issue presented by 
this accounting action, we find that the 
parties received adequate notice of the al-
ter ego issue and an opportunity to meet it 
on the ground that it is not within the issues 
made by the pleadings, the court may allow 
the pleadings to be amended when the presen-
tation of the merits of the action will be 
subserved thereby and the objecting party 
fails to satisfy the court that the admission of 
such evidence would prejudice him in main-
taining his action or defense upon the merits. 
The court shall grant a continuance, if neces-
sary, to enable the objecting party to meet 
such evidence. 
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There was no indication in the record that 
defendant ever represented to the court 
that he was taken by surprise or was other-
wise disadvantaged in meeting the alter 
ego issue. See Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 
at 91. We find, therefore, that the alter 
ego issue was properly before the court. 
II 
[3,4] There is sufficient evidence to 
sustain the trial court's finding that Owan-
ah was defendant's alter ego. "Ordinarily, 
a corporation is regarded as a separate and 
distinct legal entity from its stockholders." 
Dockstader v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 370, 510 
P.2d 526, 528 (1973). This is true whether 
the corporation has many stockholders or 
only one. Ramsey v. Adams, 4 Kan. 
App.2d 184, 603 P.2d 1025, 1027 (1979); 
Kline v. Kline, 104 Mich.App. 700, 305 
N.W.2d 297, 298 (1981). Consequently, the 
corporate veil which protects stockholders 
from individual liability will only be pierced 
reluctantly and cautiously. Ramsey v. 
Adams, 603 P.2d at 1027; William B. Rob-
erts, Inc. v. McDrilling, Co., 579 S.W.2d 
335, 345 (Tex.Civ.App.1979). 
[5] To disregard the corporate entity 
under the equitable alter ego doctrine, two 
circumstances must be shown: (1) Such a 
unity of interest and ownership that the 
separate personalities of the corporation 
and the individual no longer exist, but the 
corporation is, instead, the alter ego of one 
or a few individuals; and (2) if observed, 
the corporate form would sanction a fraud, 
promote injustice, or result in an inequity. 
Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan 
Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979). Ac-
cord United States v. Healthwin-Midtown 
Convalescent Hosp. and Rehabilitation 
Center, Inc., 511 F.Supp. 416 (C.D.Calif. 
1981). See also Centurian Corp. v. Fiber-
chem, Inc., 562 P.2d 1252, 1253 (Utah 
1977); Dockstader v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 
2. Failure to observe corporate formalities in-
cludes such activities as commencement of busi-
ness without the issuance of shares, lack of 
shareholders' or directors' meetings, lack of 
signing of consents, and the making of decisions 
by shareholders as if they were partners. Roy-
lex, Inc. v. Langson Bros. Constr. Co., 585 S.W.2d 
768, 772 (Tex.Civ.App. 1979). 
370, 510 P.2d 526, 528 (1973); Geary v. 
Cain, 79 Utah 268, 9 P.2d 396, 398 (1932). 
It is not necessary that the plaintiff prove 
actual fraud, but must only show that fail-
ure to pierce the corporate veil would re-
sult in an injustice. Healthwin-Midtown 
Convalescent Hosp., 511 F.Supp. at 420. 
[6,7] Certain factors which are deemed 
significant, although not conclusive, in de-
termining whether this test has been met 
include: (1) undercapitalization of a one-
man corporation; (2) failure to observe cor-
porate formalities;2 (3) nonpayment of div-
idends; (4) siphoning of corporate funds by 
the dominant stockholder; (5) nonfunction-
ing of other officers or directors; (6) ab-
sence of corporate records; (7) the use of 
the corporation as a facade for operations 
of the dominant stockholder or stockhold-
ers; 3 and (8) the use of the corporate enti-
ty in promoting injustice or fraud. Ram-
sey v. Adams, 603 P.2d at 1028; Amoco 
Chemicals Corp. v. Bach, 222 Kan. 589, 
567 P.2d 1337, 1341-42 (1977). See also 
Ramirez v. United States, 514 F.Supp. 759, 
763-64 (D.Puerto Rico 1981); Healthwin-
Midtown Convalescent Hosp., 511 F.Supp. 
at 418-19; Dillman v. Nobles, 351 So.2d 
210, 213-14 (La.App.1977). 
[8] The rationale used by courts in per-
mitting the corporate veil to be pierced is 
that if a principal shareholder or owner 
conducts his private and corporate business 
on an interchangeable or joint basis as if 
they were one, he is without standing to 
complain when an injured party does the 
same. Bone Constr. Co. v. Lewis, 148 
GaApp. 61, 250 S.E.2d 851, 853 (1978). In 
Lyons v. Lyons, 340 So.2d 450, 451 (Ala. 
Civ.App.1976), the court stated that "[a] 
court of equity looks through form to sub-
stance and has often disregarded the corpo-
rate form when it was fiction in fact and 
deed and was merely serving the personal 
use and convenience of the owner." The 
3. Failure to distinguish between corporate and 
personal property, the use of corporate funds to 
pay personal expenses without proper account-
ing, and failure to maintain complete corporate 
and financial records are looked upon with ex-
treme disfavor. Roylex, 585 S.W.2d at 772. 
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Lyons court found a corporation to be a 
shareholder's alter ego, even though he 
owned only one share of stock, because he 
commingled corporate funds with his own, 
kept no regular corporate records, meet-
ings, or minutes aside from a bank account, 
and did not file corporate income tax re-
turns. See Standage v. Standage, 147 
Ariz.App. 473, 711 P.2d 612, 614-15 (1985). 
[9] Former spouses attempting to 
shield assets from a court-ordered property 
distribution by using a corporate form are 
especially looked upon with judicial disfa-
vor. See Standage v. Standage, 147 Ariz. 
App. 473, 711 P.2d 612 (1985); Colandrea 
v. Colandrea, 401 A.2d 480 (Md.CtSpec. 
App.1979). 
In the present case, the trial court con-
sidered the evidence in the light of this 
test, finding that Owanah was defendant's 
alter ego on the grounds that (1) "[t]here 
exists such a unity of ownership and inter-
est between defendant and Owanah Oil 
Corporation that the separate personalities 
of the corporation and the individual no 
longer exist/' and (2) to recognize such 
separate personalities "would promote in-
justice and an inequitable result." 
For purposes of appellate review, the 
trial court's decision to pierce the corporate 
veil will be upheld if there is substantial 
evidence in favor of the judgment. Stand-
age, 711 P.2d at 614-16. An examination 
of the present trial record indicates that 
there was substantial evidence supporting 
the trial court's finding that the separate 
personalities of Owanah and defendant no 
longer existed. 
First, defendant ignored corporate for-
malities. He stated that he preferred to 
conduct corporate business personally, 
rather than in the corporate name, because 
it was more convenient than observing ap-
propriate corporate procedures, and re-
peatedly did so. 
Second, defendant failed to distinguish 
between corporate and personal property in 
his business dealings. 
In correspondence with First Security 
Bank, defendant continually referred to the 
Owanah checking account as his personal 
COLMAN Utah 787 
(Utah App. 1987) 
account Although he stated that this oc-
curred because the bank initially preferred 
to deal personally with the principals be-
cause of Owanah's small net worth, he also 
continued this practice well after Owanah 
acquired substantial assets, because, as he 
stated, adjustments in loans and sales of 
stock could be made without time-consum-
ing corporate resolutions. 
On September 17, 1976, defendant 
pledged 50,820 shares of Western Oil Shale 
stock and 48,000 shares of Cayman stock to 
First Security Bank as collateral for loans 
to Owanah. He testified that this stock 
had originally been issued in his, his broth-
er's, and his broker's names, rather than in 
Owanah's name, so that corporate formali-
ties could be avoided in selling the stock. 
Between September 17,1978, and February 
23, 1979, he held as many as 93,298 shares 
of Western Oil Shale stock and 48,000 
shares of Cayman stock in his personal 
bank and brokerage accounts. All transac-
tions dealing with these shares were autho-
rized by his signature without any sugges-
tion that he was acting on behalf of anyone 
else. 
First Security Bank released the 48,000 
shares of Cayman stock and 47,820 shares 
of the Western Oil Shale stock to defend-
ant on July 9, 1979. The bank recognized 
this stock as being defendant's personal 
property in that it required defendant to 
sign an indemnity agreement to protect the 
bank from any claim raised by plaintiff 
against the shares. 
Defendant testified that this stock, val-
ued by the trial court at $14.25 per share, 
was later sold to fund one of Owanah's 
projects, and that the proceeds from this 
sale were deposited in Owanah's account 
However, payments for defendant's resi-
dential mortgage, light and utility bills 
were also made directly from Owanah's 
account, as were numerous cash payments 
to defendant, totalling $22,695.25 within a 
twelve month period. To help finance Ow-
anah's activities, defendant also mortgaged 
the parties' Park City residence for $60,-
000, applied part of the proceeds to a reduc-
tion of Owanah's debt, and deposited the 
remainder in Owanah's account. Defend-
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ant explains the mortgage payments made 
on his behalf by Owanah as repayment by 
Owanah of this mortgage. Further, de-
fendant presented no evidence at trial that 
he maintained any personal checking ac-
count apart from Owanah's. Personal and 
corporate affairs appear to be inextricably 
interwoven. 
Third, the other officers and directors 
played little, if any, role in the operation of 
defendant's corporate entities. Defendant 
produced no evidence at trial, other than 
his testimony, to indicate that others had 
any interest in Owanah, although the trial 
judge requested such evidence on several 
occasions during the trial and the trial was 
recessed for defendant to provide it 
Fourth, there was an almost complete 
failure to keep and maintain corporate 
records. There was no evidence that 
shareholder records were kept for Cayman 
Corporation, even though such records 
were repeatedly requested by plaintiffs 
counsel and the trial judge, and defendant 
was even given an opportunity by the court 
to find and present them. Defendant was 
similarly unable to produce any records 
which showed shareholders, bylaws, or fi-
nancial status of Royalty Investment Cor-
poration. Defendant claimed that Owanah 
owned Cayman stock as well as proceeds 
from the sale of the Anderson Ranch, 
which was owned by Royalty Investment 
Corporation. 
Fifth, there is evidence that Owanah and 
the other corporate shells were used as a 
facade for defendant's personal business 
operations. The most significant evidence 
was the method in which the Anderson 
Ranch sale was consummated. After the 
property settlement agreement had been 
entered, Royalty Investment Corporation 
sold the ranch, using no corporate formali-
ties, and then deposited the sale proceeds 
in Owanah's bank account for a 4% over-
riding royalty interest in the Owanah 
project Plaintiff alleged that this was no 
consideration at all. Although the transac-
tion was ratified by Royalty on the advice 
of counsel eleven months after the sale and 
three days before trial, such a ratification 
does not invest this transaction with legiti-
macy. Since defendant did not proffer tes-
timony at trial of anyone other than him-
self, purporting to have an interest in Roy-
alty, Owanah, or the Anderson Ranch, it is 
difficult to view this transaction as any-
thing but a personal transaction done un-
der a corporate aegis. Thus, defendant's 
equivocal testimony regarding the owner-
ship of the Anderson Ranch, coupled with 
the lack of substantial evidence that Owan-
ah gave valuable consideration for the pro-
ceeds of the Anderson Ranch sale, supports 
a finding that the corporate shells were 
used as a facade for the transfer of proper-
ty from a corporate shell that plaintiff had 
some interest in to one in which she had 
less interest 
Further, defendant's use of Owanah to 
receive the proceeds from the sale of the 
Cayman and Western Oil Company stock, 
coupled with his use of Owanah's account 
to pay his personal living expenses, sug-
gest that defendant was using Owanah as 
a facade for his personal affairs. 
Finally, the use of the corporate entity in 
this circumstance would result in injustice. 
If viewed as legitimate corporate transac-
tions, plaintiffs post-settlement agreement 
business transactions would convert sub-
stantial assets, which otherwise would be 
regarded as marital property, to corporate 
assets in which plaintiff had no interest 
Such shielding of assets would result in a 
great injustice to plaintiff. 
Therefore, we find that there was sub-
stantial evidence before the trial court to 
support its finding that defendant's corpo-
rations were actually his alter ego. 
Ill 
Because application of the alter ego doc-
trine is justified, we reach the issue of 
whether the property division by the trial 
court is in harmony with the parties' prop-
erty settlement agreement Defendant ar-
gues that the property division resulting 
from the alter ego finding is contrary to 
the intent of the property settlement agree-
ment because it awards plaintiff more than 
half of the marital estate, and, thus, is an 
abuse of judicial discretion. 
COLiMAN v. 
Cite as 743 ?Od 782 
[10] In the division of marital property, 
the trial court has wide discretion, and, 
while the appellate court is not necessarily 
bound by its findings, Thompson v. 
Thompson, 709 P.2d 360, 361-62 (Utah 
1985), the findings are presumed valid and 
will not be disturbed unless the record indi-
cates such a manifest injustice or inequity 
as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion. 
Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 
Ct.App.1987); Petersen v. Petersen, 737 
P.2d 237, 239 (Utah CtApp.1987). Regard-
ing challenges to property distributions, 
the Utah Supreme Court has stated that 
a party seeking reversal of the trial court 
must prove a misunderstanding or misap-
plication of the law resulting in substan-
tial and prejudicial error, or that the evi-
dence clearly preponderated against the 
findings, or that such a serious inequity 
resulted from the order as to constitute 
an abuse of the trial court's discretion. 
McCrary v. McCrary, 599 P.2d 1248, 1250 
(Utah 1979). That the property distribution 
may not have been mathematically equal is 
not sufficient grounds to constitute an 
abuse of discretion, since a fair and eq-
uitable property distribution is not neces-
sarily an equal distribution. See Fletcher 
v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1223-24 (Utah 
1980). 
Further, it is well recognized that a par-
ties' stipulation as to property rights in a 
divorce action, although advisory and 
usually followed unless the court finds it to 
be unfair or unreasonable, is not necessar-
ily binding on the trial court It is only a 
recommendation to be adhered to if the 
court believes it to be fair and reasonable. 
Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080, 1082 
(Utah 1977); Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472, 
476 (Utah 1975). Thus, even if the trial 
court does not exactly follow the parties' 
agreement, such a decree is still within the 
trial court's reasonable discretion. 
The Utah Supreme Court has previously 
upheld a trial court's property division un-
der somewhat similar circumstances. In 
Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986), 
the defendant husband appealed from the 
portion of a divorce decree awarding the 
plaintiff wife one-half of the value of a 
COLMAN Utah 789 
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corporation formed during their marriage. 
He alleged that a corporation which the 
trial court had determined to be his person-
al, premarital property had loaned $69,000 
to a corporation which he and his wife 
formed during the marriage. Because he 
"utterly failed to prove that the loan did 
indeed exist," in that he could produce no 
papers documenting the loan, any terms, 
conditions of repayment, or interest, and 
because the trial court expressly found 
that he had commingled corporate and per-
sonal funds throughout the marriage so 
that it could not trace any assets to any 
source, the court found that he had failed 
to carry his burden of proof. Id at 119. 
[11] Similarly, the present defendant 
has failed to carry his burden of proof that 
the disputed assets are corporate rather 
than personal property, so we find no 
abuse of discretion in the trial court's prop-
erty division resulting from application of 
the alter ego theory. 
IV 
Defendant further argues that the trial 
court's order requiring him to pay plaintiff 
an amount representing a percentage of 
the price of the Anderson Ranch sale pro-
ceeds is without support in the findings, 
conclusions, or evidence. We reiterate that 
the trial judge has wide discretion in the 
division of marital property, and his find-
ings will not be disturbed by an appellate 
court unless the record shows a clear abuse 
of discretion. The Utah Supreme Court 
has stated, in Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 
at 1082, that 
in regard to the matter of the sufficien-
cy of findings of fact, a substantial com-
pliance with Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, is sufficient, and findings of 
fact and conclusions of law will support a 
judgment, though they are very general, 
where they in most respects follow the 
allegation of the pleadings. Findings 
should be limited to the ultimate facts 
and if they ascertain ultimate facts, and 
sufficiently conform to the pleadings and 
the evidence to support the judgment, 
they will be regarded as sufficient, 
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though not as full and as complete as 
might be desired. 
However, "to determine if equity was done, 
we must have before us specific findings of 
fact pertinent to that issue." Jones v. 
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1985); 
Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 
CtApp.1987). 
[12] In the present case, the trial court 
specifically found that "[a]t the time of the 
parties' agreement, and until the property 
was sold in January 1982, defendant held 
title to 62V2% interest in the ranch through 
Royalty Investment Company. The ranch 
was sold for $250,000.00 in January 1982, 
and the accounting shows that defendant is 
indebted to plaintiff in the amount of $78,-
125.00, which is 31.25% of $250,000.00." It 
is the trial judge's prerogative, not an 
abuse of discretion, to choose to disbelieve 
defendant's explanation of this property in-
terest There was evidence in the record to 
support such a finding, which is sufficient 
to come within the guidelines outlined by 
Pearson and Jones. 
Therefore, we affirm the trial court's 
award with respect to the Anderson Ranch 
property. 
V 
Defendant's final issue raised on appeal 
is whether plaintiff was estopped from de-
nying that he furnished an adequate ac-
counting. He alleges that he made an oral 
accounting to the law firm of Roe and 
Fowler and turned over to Roe and Fowler 
all the stock certificates in the parties' safe 
deposit box. Roe and Fowler later re-
turned some of these certificates to defend-
ant. Defendant argues that he acted in 
reasonable reliance upon express or implied 
representations that the accounting was 
satisfactory because defendant made no 
further demand for an accounting after 
this event However, the document which 
defendant received from Roe and Fowler 
when it returned the certificates was only 
an acknowledgement that the shares were 
delivered into his control as president of 
Owanah, rather than a release or exclusion 
of the shares from an eventual accounting. 
Further, plaintiff alleges that she was in 
continual contact with defendant concern-
ing his failure to make the accounting and 
had brought a prior lawsuit against defend-
ant to enforce the divorce decree and 
agreement Finally, plaintiff stated that 
she was totally without knowledge of the 
business affairs concerning the disputed 
assets. 
[13,14] Estoppel arises when there is 
(1) a false representation or concealment of 
material facts; (2) made with knowledge, 
actual or constructive, of the facts; (3) 
made to a party who is without knowledge 
or the means of knowledge of the real 
facts; (4) made with the intention that the 
representation be acted upon; and (5) the 
party to whom the representation was 
made relied or acted upon it to his preju-
dice. Kelly v. Richards, 95 Utah 560, 83 
P.2d 731, 734 (1938); Morgan v. Board of 
State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1976). 
See also City of Mercer Island v. Stein-
mann, 9 Wash.App. 479, 513 P.2d 80, 82 
(1973). If any of these elements are miss-
ing, there can be no estoppel. Kelly v. 
Richards, 83 P.2d at 734. Further, estop-
pel cannot be inferred from facts of which 
the party to be estopped had no knowledge. 
Grover v. Garn, 23 Utah 2d 441, 464 P.2d 
598, 602 (1970). 
[15] Estoppel is not applicable under 
the present facts. 
The judgment of the trial court is af-
firmed. Costs to plaintiff. 
BILLINGS and JACKSON, JJ., 
concur. 
APPENDIX "K" 
Foulaer v. Foulaer, 626 P.2d 412 (Utah 1981) 
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evidence to support the trial court's finding 
that the defendants as partners received 
the benefit of the money loaned by the 
plaintiff and that they are each liable for 
its repayment.5 In conformity with the 
statement in the comment just quoted 
above, the fact that defendant Morgan 
signed a note acknowledging his obligation 
does not relieve the defendant Green of his 
obligation. 
[3] The final matter to be addressed is 
the assertion of plaintiffs in their respon-
dents' brief that they are entitled to the full 
$3,700 face amount of the promissory note, 
plus interest, without deduction for the 
amounts paid by the defendants by the 
checks above referred to. Their argument 
is that the defendants failed to plead the 
defense of payment and that the issue was 
thus not properly before the trial court. 
The argument is without merit. Under our 
modernized rules of procedure, Rule 54(c), 
U.R.C.P., provides that the court shall ren-
der the judgment to which the evidence 
shows the parties are entitled, even if not so 
requested in the pleadings. 
What has just been said sufficiently dis-
poses of the plaintiffs contention. But in 
supplement thereto, we further observe 
that the defendant did not comply with the 
requirements of Rule 74(b), U.R.C.P., relat-
ing to cross appeals.6 The judgment of the 
trial court is affirmed in its entirety, the 
parties to bear their own costs. 
HALL and HOWE, JJ., and CALVIN 
GOULD, District Judge, concur. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result 
MAUGHAN, C. J., does not participate 
herein; GOULD, District Judge, sat. 
yw\ 
(o I KEY NUMBERSYSTEM> 
5. That this Court will affirm the trial court on 
any proper ground apparent from the record, 
see Edwards v. Iron County, Utah, 531 P.2d 476 
(1975); AUphin Realty, Inc. v. Sine, Utah. 595 
P.2d 860 (1979). 
Heidemarie G. FOULGER, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
John C. FOUGLER, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 16909. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 4, 1981. 
Former husband appealed from order 
of the Fourth District Court, Utah County, 
David Sam, J., granting former wife's mo-
tion for modification of decree of divorce. 
The Supreme Court, Hall, J., held that no 
compelling reasons were shown by former 
wife which would warrant modification of 
property disposition portion of divorce de-
cree. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Stewart, J., concurred in the result. 
Maughan, C. J., concurred in result and 
filed a statement. 
1. Divorce <s=>164 
Trial court sitting in divorce matter 
retains continuing jurisdiction to make such 
modifications in initial decree of divorce as 
it deems just and equitable, but where no 
appeal is taken from original decree, change 
of circumstances must be shown to justify 
later modification. U.C.A.1953,30-3-5. 
2. Divorce <3=>254(2) 
Court should be reluctant to grant 
modification of provisions of divorce decree 
which dispose of real property, and grant 
such modifications only upon showing of 
compelling reasons arising from substantial 
and material change in circumstances. 
6. See Terry v. Zions Co-op Mercantile Inst, 
Utah, 617 R2d 700. 701 (1980). 
FOULGER v, 
Cite as, Utah, 
3. Divorce <*=» 254(2) 
Where property disposition is product 
of agreement and stipulation between the 
parties, and sanctioned by trial court, trial 
court should subsequently modify such pro-
visions only with great reluctance and 
based upon compelling reasons. 
4. Divorce <s»254(2) 
At time of making of stipulated prop-
erty settlement, adopted by trial court in 
original divorce decree, which awarded for-
mer marital residence to wife, facts that 
wife would be solely responsible for mainte-
nance and upkeep on residence, would make 
payments on residence, together with taxes 
and insurance payments, and could make 
substantial improvements to property, all 
without benefit of financial help or assist-
ance from former husband, were within 
contemplation of parties, and were not com-
pelling reasons to warrant later modifica-
tion of decree. 
Noall T. Wootton of Wootton & Wootton, 
American Fork, for defendant and appel-
lant. 
Craig M. Snyder, Provo, for plaintiff and 
respondent. 
HALL, Justice: 
Defendant John C. Foulger takes this ap-
peal from an order by the trial court grant-
ing plaintiff Heidemarie Foulger's motion 
for modification of a decree of divorce. 
On October 29, 1975, the lower court 
granted the plaintiff a decree of divorce, 
dissolving the parties' marriage of nine 
years. The parties entered into an agree-
ment of settlement, which was adopted by 
the trial court Pursuant to that agree-
ment, and the decree based thereon, plain-
tiff was awarded custody and care of the 
couple's three minor cMIdren, alimony and 
child support payments, and a certain por-
tion of the marital property, including pos-
session of the family residence on conditions 
which led to the instant dispute. Para-
. FOULGER Utah 4 1 3 
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graph 5 of the decree of divorce, taken from 
the couple's settlement agreement, states 
the following: 
5. That plaintiff is hereby awarded all 
right, title and interest in and to the real 
property and residence at 195 North 7th 
East, . . . Subject, however, to a lien on 
said premises in behalf of the defendant 
equal to fifty percent (50%) of the 
amount received from any sale in excess 
of $17,000.00 which is the purchase price 
of said residence. Defendant is further 
awarded a first option to purchase said 
residence in the event of sale and apply 
his equity upon said purchase price. 
Plaintiff is hereby granted the right to 
reside in said residence as long as she so 
desires, but in the event of sale, the above 
formula shall apply. 
On November 21, 1979, defendant was 
served with an order to show cause why the 
original decree of divorce should not be 
modified with regard to those provisions 
dealing with child support and defendant's 
lien on the family residence. The trial 
court heard the matter on December 18, 
1979, at which time plaintiff asserted that 
there had been-a substantial change of cir-
cumstance justifying modification of the 
original divorce decree relating to defend-
ant's lien on the family residence.1 In justi-
fication of this assertion, plaintiff pointed 
out that she had been making payments on 
the residence, together with tax and insur-
ance payments thereon, since the time of 
the divorce without benefit of financial help 
or assistance from defendant; that she had 
been solely responsible for maintenance and 
upkeep on the residence since the decree of 
divorce was issued; that she had made sub-
stantial improvements to the property since 
the divorce, and contemplated further im-
provements, the effect of which would be to 
increase substantially the value of the prop-
erty; and that she no longer contemplated 
returning to her native land of Germany 
with the three minor children, allegedly de-
fendant's motive for imposing the lien con-
dition in the agreement. 
1. The trial court also granted plaintiffs motion 
for an increase in child support payments, from 
which ruling defendant takes no appeal. 
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The court found that paragraph 5 of the 
original decree of divorce was "inherently 
unfair" and that, the motive for the inser-
tion thereof having been obviated, it should 
be modified to grant to defendant a lien on 
the family residence in an amount equal to 
one-half the appreciated value of the home, 
over and above its purchase price as of the 
time of divorce. The purchase price of the 
residence having been $17,000, and valua-
tion thereof at the time of the divorce hav-
ing been $37,000, the modification gave de-
fendant a lien in the amount of $10,000. 
On appeal, defendant asserts that the 
modification of the decree was improper, in 
that (1) plaintiff failed to show a sufficient 
change in circumstances to justify modifica-
tion of the decree, and (2) the property 
disposition in the original decree constituted 
a court-approved stipulation drafted by the 
parties dealing at arm's length without du-
ress or undue influence. We agree, and 
reverse the trial court's ruling. 
[1] Under Utah law, a trial court sitting 
in a divorce matter retains continuing juris-
diction to make such modifications in the 
initial decree of divorce as it deems just and 
equitable.2 Where no appeal is taken from 
the original divorce decree, however, a 
change of circumstances must be shown in 
order to justify a later modification of such 
decree.3 Absent such a requirement, a de-
cree of divorce would be subject to ad infin-
itum appellate review and readjustment ac-
cording to the concepts of equity held by 
succeeding trial judges. 
[2] The change in circumstance required 
to justify a modification of the decree of 
divorce varies with the type of modification 
contemplated. Provisions in the original 
decree of divorce granting alimony, child 
support, and the like must be readily sus-
ceptible to alteration at a later date, as the 
needs which such provisions were designed 
to fill are subject to rapid and unpredicta-
2. U.C.A., 1953, 30-3-5, as amended. 
3. Anderson v. Anderson, 13 Utah 2d 36, 368 
P.2d 264 (1962). 
ble change. Where a disposition of real 
property is in question, however, courts 
should properly be more reluctant to grant 
a modification. In the interest of securing 
stability in titles, modifications in a decree 
of divorce making disposition of real prop-
erty are to be granted only upon a showing 
of compelling reasons arising from a sub-
stantial and material change in circum-
stances.4 
[3] The above holds true a fortiori 
where the property disposition is the prod-
uct of an agreement and stipulation be-
tween the parties, and sanctioned by the 
trial court. Such a provision is the product 
of an agreement bargained for by the par-
ties. As such, a trial court should subse-
quently modify such a provision only with 
great reluctance, and based upon compel-
ling reasons.5 
[4] In the instant case, no such compel-
ling reasons have been shown to exist which 
warrant the modification granted. Matters 
such as payments on the home, and mainte-
nance and upkeep thereof, certainly must 
have been within plaintiffs contemplation 
at the time she agreed to the disposition set 
forth in the original divorce decree. In 
regard to permanent improvements, de-
fendant concedes that he is not entitled to 
share in any increase in value resulting 
therefrom, but only in the enhancement in 
any increase by an accelerated economy. 
The matter of plaintiff's possible departure 
to Germany was, by her own admission, 
never anything more than a remote possi-
bility. The fact that she is now more estab-
lished as a resident of the United States, 
while it further diminishes the likelihood of 
her departure, constitutes no change of cir-
cumstances sufficiently radical to justify 
the trial court's action. 
Reversed and remanded to the trial court 
for further proceedings consistent with this 
5. Despain v. Despain, Utah, 610 P.2d 1303 
(1980); Land v. Land, Utah, 605 P.2d 1248 
(1980). 
4. Callister v. Callister, 1 Utah 2d 34, 261 P.2d 
944 (1953), and cases referred to therein. 
PLEDGER v. COX 
Cite as, Utah, 626 P.2d 415 
opinion. Plaintiffs prayer for attorney's 1. Administrative 
fees is denied, and the parties are to bear 
their own costs. 
Utah 415 
CROCKETT,* and HOWE, JJ., concur. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result. 
MAUGHAN, Chief Justice (concurring in 
the result and dissenting): 
I concur in the result, but refer to my 
dissenting opinions in Despain v. Despain, 
Utah, 610 P.2d 1303, 1307 (1980) and Chris-
tensen v. Christensen, Utah, 619 P.2d 1372 
(1980). 
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Ray PLEDGER, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
S. Tony COX, Director, Drivers License 
Division, Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 16987. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 4, 1981. 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Maurice D. Jones, J. pro tern., up-
held revocation of driver's license, and ap-
peal was taken. The Supreme Court, Oaks, 
J.„ held that statutory "trial de novo" pro-
vided to review administrative revocation 
of driver's license for refusal to submit to 
blood test for alcohol content is a complete 
retrial upon all the evidence, and upon such 
complete retrial, the Drivers License Divi-
sion should have the burden of proof and 
the burden of going forward with the evi-
dence. 
Reversed and remanded for new trial. 
Law and Procedure 
<3=>744 
"De novo" means literally "anew, 
afresh, a second time," and has at least two 
possible interpretations when applied to ju-
dicial review of administrative action: (1) a 
complete retrial upon new evidence, and (2) 
a trial upon the record made before the 
lower tribunal, and the meaning of "trial de 
novo" in each statute is dictated by the 
wording and context of the statute-in which 
it appears and by the nature of the adminis-
trative body, decision and procedure being 
reviewed. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Automobiles e=> 144.2(4) 
Statutory "trial de novo" provided to 
review administrative revocation of driver's 
license for refusal to submit to blood test 
for alcohol content is a complete retrial 
upon all the evidence, and upon such com-
plete retrial, the Drivers License Division 
should have the burden of proof and the 
burden of going forward with the evidence. 
U.C.A.1953, 41-2-19, 41-2-20, 41-6-44.-
10(b). 
3. Automobiles o=> 144.2(4) 
Where review of administrative revoca-
tion of driver's license for refusal to submit 
to blood test for alcohol content was faulted 
by erroneous ground rule about the se-
quence and burden of proof, Supreme Court 
would not speculate about whether the er-
ror was prejudicial but would reverse and 
remand the case to district court for a new 
trial. 
Jo Carol Nesset-Sale, of Salt Lake Legal 
Defenders Association, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and appellant. 
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Bruce M. 
Hale, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and respondent. 
* CROCKETT, J., concurred in this case prior to 
his retirement. 
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Bruno D'Aston, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Dorothy D'Aston, et al. 
Defendant and Appellant, 
AMENDED ORDER DENYING 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 890050-CA 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon 
Appellee's Petition for Rehearing, and Appellant's 
Response to Petition for Rehearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellee's Petition for 
Rehearing is denied. 
Dated this W af day of August, 1990, 
FOR THE COURT 
£2» 
Mary Ty Noonan, Clerk 
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Bruno D'Aston, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Dorothy D'Aston, et al. 
Defendant and Appellant, 
ORDER DENYING PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 890050-CA 
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THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon 
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, filed July 16, 
1990, and Appellee's Response to Petition for Rehearing 
filed Aug. 20, 1990. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellant's Petition for 
Rehearing is denied. 
Dated this <• f[y day of August, 1990. 
FOR THE COURT 
Mary Y. Noonan, Clerk 
